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Abstract
Officer Trust in Army Leadership 
Robert Philip Schloesser 
The purpose of this research was to assess officer tmst in Army leadership during 
the 1998-2000 timefi-ame. Research was prompted by a high rate of junior officer 
resignations, as well as an unprecedented rate of battalion and brigade level declinations 
of command. Qualitative in-depth interviews of 40 officers selected randomly at a 
division installation were accomplished. The respondents represented Army 
demographics fi’om the perspective of rank, branch, race and gender. Eleven issues were 
addressed utilizing a fixed series of questions asked in an open-ended format. Interviews 
were taped and verbatim transcripts prepared and approved by respondents. The issues 
were: zero defects, the new officer efficiency report, operational tempo, women in the 
Army, downsizing implications, reduced retirements (REDUX), Gulf War Syndrome, 
health/dental care, expectations being met, state of morale and attitudes toward senior 
leadership trust and advocacy. In addition to interview responses, relevant commentary 
from 16 of 64 Command and General Staff College Class of 2000 class sections, which 
were generated at the request of General Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff at the time, are 
included. These comments were leaked to a Washington Post reporter who provided 
them to this researcher.
Of the 11 issues assessed, operational tempo was identified as the most significant 
factor prompting officer resignations, low morale and a general sensing across
V
respondents that the senior leadership was out of touch, too politically correct, unable or 
unwilling to say “no” to new commitments and, in general, not advocating for soldiers. 
Seventy-four percent of respondents were negative in regard to the state of morale and 
56% were negative in regard to the trust and advocacy of senior leadership. Health and 
dental care was singled out as being far less than satisfactory. Recommendations for 
future research, as well as recommendations for the Army leadership to consider in order 
to resolve morale issues, are provided.
Wilbur J. Scott, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Sociology, The University of 
Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, was the advisor on this research as well as committee 
chair of the oral examination (dissertation defense). Dr. Scott has been selected as 
Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy for the 2004 calendar 
year.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Introduction
1. Questions and Overview
In this dissertation, I assess, through in-depth interviews and a resulting 
histography, the level of trust that Army officers have in today’s U.S. Army’s leadership, 
both uniformed and civilian. Do Army officers trust implicitly what the Army leadership 
says both verbally and in writing? Do Army officers believe that the leadership tells lies 
by either commission or omission? Does the existence of a zero defects mentality 
(cannot afford a mistake) promote the necessity of making false statements as a survival 
tool? Does the need to be “politically correct” in verbal intercourse cause statements to 
be made that do not accurately portray the real feelings of the leader making the 
statement? Are commanders forced to falsify unit readiness reports? Does the command 
climate of today’s Army condone untruthfulness as a means of obtaining promotion and 
quality assignments? Does being considered a “team player” connote that you will place 
“unit success” above your personal integrity? If any of the answers to these questions are 
“yes,” how widespread is the occurrence in an Officer Corps that bases its culture on 
“Duty, Honor, Country,” and the traditional philosophy that “An officer’s word is his 
bond?” These are crucial questions that are deserving of an answer because they have 
implications related to the national defense and our country’s ability to carry out 
successfully those actions related to the national interest.
Because trust is a critical ingredient, perhaps the most critical, to unit 
cohesiveness, morale and combat readiness, its absence is an extremely serious condition. 
The implications of the absence of trust are possibly lethal to a unit’s ability to go in 
harms way and attain success or even at best survive. When taken to the macro level, 
trust may be considered the characteristic that holds an Army together as it carries out its 
missions related to national interest. Ultimately, survival of the nation as a world power
may rest upon the levels of trust that exist within the leadership of the Army.
2. Background
The Army has been in a constant state of turmoil since the end o f the Cold War 
symbolized by the fall of the Berlin wall (9 November 1989). Subsequent to that historic 
event, a major victory over the Warsaw Pact by the United States and its NATO allies, 
the anticipation existed that world peace was at hand and that a substantial reduction in 
military forces was about to commence. The planned reduction was placed on hold when 
in 1991, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Led by a major deployment of U.S. and allied forces to 
the Persian Gulf, Iraq was expelled from Kuwait and the Iraqi army was routed and 
seriously depleted in a one hundred-day war. Unfortunately, the euphoria of victory was 
quickly dissipated as the economic implications and budget benefits o f a major reduction 
in the size of U.S. forces, to include the Army, became a major government policy 
priority. Army active duty strength was 711,000 in fiscal year 1991. As of 31 May 95, it 
was at 527,520. (Sullivan, p. 456) Subsequent cuts by the Quadrennial Defense dictated 
that Review puts Army strength reach 480,000 by September 30, 2000, (Armv Times, 
November 24,1997, pp. 3-4), in spite of the fact that current Army structure requirements 
are 518,000. In summary. Army strength fell by more than a quarter of a million soldiers 
in nine years. That equates to almost 26,000 soldiers per year who left the Army, many 
against their wishes. The net result of that substantial drawdown was the loss of the 
historical job security that substantially had guaranteed Army service for at least twenty 
years if a soldier did his/her duty. As a result of the new system of competitive survival 
whereby any discriminator could become the cause of selection for separation, it appears 
to be a natural phenomenon that self preservation and a “me first” attitude could result. 
Such a cancer eating could, oftentimes invisibly, eat at the heart of the Army ethic that 
had been a key to success in both peace and war. Trust is a critical element o f the Army 
ethic. Trust in Army leadership is the cement that holds the Army together.
An assessment of that trust level is a worthwhile endeavor. It has genuine value
to the Army leadership and to those who understand the necessity of maintaining a 
cohesive, combat ready Army that must be able to win on the battlefield. A schematic of 
the dissertation issues is at Table 1. (See next page)
Table 1
Dissertation Framework Issues
I Downsizing l 
Reduced Funding
Forced Departures/Career Disruptions 
Zero-Defects Environments
Officer Perceptions 
' No Advocacy 
’ Denial Problems 
Lack o f Truth/Candor 
Too Much “Can Do”
End of Cold War Lingering, Unresolved 
Women in Military Problems
New Missions *1 
Mission Creep/Gallop 
Repeated Deployments
Other Issues:
Reduced Health Care 
Reduced Retirement 
Gulf War Syndrome Controversy 
Personnel and Parts Shortages 
Adverse Command Climate Surveys 
Inconsistent Discipline revelations 
Do More with Less
Heightened Concern 
for
Public Image
Officer Reactions 
Cynicism
Don’t Rock the Boat 
No Bad News Expected 
Falsify Readiness Reports 
Bend the Truth 
Low Morale
Won’t Make Bold Decision 
Can’t Make Mistakes
3. Definitions
Army ethic: FM 100-1 (1986, August) states:
The professional Army ethic articulates our values, and applies to all members o f 
the Army, active and reserve. The ethic sets the moral context for the Army in its 
service to the nation and inspires the sense of purpose necessary to preserve the 
nation even by the use of military force. From the moral values of the 
Constitution to the harsh realities of the battlefield, the professional Army ethic 
espouses resolutely those essential values that guide the way we live our lives and 
perform our duties, (p. 22)
Army officer: A person commissioned into the United States Army with the 
grade (rank) of 0-1 (second lieutenant) to 0-10 (four star general) including all branches, 
all sources of commission, male and female.
Candor: “Forthrightness (straightforward).” (Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate 
Dictionary. 1971). Warren Bennis in On Becoming a Leader (1989) states:
FM 100-1 (1986, August) states:
Candor “is honesty and fidelity to the truth. There is no time in combat to verify 
reports, question the accuracy of information or wonder about the reliability of 
equipment. Consequences are too important, and time too short, to communicate 
anything but the truth - peoples’ lives are at stake. Candor is not essential only in  
combat. Soldiers at all times demand honesty and candor from themselves and 
from their fellow soldiers. Otherwise, we will not be able to live up to the Army 
ethic, (p. 23)
Command climate: DA Regulation 600-100 (1994) defines command climate as:
The trend of fundamental concepts and attitudes that are present within a 
command, unit, organization; a measure of the comfort, confidence and prevailin.g 
mood and spirit among the soldiers/officers within a unit or the Army as an 
institution; the level of faith in the leadership by both individual soldiers/officers 
and the organization as a group; the prevailing quality of thought and attitude, (p. 
21)
Honesty:
Fairness and straightforwardness of conduct: INTEGRITY; adherence to the 
facts: SINCERITY. Synonyms: Honor, Integrity, and Probity mean uprightness 
of character or action. Honesty implies a refusal to lie, cheat or steal or deceive in
any way; honor suggests an active or anxious regard for the standards o f one’s 
profession or calling, or position; integrity implies trustworthiness and 
incorruptibility to a degree that one is incapable of being false to a trust, 
responsibility or pledge; probity implies tried and proven honesty or integrity. 
(Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. 1971) Integrity:
An unimpaired condition: Soundness; adherence to a code of moral, 
artistic or other values; the quality or state of being complete or undivided: 
COMPLETENESS.” (Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. 1971). 
“Integrity is the basis of trust, which is not as much an ingredient of leadership as 
it is a product. It is the one quality that cannot be acquired, but must be earned. It 
is given by co-workers and followers, and without it, the leader can’t function. 
(Bennis, 1989, p. 41)
Is the thread woven through the fabric of the professional Army ethic? 
Integrity means honesty, uprightness and the avoidance of deception. It also 
means steadfast adherence to standards of behavior. Integrity demands a 
commitment to act according to other values of the Army ethic. It is the basis for 
the trust and confidence that must exist among members of the Army. Further, 
integrity is demonstrated by propriety in our personal lives. Integrity means that 
our personal standards must be consistent with the professional values we 
espouse. To compromise personal integrity means to break the bonds of trust 
upon which leadership relies. (FMI00-1. August 1986, p. 23)
Trust:
Assured reliance on the character, ability, strength or truth of someone or 
something; one in which confidence is placed. (Webster’s Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary. 1971).
The underlying issue in leading by voice is trust - in fact, I believe that 
trust is the underlying issue in not only getting people on your side, but having 
them stay there. There are four ingredients leaders have that generate and sustain 
trust:
1. Constancy: Whatever surprises leaders themselves may face, they don’t create 
any for the group. Leaders are all of a piece; they stay the course.
2. Congruity: Leaders walk their talk. In true leaders, there is no gap between 
the theories they espouse and the life they practice.
3. Reliability: Leaders are there when it counts; they are ready to support their 
co-workers in the moments that matter.
4. Integrity: Leaders honor their commitments and promises. (Bennis, 1989, p. 
160)
B. Purpose of the Study
The objective of this study is to add to the body of knowledge regarding the state 
of trust that the Officer Corps has in the U. S. Army leadership. Specifically the research 
is designed to augment, through one on one in-depth interviews of a representative group 
of officers, statistical data already collected by the Army. Three critical data collection 
efforts undertaken by the Army were the 1995 Command Climate Survey of 24,000 
subjects, the 1997 Leadership and Professionalism Survey of 4,065 subjects to include 5 
percent of the Officer Corps and the Fall 1998 Sample Survey of Military Personnel 
which included responses from 4,705 officers. The array of indicators addressed in the 
introduction and background as well as literature review portions o f this prospectus 
combined with discussions with a number of active and recently retired officers indicate 
that there are perceptions that problems may exist within the ethical practices and 
decisions of Army leadership. A question of honesty and forthrightness within the 
leadership and a resulting denigration of trust of those in charge seems to exist.
The qualitative in-depth interview methodology used by this research was 
designed to develop a rich mosaic that provides the human perspective necessary to 
augment the statistical results of Command Climate Surveys. There are varying levels o f  
passion regarding the trust issue that seems to exist within the Army. Those passions and 
the stories associated with them are, from this researcher’s perspective, critical to 
determining if a problem exists and if one does its scope.
Ultimately, my objective is to provide copies of the dissertation to the senior 
leadership of the Army for their consideration. Additionally, my intent is to develop a 
seminar workshop program that addresses and teaches Army values and its ethic and the 
criticality of employing trust and the “rules of the Army leadership game” in day-to-day 
living both on and off duty.
C. Importance of the Study
This study is important today because the Army is being stretched to its maximum
as it meets demands of national interest across the world. As deployments away from 
home base for periods of six months or more become a regular occurrence, morale tends 
to suffer. Deployments, normally in peacekeeping missions can result in deterioration of 
war fighting skills and combat readiness. Additionally, with sixty three percent of the 
Army married (Army Times. May 12,1997, p. 18) constant family separation may add to 
stress and reduced morale of both the deployed soldier and the effected family. As 
individual soldier stresses increase, regression toward more basic needs occurs 
challenging reliance upon accepted ethical standards. Additionally, as retaining 
experienced officers in the army may become a significant challenge as well.
A number of indicators reflect that the Army may be in trouble. Those indicators 
are illustrated by a series of less than complimentary events and situations reported in the 
press. Among the more noteworthy was the February 1998 court martial of the 
Command Sergeant Major of the Army for sexual harassment and obstruction of justice, 
the September 1999 overnight retirement as a brigadier general of the Deputy Inspector 
General. Major General David Hale under investigation for allegedly forcing a 
subordinate’s wife to have sex with him, as well as the 1996 sexual scandals at the 
training base at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and other training bases. Additionally, the 
failure of the Army to address with complete candor the exposure to toxic chemicals of 
Gulf War combatants in spite of thousands of cries for medical assistance gained national 
interest. Manpower shortages exacerbated by significant numbers of experienced 
soldiers departing the Army, as well as alleged cover-ups of equipment readiness and 
serious soldier shortfalls in deployable units added to the image of an Army with 
problems. That series of reports in the media had a tendency reflect adversely upon 
Army leadership and its effectiveness in maintaining a high morale, combat ready force.
The perception of this researcher, along with others who are similarly loyal and 
concerned supporters, is that the Army is in trouble. More importantly, it appears to be 
an Army in trouble that seems unwilling to look objectively and critically at itself. That
perception is created by the lack of evidence to the contrary, available to the public that 
could refute the plethora of bad press. Such a situation is dangerous since like an 
alcoholic, who is unable to attain sobriety until he recognizes his illness and publicly 
professes it, the Army leadership appears to be in a state of denial, consistently looking at 
the bright side and ignoring the growing maladies that seem to exist.
It is important for readers to understand that the Army leadership oftentimes may 
include both Department of Army and Department of Defense government career 
civilians and political appointees. This group is referred to as the military-civilian 
leadership. Major policy and operating philosophy begin with the politically-appointed 
civilian Secretary of Defense and his Assistant Secretaries along with the politically- 
appointed civilian Secretary of the Army and his/her appointed-civilian assistants. It is 
normal for soldiers to expect that the four-star general. Army Chief o f Staff, as their 
leader, will be their advocate and the buffer between them and the civilian hierarchy.
This study does not intend to assess the honesty of the Army leadership. Rather, 
it is to measure the perceptions regarding the degree of trust of Army leadership that the 
Officer Corps possesses at this point in Army history.
Those that lead the Army as uniformed members are dedicated to service to our 
nation. Many have risked their lives in combat as they advanced through the ranks. Some 
are recognized heroes who have led and fought with distinction and bravery in combat. 
This researcher does not question the personal honesty of those in leadership although 
some may have rationalized their core beliefs as they attempted to protect the public 
image of the Army. Washing dirty linen outside of the organization or admitting that 
misstatements or mistakes were made is sometimes difficult. The resistance to such 
actions can sometimes result in honest men and women going into a state of denial. The 
latter may be far more dangerous to the health of an organization than the former.
In summary, the state of trust in the Army leadership is an important, if not 
critical, current national defense issue that deserves to be studied and conclusions 
reached.
D. Extent of the Study
The central focus of this study was to investigate and assess the perceptions of 
Army officers in regard to their level of trust in their leadership. The dissertation itself 
addresses five related areas of inquiry: (a) the Army ethic as articulated in a myriad of 
Army publications both official and unofficial; (b) history of the Army ethic and the 
importance of trust, integrity and candor in its more than two hundred years of existence; 
(c) current alleged and confirmed failures in Army leadership to be totally forthcoming 
that were significant enough to become major news stories; (d) officer perceptions of 
trust in their leadership as determined through in-depth interviews across an array of 
active duty officers; (e) implications and effects of leadership failures on Army morale, 
retention and readiness.
This study took place within the Army culture itself, seen through the eyes of a 
retired army colonel with 27 years of service. Army policy and Army history regarding 
ethics and values were used as the standard against which today’s levels o f trust in 
leadership will be measured.
A review of journals, military oriented periodicals and print media in general, has 
been accomplished over the past several years. That review substantiates the perception 
that serious problems appear to exist today within the Army and its leadership. Other 
Army and government sources to include reports and papers from the Pentagon, West 
Point, the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College have 
also provided important contributions to this dissertation.
Lofland and Lofiand (1995) provide a comprehensive guide to qualitative
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observation, and analysis in their book, Analyzing Social Settings. The three major
activities addressed are gathering, focusing and analyzing data. These authors emphasize
the need for the researcher to find a research study that is “personally meaningful,” and
that you must be “emotionally engaged” in your work. These two characteristics provide
the framework for the naturalistic or fieldwork approach to social research. They go on
to emphasize that the researcher’s goal is to collect the richest possible data.
Additionally, they advise:
The naturalistic penchant for direct observation and apprehension of the social 
world reflects a certain epistemology, that is, a theory of knowledge. The central 
tenets of this theory are (1) the face-to-face interaction is the fullest condition of 
participating in the mind of another human being, and (2) you must participate in 
the mind of another human being (in sociological terms “take the role of the 
other”) to acquire social knowledge . . .  You will note that nowhere in the 
preceding paragraphs have we said anything about “objectivity” and “distance.” 
Quite the contrary, we have exhorted the researchers to
* collect the richest possible data.
* achieve intimate familiarity with the setting, and
* engage in face-to-face interaction so as to participate in the minds of the 
settings participants. That is, we have counseled involvement and enmeshment 
rather than objectivity and distance . . .  (1995, pp. 16-17)
Finally, Lofland and Lofland admonish the researcher to ask “activist” questions
that approach and develop data using two questions:
1. “What is the situation being dealt with?
2. What strategies are being employed in dealing with that situation?” (1995, p. 146).
Bruce Berg, in Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, states in hi s 
preface:
The book’s central purpose remains a desire to instruct inexperienced researchers 
in ways of effectively collecting, organizing and making sense from qualitative 
data (1995, p. ix). Berg spends time in differentiating between quantitative and 
qualitative research and the value of each. He emphasizes that qualitative 
research refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, 
symbols and descriptions of things while quantitative research refers to counts 
and measures of things . . .  clearly certain experiences cannot be meaningfully 
expressed by numbers. (1995, p.3)
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The emphasis of Berg is on the human element within a social setting and how 
humans make sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, 
social roles, and so forth. The theme that unites all of the pieces of symbolic interaction 
is the focus on subjective understandings, as well as perceptions about people, symbols 
and objects.
The admonition and guidance contained in both texts as addressed above provide 
both the cognitive and philosophical framework that this researcher has employed in his 
research.
E. Context of the Study
The setting is the United States Army. Uniformed officers, serving in an active 
army division were interviewed.
The Army as an institution is a solid example of a culturally diverse team working 
together successfully. The U.S. Army has been a driving force in managing diversity. 
Therefore, a conscious effort to include a representative number of minority members in 
the interview process has taken place. An additional factor that has been considered is 
the high percentage of married soldiers. The sustained rate of deployments for the Army 
has remained high. Following the Desert Storm defeat of Iraq in 1991, the Army was 
eventually reduced to a force of 480,000. The net result is that a relatively small Army, 
as compared to Cold War days, continues to be committed to an ongoing open-ended 
series of mission deployments around the world. Some, like Bosnia, and Kosovo as well, 
and the Sinai peace keeping commitments, have become long term missions that strain 
family relationships, create uncertainty and in general have an adverse impact upon 
morale and ultimately retention of trained professionals. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and 
the current peacekeeping efforts adds to the mission with no increase in end strength.
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A state of turmoil and uncertainty appear to exist within the Army today. That
condition may be driven not only by constant deployments, but also a leadership climate
that is in the words o f a recent Army Chief of Staff is “abysmal.” General Reimer, in a
1995 white paper, stated the following which is an alarming description of the context
that environment prompted, in part, this research;
The state of ethical conduct is abysmal. Few battalion commanders can afford 
integrity in a zero defect environment. Telling the truth ends careers quicker than 
making mistakes or getting caught doing something wrong. I have seen many 
good officers slide into ethical compromise. (1995, Reimer, p.3). General Reimer 
goes on to conclude: Leaders create command climate - positive leadership can 
eliminate micro-management, careerism, integrity violations and the zero defects 
mind-set. (1995 Reimer, p. 14)
The context of this research, therefore, has been an Army that is hopefully 
recovering firom the serious leadership shortcomings that were so pervasive to cause the 
senior leader of the Army to address them publicly. Unfortunately, little has been 
published on the subject since 1995 and General Reimer’s White Paper, which saw very 
limited distribution and is extremely difficult to find. Instead, the standard official army 
or DOD release on anything controversial, such as historically high resignations of junior 
officers, is that “the problem is fixed or about to be fixed.” It is worth noting that the 
number of “leaks” of army reports and briefings that address problem areas has grown 
significantly. From this researcher’s perspective, the “leakers” are well meaning officers 
who sense the senior leadership’s hesitancy to address serious problems and as a result 
gamble their careers in hope that someone in authority outside the army will notice and 
take action. Some of the most revealing information that became available to the media 
and this research was “leaked.”
F: Review of Literature:
This dissertation relied upon leadership texts, published books about Army 
leaders, articles on Army leadership and leadership problems cited in military journals
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and military oriented newspapers (weekly and daily), Army manuals, pamphlets, 
circulars, regulations and related publications as well as special reports and studies that 
address Army leadership and leadership issues. Additionally, as appropriate, 
congressional publications, to include committee reports, newsmagazines and the popular 
press provided important information and leads to other sources.
Major emphasis was placed upon stories that have appeared in the Armv Times. 
an independent weekly with a predominantly military readership and the European 
edition of The Stars and Stripes, “an authorized unofficial publication for members of the 
military services overseas” (The Stars and Stripes masthead). The commander/publisher 
is typically an Army colonel who reports to the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, 
Germany.
Archival records, both public and private, were a source of data/information for 
this research. Maximum use of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provisions were 
utilized in order to obtain pertinent data and reports that may be restricted by the Army 
and the Department of Defense (DOD) for release to the general public. It is worth noting 
that the processing period for obtaining information under FOIA is long and tedious as 
well as oftentimes ftrustrating. Maximum utilization of commercial printed media 
accounts was employed since the ferreting out of leadership trust issues in today’s Army 
is difficult and often not published in books because of the time factor associated with 
publishing. Army leadership issues are current events.
Official Army Publications: There is great value in establishing what Army 
publications state in relation to the professional Army ethic in general and trust in 
particular. Those statements are designed to establish with great clarity and as policy the 
personal and professional standards to which Army officers and senior commissioned
14
officers are to adhere and to practice in carrying out their duties both in peace and war. 
This dissertation assesses how well officers perceive their leaders’ success in adhering to 
and practicing what they have committed to do in regard to those Army ethics and value 
standards.
Field Manual 100-1. The Armv. August 1996, among its descriptions of the roles 
and precepts of the Army defines the professional Army ethic and individual values. The 
manual states;
A profession is a calling, which demands of its members, specialized knowledge 
and skills, established ethical and professional standards and intensive preparation 
as a profession dealing with the very survival of the nation. The Army requires its 
members to embrace a professional ethic. The professional Army ethic articulates 
our values, and applies to all members ...the professional Army ethic espouses 
resolutely those essential values that guide the way we live our lives and perform 
our duties, (p. 22)
The manual goes on to address the values of loyalty, duty, selfless service, 
commitment, competence, candor and courage:
It is of value to the readers of this dissertation to understand what the manual 
states regarding candor. “Candor is honesty and fidelity to the truth . . .  soldiers must at 
all times demand honesty and candor from themselves and from their fellow soldiers” (p. 
2 3 ).
Army Regulation 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reporting Svstem. dated October
1997, and effective on that date, makes some significant changes to the officer evaluation
reporting system (OERS). As the revised regulation is reviewed from a perspective of
measuring honesty, it is important to be aware of the fact that it states;
The information provided on the OER, combined with the Army’s needs and 
individual officer qualifications, is used as a basis for personnel actions. Included 
are promotion, elimination, retention in grade, retention on active duty, reduction 
in force, command selection, school selection, assignment, specialty designation, 
and RA (Regular Army) integration, (p.2)
In summary, it is the most important document in an officer’s professional career
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and development since it defines forever his/her performance and potential.
Of specific interest to this dissertation is the absence of the word TRUST on the 
Officer Evaluation Form (DA Form 67-9, Oct 97). There are, however, under block I Va 
“Army Values” several yes-no measurements that are somewhat related to Trust: “1. 
Honor: adherence to the Army’s publicly declared code of values, 2. Integrity:
Possesses high personal moral standards; honest in word and deed.” Several other rating 
blocks relate somewhat to trust but are not straightforward. Specifically, under block b.2 
“Conceptual: Demonstrates sound judgment, critical/creative thinking, moral reasoning” 
and block b.3 “Building: Spends time and resources improving teams, groups and units; 
fosters ethical climate.”
It is important to note that a new Junior Officer Developmental Support Form 
(JODSF), DA Form 67-9-la, has been added to the evaluation system. This form is 
limited to use with lieutenants and warrant officers (WOI). Its purpose “is to assist in the 
rapid, equal, and fair transition and professional development o f Army junior officers.
The concept is to drive development and integrate it with performance” (1997, p. 14).
The purpose of the form is to cause a regular interaction between rated officer and rater to 
guide performance and development, to record progress, and to adjust/update 
developmental tasks. The Army Values of honor and integrity, with the same 
explanations found on the OER (DA Form 67-9), are included as part of the “Character” 
explanation. They are present on the form to be discussed and understood. Under the 
“Improving” portion of the form, “Building,” with the explanation: “Develops effective, 
disciplined, cohesive, team built on bonds of mutual trust, respect and confidence.
Fosters ethical climate” is present and required to be addressed by the rater. The form 
has three separate assessment blocks that require the initials of both the rated officer and 
rater and the date of counseling. Key points discussed are to be recorded on the form.
The DA Form 67-9-la other than for approval of the initial “Developmental Action Plan.” 
is not seen again by the senior rater. It is used solely by the rated officer and the rater to
16
complete the OER Support Form which becomes the actual basis for the OER process 
developmental plan and eventual rating.
Critical to the entire evaluation process are periodic face-to-face discussions 
between the rated officer and the rater. A case can be made that the first element o f trust 
building with a junior officer will be rater compliance with the requirement to conduct 
the periodic counselings in a meaningful manner. That process, if followed as prescribed, 
may be a major factor in building trust between the rated and rating officers involved as 
well as the professional development of the officer involved. Unfortunately, the 
experience of this researcher reflects that after the initial emphasis on mandated 
counseling passes, it eventually becomes a time consuming chore that just does not get 
done for varying reasons. The carrying out of the counseling process as required by the 
regulation has the potential for becoming an ethical and trust issue itself, if not followed. 
Since the recording of the counselings are required for junior officers on both the DA 
Form 67-9-la and DA Form 67-9, and for all officers on the DA Form 67-9, the first test 
o f integrity, honesty and ultimately trust will be the actual performance of the prescribed 
counselings in the time frames dictated rather than falsifying of the forms at rating time 
to meet the regulatory requirement.
One item in this researcher’s array of interview questions is the assessment of 
compliance with the counseling requirement. This can prove to be a good measure of the 
integrity of the officer population charged with making the counseling process work as 
prescribed. Timely counseling is a key part of the mentoring process of subordinate 
officers.
Leadership Texts and Related Publications: Warren Bennis, Distinguished Professor 
o f Business Administration at the University of California, has addressed the relationship 
of leadership and trust in several of his books. When discussing the lessons learned from
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great groups in Organizing Genius. Bennis and Biederman, state: “The leader has to be
worthy of the group. He or she must warrant the respect of people who may have greater
genius . . .  Great Groups don’t require their leaders to be saints. But they do expect them
to be absolutely trustworthy where the project is concerned” (1997, pp. 200-201). In his
book, Leaders-Strategies for Taking Charge, written with Burt Nanus, Bennis points out
“Leaders have failed to instill vision, meaning and trust in their followers. They have
failed to empower them” (1997, pp. 7-8). Further, Bennis, in discussing his four
strategies or competencies that he found in studying ninety successful leaders lists, as
Strategy III, “Trust Through Positioning.” He goes on to explain:
Trust is the lubrication that makes it possible for organizations to work. It’s hard 
to imagine an organization without some semblance of trust operating somehow 
somewhere. An organization, without trust, is more an anomaly; it’s a misnomer 
of Kafka’s imagination. Trust implies accountability, predictability, and 
reliability.. Trust is the glue that maintains organizational integrity. (1997, p. 41)
In discussing five key leadership skills, Bennis notes:
The ability to trust others, even if  the risk seems great, a withholding of trust is 
often necessary for self protection. But the price is too high if  it means always 
being on guard, constantly suspicious of others. Even an overdose of trust that at 
times involves the risk of being deceived or disappointed is wiser, in the long run, 
than taking it for granted that most people are incompetent or sincere. (1997,
p.62)
Bennis, in his book. On Becoming a Leader, addresses the basics that all
successful leaders share. He addresses trust in the following manner:
Integrity is the basis of trust, which is not as much an ingredient of leadership as it 
is a product. It is the one quality that cannot be acquired, but must be earned. It 
is given by co-workers and followers, and without it, the leader can’t function. 
(1989, p.41)
He goes on to state:
Leaders who trust their co-workers, in turn are trusted by them. Trust, of course, 
cannot be acquired, but can only be given. Leadership without trust is a
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contradiction in terms. (1989, p. 140)
Perhaps most insightful as Bennis discusses “getting people on your side” are four 
ingredients that generate and sustain trust:
1. Constancy. Whatever surprises leaders themselves may face, they don’t create 
any for the group. Leaders are all of a piece; they stay the course.
2. Congruitv. Leaders walk their talk. In true leaders, there is no gap between 
the theories they espouse and the life they practice.
3. Reliability. Leaders are there when it counts; they are ready to support their 
co-workers in the moments that matter.
4. Integrity. Leaders honor their commitments and promises. (1989, p. 160) 
Bennis sums up the power of trust or the lack of it in the corporate culture when
he concludes:
If there is anything that undermines trust, it is the feeling that the people at the top 
lack integrity, are without a solid sense of ethics. The characteristics of empathy 
and trust are reflected not just in a code of ethics, but in organizational cultures 
that support ethical conduct. (1989, p. 164)
Controlled Publications: The use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a
required tool in obtaining some studies and reports from the U.S. Army and its
subordinate agencies. Command Climate Assessments prepared by the Army Research
Institute (ARI) are an excellent example. A small pamphlet written by the former Chief
of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer, entitled. Leadership for the 21st Century:
Empowerment. Environment and the General Rule (undated, circa 1995), states that it is
based upon an ARI command climate assessment which was “based on responses from
more than 24,000 Active, Reserve and National Guard soldiers and Aviators.” When this
researcher attempted to obtain the referenced survey and its conclusions from ARI that
General Reimer cites, I was advised: “the materials referred to are controlled by General
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Reimer. Only he authorizes release.” Eventually, the researcher was provided an ARI 
prepared three page executive summary of Armv Assessment of Command Climate (May 
1996). As an illustration of how different conclusions can be obtained from the same 
1995 Command Climate Assessment, the executive summary concludes:
Oualitv: Today’s quality is good.
Leader Development: Leaders are good: concern exists about zero defects and
command climate.
Armv Environment: There is a strong sense of belonging and commitment to the
Army, but concern that quality of life will decrease in the future. (May 1996)
That glowing report appears to be somewhat misleading and perhaps reflects an 
unwillingness to publicize internal problems. This researcher’s conclusion is based upon 
General Reimer’s very different assessment o f the same survey published in bis white 
paper. General Reimer’s assessment was “The state of ethical conduct is abysmal.” 
Clearly bis statement of alarm is far different than the bland summary comments from the 
ARI executive summary. Of concern to this researcher is the questionable value of the 
ARI summary to those officers who are serving and who may sense it as not factual and 
therefore misleading.. Perhaps of greater concern is that when the summary is read by 
the leadership, who are very busy people, the assumption may be that all is well with the 
Army and that no action by the leadership is required.
The conclusion from this particular experience with the ARI Survey and its 
interpretation is that perseverance on the part of the researcher in obtaining all available 
data from the Army itself is an absolute necessity. It also points out the value of 
employing qualitative histographic research through face-to-face interviews in order to 
assess the human perceptions of the honesty/candor issue from those who actually serve 
in today’s Army.
It is significant that General Reimer, in his F Y 98 United States Armv Posture 
Statement (Feb 1997) presented to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives titled
20
Soldiers are our Credentials, included the following comments;
“Since FY89, the Army’s buying power is down 39%, active duty strength is
down 36% and Army missions are up by a factor of 16” (p. xi).
“This strain of these circumstances has not only reduced the modernization
budget but also required greater sacrifices from soldiers who spend longer periods
deployed away from home” (p. xi).
“Increasingly our people are feeling the uncertainty of continued or rumored
reductions and increased missions” (p. xi).
“Since 1989 while conducting a broad range of missions, the Army has reduced
end strength by 469,000 soldiers and 15,000 Army civilians.”
“The future of America’s Army is rooted in its values” (p. 49).
Readiness problems are addressed in a 4 January 1999 Armv Times article by
Sean Naylor titled. Readiness: more than a can-do spirit. Naylor made the following
salient points:
* Army readiness has been in a steady decline since the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
* The Balkans commitment since January 1996, originally a one year mission, has 
been extended indefinitely.
* Several Army generals to include Major General Keith Kellog, commander 82*^ 
Airborne Division, and Lieutenant General David Heebner, Assistant Vice Chief 
of Staff, spoke out publicly about budget shortfalls and problems in manning the 
Balkans.
* Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre caused an investigation to be conducted 
to determine if the Army was illegally lobbying Congress to increase its slice o f 
the defense budget.
* A leaked memo to Defense Secretary William Cohen from then Acting Army 
Secretary Mike Walker dated 22 May predicted a “failure characterized by 
deteriorating facilities, aging weapons systems and declining readiness . . .  We are 
now convinced . . .  That Army programs will fall short of providing a trained, 
ready and modem Army into the next century, (p. 12)
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* That the optimistic publie statements of “many senior Army leaders and their 
spokesmen” repeated again and again by officers in the Pentagon in spite o f other 
reports citing readiness problems, “have helped widen the substantial credibility 
gap that exists between the Army’s senior leadership and the rank and file. (p.
13)
* Sergeant Major of the Army Robert E. Hall acknowledged that in his visits with 
troops he hears complaints about “careerism in the Officer Corps” and that 
“soldiers’ perceptions are that their leaders are looking up, not looking down. (p. 
13)
Communications/Leadership Publications: Steven Beebe and John Masterson, in their 
book. Communicating in Small Groups, make several statements that address the 
criticality of trust in small group communication:
1. . . .  developing trust takes time.
2. . . .  the degree of trust you have in others affects your relationships with them.
3. . . .  trust then develops when you can predict how another person will behave 
under certain circumstances.
4. . . .  trust helps you reduce uncertainty as you form expectations of others.
(1997, p. 92)
5. Trust is always a risk, a kind of leap in the dark . . .  trust is always a gamble. 
(1997, p. 92, quoted from Richard Reichert, Self Awareness through Group 
Dvnamics. 1970)
Cultural Diversity/Ethics Publications: Dr. George Henderson, in Cultural Diversitv in  
the Workplace, addresses trust as a key ingredient to managing diversity and change.
“One goal of a healthy organization is to develop open communication, mutual trust, and 
confidence in management” (1994, p. 4, quoted firom Richard Beckhard (1969). When 
discussing the planning strategies for instituting a diversity effort, Henderson makes his 
number one factor: “to build trust among all employees” (1994, p. 225). He concludes 
his book by stating: “Trust and respect are the essential characteristics of successful 
managers and supervisors they teach diversity by living it” (1994, p. 230).
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William D. Hitt in Ethics and Leadership highlights the criticality of trust when he
states;
Assuming that leadership is conducive to an organizational climate promoting 
ethical conduct, then the direct effect is the building of trust. Thus, we agree with 
those astute observers of organization behavior who view trust as the “miracle 
ingredient” - the bond that holds the organization together . , .  everything else 
equal, those organizations that generate trust are much more likely to achieve 
long-term success than those organizations that fail to generate trust. (1990, p. 2)
Hitt emphasizes the power of leaders when he repeats: “leaders are persons who
are able to influence others; this influence helps to establish the organizational climate for
ethical conduct; the ethical conduct generates trust; and trust contributes substantially to
the long-term success of the organization” (1990, p. 3). Several other comments by Hitt
bear heavily on the subject of trust:
“.... because of failure to generate trust, this manager will ultimately fail,” (1990,
p. 37).
“The principal consequence of Machiavellian leadership (master of manipulation) 
is that it leads to a lack of trust. Without trust, there can be no genuine relationship 
between leader and follower. And without a genuine relationship between leader and 
follower, there can be no effective leadership. We may very well find short-term gains 
but long-term disasters” (1990, p. 145).
“Most important is that the effective leader-manager is a person of integrity. This 
is the spark that casts the light. And, through the generation of trust, this is the spark that 
contributes to long-term success” (1990, pp. 171-2).
Hitt concludes his thesis by stating:
In summary we have defined leadership in terms of relationship between leader 
and follower - this relationship is based upon trust and trust is generated by being 
a person of integrity. The hallmark of the entire process is authenticity. The 
causal chain can be elucidated in terms of a syllogism:
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* Trust is required for effective leadership.
* Without personal integrity, there can be no mutual trust.
* Therefore, without personal integrity, there can be no effective 
leadership. (1990, p. 206)
Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler and Tipton, in The Good Societv. as they
address the vocabulary of morality and specifically responsibility state:
Two aspects of responsibility go beyond purely sociological description: One is 
trust, and the other is the scope of the responsible action to which we are called. 
T rust.. . Because of previous experiences, a degree of mistrust, is usually 
realistic; yet if we are dominated by mistrust we cannot attend or interpret 
adequately, we cannot act accountably and we will rupture, not strengthen, the 
solidarity of the community or communities we live in. (p. 284)
Military Related Periodicals: The following array of information, assessments and
situations that have attracted media attention are pertinent to this study: Deterioration of
trust and confidence of and within the military in general, and the Army specifically,
appears to be a topic worthy of deeper study. Regardless of possible internal problems,
however, the military has continuously remained as the top institution from a public
confidence perspective.
A Louis Harris and Associates poll of 1,005 adults conducted in January 1997 on.
public confidence in the leadership of national institutions revealed that the index of
public confidence based on all answers fell from 47% in 1996 to 42%. The largest drop
in confidence is the military - although it continues to top the confidence list, at 37%. It
was 46% in 1996 and 43% in 1995. No other institution slipped more than 3 percentage
points, making the military’s ten point drop substantial” (Retired Officer’s Magazine.
September 97, p. 25). The Armv Times of 20 December 1999 in an article. Confidence
in Military, reported that a June 1998 Gallup poll of the general public indicated that 64%
registered a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military, (p. 1) However,
the Wall Street Journal on 14 December 2000 reported that “according to the latest poll
for the Wall Street Journal and NBC News taken 7-10 December 2000:
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“70% had a great deal/quite a bit of confidence in the military.” The next highest 
was small business at 59%, federal government at 28% and Congress at 26%.” (p. 1)
The zero defects Army continues to prevail as identified by General Reimer,
Chief of Staff of the Army, in his 1995 White Paper. An editorial in the 4 Aug 97 Army 
Times, states:
The general mentality is that soldiers who have committed some infraction or who 
have had an article 15 (non-judicial punishment) cannot be quality soldiers. I 
have observed that young soldiers in particular feel that there is no recovery from 
an honest mistake or an Article 15 ... We don’t give second chances anymore, (p. 
19)
The 1998 Defense Authorization Act signed into law by President Clinton on 
November 18,1997, included leadership standards for all services. Those standards, 
which have been a historical and long-standing part of serving as an officer in the 
military, are now part of the law of the land. According to the 22 December 1997 Armv 
Times. “The Senate Armed Services Committee, which reviews officer conduct to 
confirm appointments and promotions of officers pushed for the wider application of 
officer standards after finding that some of today’s officers lack leadership qualities.”
One Senate aide who worked the provision was quoted in response to a question by the 
Armv Times reporter “what we are seeing is a general denigration of leadership in which 
people turn their heads to problems rather than facing them head on. That is not what 
leaders are supposed to do . . . ” “There is nothing wrong with reminding officers about 
the responsibilities of command, although you might wonder why this is necessary” (p.
9).
It is worth noting that the examples set by President Clinton as Commander in 
Chief o f the armed forces have not always met the standards set by this act. In an Armv 
Times editorial (4 August 1997) the writer addressed with a glowing review, the new 
Army Chief of Staff guide entitled “Leadership and change in a values-based Army.”
The guide addressed the seven Army values. However, the editorial went on to address
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the current values climate as seen through the eyes of 40 enlisted soldiers who were 
interviewed. “They talked time and time again about falsifying reports and how difficult 
it is to put duty to country before duty to family.. .  It was not from Army preaching or 
lecturing but from daily experience of life in the ranks” (p. 19).
An Armv Times (17 Nov 1997) editorial addressed the corrosive effect of the 
ongoing high OPTEMPO (Operation Tempo) of today’s Army. The article cited the 
average time for today’s soldier to be away from home is almost five months per year and 
concludes “The Army has too many demands and too few people. It is unlikely the 
number of people is going to increase. So someone needs to rethink them . . .  If this 
doesn’t happen soon, this stressed force may become a broken one” (p. 20).
In an Armv Times commentary (25 May 1998) George C. Wilson, a former 
national defense correspondent of The Washington Post and author of several books on 
military affairs addressed perceived flaws in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 
its two-war strategy. Wilson discussed the QDR with General Ronald R. Fogelman, 
former Chief of Staff at the Air Force who retired from his job in protest against 
Secretary of Defense Cohen’s demands to punish officers for the Khobar Towers 
bombing in Saudi Arabia. According to General Fogelman, “Nobody but nobody has 
examined and challenged the underlying assumptions of defense planning particularly not 
the time lines.” According to Wilson, General John M. Shalikashvili, then Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent word around to the Chiefs that “he did not want any Billy 
Mitchell’s writing the QDR.” Mr. Wilson concluded by seeking an independent and 
objective panel led by General Fogelman to take the QDR away from the Pentagon 
insiders. He summed up his view of the current leadership which, of course, includes the
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Army by stating:
There is no chance the Pentagon go-a-longers will test and rebuild the foundations 
of the war plans. Their modus operandi since the end of the Cold War has been to 
review the reviews, endorse the endorsers and hope for more money to carry out a 
two-war strategy that cannot be financed with money now in sight, (p. 39)
In a somewhat related story, “go-a-longers are in charge,” in the 14 June 98 The
Stars and Stripes. John Anderson, staff writer, reported on the recently announced
controversial redesign of the Army’s heavy division which reduces the strength of the
division by 2300 soldiers and Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles by thirteen
each from 58 to 45. Although the article is a balanced one, it is laced with commentary
that the division design is evolutionary and not revolutionary and “nothing more than
slapping new technology on an outdated structure. What’s really needed many argue, is
wholesale reorganization firom the ground up.” Quoting retired General Wayne A.
Downing as saying “what we need is bold innovative thinking.” That quote followed a
quote from a Joint Staff Army Officer who asked for anonymity after stating “you didn’t
find any meaningful debate within the journals . . .  it was all in-house behind closed
doors and any naysayers were written off as chimes in the wind” (pp. 1-2).
In a syndicated The Stars and Stripes. 26 Mar 97, commentary by well known
military columnist. Colonel Harry G. Summers, he addressed the adverse impact of the
growth of political correctness as he commented on a Thomas E. Rick’s 11 March 98
article in the Wall Street Journal. “Army at Odds.” Specifically, Colonel Summers
addressed the relief of Colonel James Hallums, the head of the Leadership Department a t
West Point, a highly decorated combat officer. Colonel Halums’ demise, according to
the article, was “Colonel Hallums’ glorification of the combat arms . .  . translates into a
program that is being perceived as exclusionary to women” and “Colonel Hallums was
insensitive to our feelings.” The article concludes that war and war stories is what
military leadership is all about and “Do away with their “war stories” and you might as
well do away with the Military Academy itself’ (p. 15).
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An Armv Times editorial, 3 March 1997, entitled “The Army’s Tailspin” reports
“The Army is unhappy about a story in the February 24, 1998 Armv Times that reports
that the quality of recruits has dropped sharply.” The article addresses the drop of high
school graduate recruits from the Army goal of 95 percent to 88 percent. The article
states that those officers who provided information for the article have been advised
“don’t say anything that will make the Army look bad, even if  what you say is true.” In
addressing the Army spin on quality reduction and its reduced emphasis on the benefits
o f recruiting high school graduates, the editorial writer states:
“What irks us even more is what we view as a double talk by the Army leadership
. . .  The talk is about honesty and truthfulness, but only when the news is good.
Otherwise, soldiers are ordered to clam up and not make the institution look bad.”
The wrap up of the article is worth recording because it hits at the heart at what
this dissertation is about:
The knee jerk reaction to negative news is all too common in the Army. Those in 
top leadership should consider the damage this run-for-the-hills and don’t-talk-to- 
the-press dictum does to soldiers in the field. Anyone can mouth the importance 
of being straight with the American people and teach the importance of honesty 
and candor at West Point. . .  But none of that means a thing when one soldier 
sees another soldier tell it like it is, and then witnesses the weight of the Army 
leadership fall on him or her. That indicates a mind-set that will cause the Army 
more problems than will a few slips in recruiting statistics. It’s why incidents like 
Aberdeen are such a surprise. Why don’t soldiers tell their chain of command 
when something goes wrong? Because it might make it into a newspaper and 
God forbid if  the Army has to deal with the truth instead of its own spin. (p. 19)
A Wall Street Journal article, 5 December 1996, entitled, Flavine politics with the
Military, by John Hillen, a Persian Gulf War veteran and defense policy analyst at the
Heritage Foundation, addresses the prolonged Bosnia mission and its adverse impact on
the fighting capability of the Army. After quoting the then NATO Commander, General
George Joui wan, as saying that “the Bosnia peacekeeping mission, far from debilitating
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and undermining U.S. combat readiness, has actually improved it.” Allen’s article went 
on to say that, “the peacekeeping is good combat training” line is a “command directed 
fabrication.”
: The article then cites serious readiness problems, inflation of combat readiness
status reports and the perceived willingness of generals to “tell their political bosses what
they want to hear.” It goes on to quote Representative Ike Shelton, D-Mo, who by
contrast to the generals’ party line stated: “Peacekeeping commitments may so degrade
the armed forces’ war fighting capability that it will be impossible to carry out the
national military strategy.” Mr. Allen concludes his article by noting, “Soldiers can make
good social workers, but social workers make lousy soldiers” (p. 4).
A U.S. News and World Report. August 11,1997, commentary by John Leo
entitled, “A Kinder Gentler Army,” addresses the relaxed FT and other training standards
designed and driven by mixed gender training. The net result according to Leo:
Gender norming and related deterioration of standards are a disaster for the 
military. Mixed-gender training has nothing to do with combat readiness. It has 
to do with politics and the desire to show absolute equality even where it doesn’t 
exist and can’t . . .  Almost any one in the military or Congress will say so because 
their careers are at stake. Better go along and create endless study commissions. 
Reversing the practice of mixed gender training would “have a negative effect on 
the cohesion and by extension, the readiness of our forces” a senior Defense 
Department official said recently. Exactly the opposite is true, of course. Despite 
the risks, another push to kill mixed gender training has started. For the sake of 
the military’s integrity, it should succeed, (p. 19)
An Armv Times. August 18,1997, commentary summarizes “Readiness in a 
Tailspin” as it describes informal chat e-mail traffic among military officers that points to 
a theme of deteriorating readiness across the services. The article goes on to detail other 
issues to include:
1. Dismay over the widening credibility gap between military leaders and their 
subordinates and the resulting exodus of many of the best and brightest to include pilots
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of all services.
2. As of March 1997, over 110 resignations of Army Apache pilots were on the 
career manager’s desk.
3. The unrest among Apache pilots because of continued rotation to Bosnia,
Korea and to Germany where you then get deployed to Bosnia again.
The capstone of this report on readiness is a co-located related short report by George
Wilson entitled “Readiness Chief wants staff to put lid on issue.” The article is quoted in
full because of its direct relationship to the honesty/candor issue of this researcher’s
topic.
Louis C. Finch, Deputy Director of Defense for Readiness, has launched a 
campaign to control information about the state of readiness in the armed forces, 
including issuing a gag order to his staff members who go on field trips and 
reserving the right to declare secret what they learn. I have established the 
following ground rules to he used by all trip participants in handling trip 
information (notes, draft reports, etc.) collected in the field. Finch wrote August 7 
in a memorandum to specialists who go out to military bases under his auspices to 
assess readiness . . .  Such materials will, where appropriate, be classified. Will 
not contain editorializing opinions or speculations of team members or others.
Will not be transferred electronically among participants or shared with others 
without my consent. Will not be printed on letterhead, contain reference to 
intended recipient (i.e., memorandum for or memorandum through) or indicate 
coordinating officials until it is in final form. Will not contain the names of 
anyone visited in the field, (p. 3)
An Armv Times commentary (February 2,1998) titled “NTC training called into 
question” discusses official Army denial of e-mail charges of lowered standards and lying 
to units. The central aspect of the article is a lengthy e-mail article authored by “a 
decorated combat veteran, entitled “Direction and Deceit - an Army in Trouble.”
The three-part e-mail article paints a “bleak picture of Army readiness.” The 
critical charge made by the author is that in order to make training readiness appear to b e  
better than it is, “training centers and in particular NTC (National Training Center), are 
making things easier than they used to for visiting units, and then lying to those same 
units about it.”
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In spite of the expected denials from the Army command structure, an official at 
NTC (anonymous) “agreed with the author of the article that the training centers are 
being forced to accommodate the weaknesses of units whose training budgets have been 
slashed and whose ranks have too many spaees where there should be faces” (p. 8).
(Note: From this researcher’s perspective, the boldness of the Army officer e-mail author 
reflects a level of frustration with the Army leadership that my research indicates is 
growing dramatically.)
An Armv Times commentary (January 5, 1988) entitled “Readiness problems 
expected to continue” details the adverse impact of personnel shortages, high OPTEMPO 
and lack of cash” driven in part by the Clinton administration plan to maintain forces in 
Bosnia beyond the promised June 1998 deadline. According to Lieutenant General Jay 
Gamer, then Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and now retired: “1 think there’s a 
lot of hollowness in the divisions right now.” According to one battalion commander (off 
the record) “while everyone is looking at the tip of the spear, the shaft is rotting, and no 
one is picking up on it” (p. 16).
The Stars and Stripes (May 7, 1997) reported that the U.S. Army suspended a 
policy that allowed enlisted soldiers with a local bar to re-enlistment to request 
separation. The old policy offered soldiers an option to leave service when he/she 
perceived they could not overcome a bar which makes them ineligible for re-enlistment 
due to failure to meet Army standards or for disciplinary reasons. Due to the fact, 
according to the article, that “the Army separates 15 of every 100 soldiers within six 
months and 37 of every 100 soldiers before they finish their first term” the Army needs to 
reduce attrition. The suspension of the old policy keeps the problem soldiers on duty and 
reduces attrition. That makes the retention rates look better but hurts unit morale (p. 3). 
(Note: In many cases, soldiers barred firom re-enlisting are constant problems who 
denigrate unit morale, cohesiveness and readiness. They oftentimes are a consistent 
irritant and usurper of time and attention of the chain of command. The policy
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suspension appears to be a numbers game to reflect the Army is meeting authorized 
strength levels. This researcher’s experience is that in many cases, the commander and 
the unit are better off without the barred soldier.)
An Armv Times special report (12 May 1997) entitled “Feel the Crunch” talks 
about Army manpower shortages against its 495,000 strength authorization. This is a 
very detailed article that discusses retention, recruiting challenges and related issues. Of 
interest to this researcher are some candid quotes from the Army leadership:
General Reimer, Army Chief of Staff: “In too many of our units we have 
shortages of people, there is too much turbulence. We are moving our people too fast.” 
Brigadier General Stephen Smith, Director of Enlisted Personnel Management: 
“one of the fundamental issues that I face is that we have a force structure that cannot be 
met with the end strength we are authorized.” (If all units were filled to full 
authorization, the need is 518,000 versus the 495,000 authorized.)
The article on the other hand reflects the consistent and inaccurate positive spin 
that does not go down well with leaders in the units with major personnel shortages. For 
example, Lieutenant General Fred Vollrath, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel:
“I do not anticipate any significant decreased personnel readiness in June or July 
either. These shortages are tied to the seasonality of recruiting. This is not unique to this 
year . . . ” (pp. 10-14).
The Stars and Stripes (November 14,1997) military update entitled “Retirees 
mired in benefits battle” provided the latest in a class action suit against the U. S. 
Government over the widespread perception by former military members that medical 
care for life for both them and their spouse was a guaranteed benefit. The government 
position is that benefits were limited to only “space available” care. In spite of a little 
known Congressional Act in 1956 making “space available” a condition of care, 
recruiters for the next thirty years were encouraged to continue promising lifetime 
medical care. It is clear that neither recruiters nor the soldiers and officers who entered
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the service were aware of the 1956 law.
The case was before the U.S. District Court in Pensacola, Florida, at the 
commencement of this research. (Note: Keeping faith with retirees is an honesty and 
ethics issue. The potential fallout on recruiting as well as the general message to service 
members that they had better “read the fine print” in their contract adds to a mosaic of 
issues that cause one to question the credibility of the leadership they serve.)
The Supreme Court eventually ruled in 2003 that in spite o f the fact that the 
promises of lifetime health care had been made by the military, they were unenforceable 
since they were not based upon law. Unfortunately, Congress had never authorized such 
a promise in the form of legislation.
An important health care effort did come to fruition on 1 October 2001 when the 
Tricare For Life program was established for military retirees. Under that major program 
retired military members at age 65 who signed up for Medicare Part B saw Tricare For 
Life pick up that portion of health costs not covered by Medicare part B. The number o f  
retirees covered by the program is estimated to be 1.4 million. In addition, the Tricare 
Senior Pharmacy benefit was initiated in April 2001 which provides retirees the option o f  
utilizing Tricare approved local drugstore pharmacies or the Tricare mail order program. 
Under this program, retirees pay $3 for generic drugs and $9 for brand name drugs. That 
same co-payment is charged for a 90-day mail order or a 30-day drug store order. The 
drugs continued to be fi-ee at military treatment facilities. The major plus of this 
important benefit was the availability to the very large retiree population that did not live 
near a military treatment facility.
It is important to note that this critically important benefit which addresses the 
past promises of “life time health care” was passed by Congress after a long battle by the 
many military advocate organizations rather than by DOD. fArmv Times. October 1, 
2000, p. 34, 38, 39).
An Armv Times article (November 24, 1997) reported that “re-enlistments rise,
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ease shortfalls.” The details of the article however may paint a different picture to unit 
commanders in the field in that it addresses the 15,000-authorization cut o f the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which takes the Army to an authorized strength of
480.000 by September 30, 2000. The goal of the Army was to achieve an end strength o f
488.000 by 30 April 98. That 7,000 reduction in end strength from 495,000 is a critical 
aspect of the statement by Lieutenant General Vollrath, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Personnel, that “the service is well positioned to accomplish the mission of recruiting
75.000 new soldiers in fiscal 1998” (p. 3). (Note: The optimistic title of the article fails 
to address the fact that according to the Director of Enlisted Personnel, Brigadier General 
Stephen Smith, the strength needed to fill Army units is actually 518,000. The only good 
news is that the DCSPER is confident the Army will be able to recruit to the lower 
authorization - the salient issue to unit commanders is that the Army will in reality 
increase the shortages in units’ authorizations by 7,000 to a total of 30,000.)
An Armv Times story (January 19, 1998) reported: “With budgets tight, machine 
parts can be hard to get.” The story cited Defense Dailv newsletter, as reporting that a 
shortage of spare parts at Aviano Air Base in Italy was forcing two Air Force squadrons 
to cannibalize other F-16 Fighting Falcons. The 510th and 555th Squadrons routinely fly 
over Bosnia in their NATO peacekeeping role as part of Operation Deliberate Guard.
The story went on to report, “These comments drew an extensive rebuttal from 
Pentagon spokesman, Kenneth Bacon, the Defense Department’s chief spokesman. “I 
can’t tell you that there are not readiness problems in the military because, clearly from 
time to time, we do have needs for spare parts or we run into temporary shortages of 
people . . .  but we try to address these as quickly as possible” (p. 6). (Note: To the 
maintenance officer. Major Dennis Schumaker at Aviano Air Base in Italy, who reported 
the problem, the statements of Mr. Bacon did not assist in getting the non-op F-16s into 
service in support of the Bosnia peacekeeping mission. It is easy to see the perception 
differences of what is truth at the Pentagon versus those in the units deployed on the
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ground in mission support. Mr. Bacon represents the chain of command of the Army as 
well as the Air Force. He is a long distance from the sound of the drums.)
A March 2,1998, Armv Times article entitled, “Army gripes over budget lead to 
IG (Inspector General) investigation,” summarized completion of an investigation to 
determine if  Army generals were illegally lobbying Congress in an attempt to increase its 
share of the defense budget.
According to the story, an article in the February 3, 1998, Wall Street Journal 
quoted Army Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General David Heebner, saying, 
“we have major problems down range because of funding shortages” caused Deputy 
Defense Secretary, John Hamre, to “hit the roof’ (p. 2).
The article went on to address the widespread perception that the Hamre 
statement was intended to send a clear message to the Army to stop complaining about 
the budget. (Note: The readers, especially the military members or other informed 
citizens, do not need to be extremely perceptive to understand that the party line of the
Defense Department is to keep quiet about problems.)
A 3 August 1998 Armv Times editorial. Breaking the budget silence” provided
further insight regarding budget issues stating:
The Army’s own survey of its officers and NCO’s indicates a cynical mind-set 
spreading among many mid-level leaders. This in part is because they perceive a 
lack of outrage from their senior leadership over the mismatch between missions 
and resources.. .  The leadership must go beyond circulating memos in the 
Pentagon. It must start speaking out loudly and clearly about what is required to 
keep a well-trained, well-equipped Army...  Anything else is totally unacceptable, 
(p. 17)
In a series of The Stars and Stripes articles (November 16,1997, November 30, 
1997, March 2, 1998, March 5, 1998, March 8, 1998) delays in awarding the soldier’s 
medal to Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, and meritorious service medals to his crew 
chief and door gunner, (killed in action shortly thereafter) for their heroic action on 16
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March 1968 in stopping the massacre at My Lai in Vietnam and then reporting it were 
revealed. The medal for WO Thompson was approved in August 1996 but as of 
November 16,1998, had not been awarded nor had he been officially notified that the 
award had been granted. According to an Army spokesman, the difficulty was “coming 
up with the proper location.” The initial suggestion was Secretary of the Army Togo 
West’s Pentagon Office. According to the March 8,1998, story which covered the award 
ceremony at the Vietnam War Memorial Wall in Washington stated:
The Army, not keen on drawing attention to the long-past atrocities, especially as 
other newer scandals were rocking the service, wanted a private ceremony. 
Thompson insisted it be public, at the Wall. As news of the standoff started to 
bubble up and Congress got involved, the Army relented.
It appears that the pattern of lack of candor on the part of the Army continued. 
What could have been a “good news” story that three soldiers were able to rise above the 
criminal activity at My Lai at risk of their own lives was lost in an effort to forget the 
tragic event. At a time when the Army is pushing its seven values of honor, integrity, 
courage, loyalty, respect, selfless service and duty, it seems that attempting to low key a 
heroic and selfless action of this nature flies in the face of the entire values effort.
An Armv Times editorial (March 23, 1998) entitled “Keeping troops is daunting 
challenge” addresses soldier retention. The emphasis is upon the impact of constant 
deployments with no relief in sight. Of particular interest are the comments of Sylvia 
Kidd, wife of the former Sergeant Major of the Army. Their son recently graduated from 
college and is taking steps to enter the Army through Officer’s Candidate School. Mrs. 
Kidd states, “I’m talking as hard as I can to keep him out of i t ..  . We hear a lot about 
quality of life and supporting soldiers and troops . .  . We don’t see quite as much action, 
as reality” (p. 19).
The issue here is that retired members of the Army wield a great deal of influence 
in advocating military service. A significant number of “Army brats” follow parents into
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the Army. Ms. Kidd went on to state to the House National Security Subcommittee as 
she explained why she is discouraging her son from joining the military: “I believe we 
are in danger because we tend to grow our own.” It is an alarming signal to everyone 
when the wife of the former senior non-commission officer of the Army publicly 
discourages her son from becoming an officer in the Army.
The article concludes with some perceptive statements abut the state of the Army. 
Indications are that continually asking soldiers to do more has brought the Army 
near the breaking point. . .
It will take an outspoken, frank leadership willing to tell the Congress and the 
president there are limits on what a smaller force can do. It will take telling the 
troops that yes, things aren’t what they used to be, and, no, they probably never 
will be again . . .
Congress needs to hear the unvarnished truth . . .
Whitewashing is not going to solve this problem. If the services are losing the 
faith of people like Sylvia Kidd, their problems are just beginning, (p. 19)
Retirees like this researcher wield great power in the recruiting process. When 
retirees perceive the existence of a less than candid leadership that is not standing up in a 
straightforward and forthright manner for the soldier, the recruiting process itself is in 
danger. These same leaders may in the future be required to lead our soldiers in harm’s 
way. Retirees, fortunately, are not in danger of retaliation from the Army for addressing 
the issues in a straightforward manner.
An Armv Times (April 27, 1998) cover story entitled, “No thanks, the 40 percent 
retirement has troops reconsidering military careers,” staff writer. Jack Weible, reports oai 
three operating retirement systems currently being applied in the Army. The Military 
Retirement Reform Act of 1986 called REDUX bases retirement pay on 40 percent o f the 
high 3 years basic pay. Further, annual cost-of-living allowances will grow at one 
percentage point lower than the cost-of-living adjustment under the other two plans. This
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is a far different and more complicated plan than the long time 50 percent of base pay at 
20 years retirement and 75 percent base pay at 30 years. The former retirement plan had 
prevailed since at least War World II. That more generous plan ended for those entering 
service after September 8,1980. Those who entered service between September 8,1980, 
and July 31,1986, (then came REDUX) operate under the old rules except that the 50 and 
75 percent is based on average pay of last three years rather than on high base pay at 
retirement date.
The story concludes with the statement: “ out in the field, would-be future
retirees say there’s an issue of trust involved. Many of them already feel deceived over 
the increasing difficulty in obtaining health care, for example, and simply don’t believe 
that even the 40 percent retirement system will be there for them at retirement.” (pp. 10- 
12)
The perception of uniformed members regarding trust that the system 
(leaders/congress) will not take care of them over the long haul impacts upon retention, 
recruiting, morale and ultimately readiness.
In a May 5, 1998, The Stars and Stripes article entitled, “Cohen takes aim at 
readiness,” the commencement of a series of Joint Chiefs meetings with Secretary Cohen 
was announced. The meetings “are designed to address Cohen’s concerns that readiness 
reporting is not as accurate or predictive as it needs to be.” The article goes on to discuss 
related issues from the 20 March 1998 GAO report on readiness which cited that in the 
1st Armored Division, 1st Brigade stationed in Germany only 16 of 116 tanks had full 
crews and that two brigades of the Division were short over half of their infantrymen 
needed to man Bradley fighting vehicles” (p. 1).
In opposition to some Army statements, General Wesley K. Clark, Commander o f  
European Command warned Congress” that “back-to-back peacekeeping or humanitarian 
operations of the kind we have experienced since 1994 hinder the ability of combat units 
to maintain their readiness for high intensity operations” (pp. 1-2). (Note: There is no
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doubt that commanders of the 1st Armored Division with their severe shortage of combat 
vehicle crews were aware that General Clark who as a joint service rather than an Army 
commander was far closer to being accurate than the standard Army leadership rhetoric 
that “all is well.” The 1st Armored Division was one of the forward-deployed units that 
the Army stated previously was in a “good readiness state.”)
The Cincinnati Enquirer (May 7,1998) published an AP story entitled, “Senators 
report low morale among Persian Gulf troops.” Summary of the story is contained in the 
following statements;
Senator Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, “likened morale to that o f the Vietnam era and 
said the military was in danger of having to lower its standards to be able to make 
recruitment goals.”
Sen. Pete Domenici, R-New Mexico, “Morale was extremely low, the desire to 
get out of the military and just anxiously waiting for their time to run was far more 
rampant than I believed” (p. A7). (Note: One could ask why the troops in the Gulf 
needed the senators to carry the message of bad morale back. Knowing the pulse of 
morale and articulating the dangers on retention of constantly deployed soldiers is the job 
of the chain of command.)
In an Armv Times commentary (May 18, 1998) entitled “Army: Despite 
concerns, we’re ready to fight,” the Army responded at a 5 May 98 Pentagon briefing to a 
General Accounting Office 20 March 98 report on personnel readiness that cited the 
existence of serious personnel shortages. The Army made the following statements: 
“Those units that are forward and those that are first to fight are high . . .  they’re in good 
readiness state . . .  So for ‘98 for the Army, personnel is no longer the problem, or will 
no longer be at the end of the year the problem that we’ve had previously.” (Note: This 
statement is not a misprint.)
When questioned about the disconnect between the GAO report and his
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comments, the Army official said, “The GAO report is slightly old, is the problem with
it” (p. 6). (Note; The article goes on to discuss how “these statements are a change in
Army rhetoric on personnel shortages. It concludes with a comment from General David
Bramlett, Forces Command Commander: “The tank commander looks at readiness from
a different perspective than the division commander and I do.” What that means to this
researcher and that sergeant E-5 tank commander is that if he is short a tank main gun
gunner, his tank is useless. However, the generals do not see those kinds o f shortages.
Unfortunately, when you go to war or even to train, that crew needs a trained gunner.)
Armv Times reporter, Rick Maze, reported in an October 12, 1998, article
Congress bears readiness woes, in candid testimony, which some lawmakers said was
long overdue, the chiefs acknowledge they see evidence of serious and growing problems
in the ranks after 14 consecutive years of declining budgets
“Senator John McCain, R. Arizona, stated to the Chiefs ‘the fact is, with the
exception of the Marine Corps, you were not candid.’”
Senator Rick Santorium, R-Pennsylvania, faulted the chiefs for not standing up
for the troops. ‘You have a responsibility at the top of the chain of command for the
people who work for you.’ (p. 4)
In an October 14,1998 article of Stars and Stripes. Henry G. Summers,
Distinguished Fellow of the Army War College, wrote in a commentary:
Two weeks ago the Joint Chiefs of Staff caught hell from the Senate Armed 
Services Committee for not being more frank in previous testimony about 
declining readiness in the armed forces . ..  The senator accused them of 
misleading Congress in testimony last February about the seriousness of the 
problems eroding the armed forces fighting abilities . . .  ‘This is war,’ said New 
Hampshire Senator Robert Smith. ‘You’re battlefield commanders. You have to 
be commanders rather than bureaucrats.’ (p. 17)
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The U. S. War College Strategic Studies Institute in a December 1999 report title,
Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic and Officers in the 21^ Century, by Dr. Don M.
Snider, Major John A. Nagel and Major Tony Pfaff, stated:
Since the Gulf War, the serious mismatch between a military structure too large 
and resources too small, when combined with an unusually high operational 
tempo for MOOTW (military operations other than war), has seyerely eroded the 
trust and commitment of indiyidual officers and soldiers, (p. 6)
The senior leaders who expect to do ‘more with less’ is one of the most frequently 
mentioned as cause of the unprecedented, and growing gap in trust and 
confidence between the lower echelons of the Army Officer Corps and its senior 
leadership . . .  It is a sure sign of a military profession in trouble that junior 
officers do not aspire to serye in their commander’s position, (p. 19)
May 1997 Army Magazine: In an article entitled “Cynicism and careerism: threats
to Army ethics,” John Marlin, a 14 year Army yeteran, commented on his observations o f
the state of Army ethics. Marlin attributes “existing contributors to ethical cynicism
likely to be compounded by four trends in the post Cold War Army: the drawdown,
declining resources, the proliferation of computers, and societal changes with respect to
honesty and integrity.”
Following a discussion of specific causes related to ethical issues, Marlin makes
two summary points related to this research:
* Major ethical crises rarely rise from willful criminality. Instead, they simmer 
slowly in a stew of frustration, fear, and pessimism, fueled by perceiyed 
institutional inequity, inconsistency and irrationality, eyentually frothing up in 
cynical disregard for the Seryices’ core yalues...
* Finally leaders at all leyels need to combat unhealthy cynicism. While this is 
done in part by eschewing euphemism and by building unit pride and esprit de 
corps, it is mostly done by being simply, completely and sometimes brutally 
honest on eyery occasion, (pp.7-10)
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Ralph Peters in an opinion article published in the M ay 
25, 1998 Army Times entitled “Generals, it’s time to face reality” addresses what he
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perceives to be a malaise in bold, forward thinking on the part of Army leadership (the
generals) and a willingness to mislead themselves as to the real state of the Army. The
result according to Peters is depicted as follows:
I fear that our generals have no idea how widespread discontent is in today’s 
Army. Before I began writing this column, I had no idea...
The messages I get from the field do not come from those with axes to grind, but 
from lieutenants, field grades, and yes, a few generals who love the Army and 
hate the deterioration and decay they see around them. They believe the senior 
leadership is failing the Army and lying about it. (pp. 21)
In a 12 July 1999 Armv Times article, written by staff writer Christopher Lawson,
titled Shinseki: We Have an End-strength Issue. General Shinseki, who became Army
Chief of Staff in June 1999, is reported to have said he believes “today’s Army is too
small in numbers and too heavy in its force structure.” (p.2)
The June 26, 1998 The Stars and Stripes published an article by Aimee Seebolt,
“Woman files claim against general,” which addresses the $10 million claim against
retired Major General David R. Hale and a $1.5 million claim against the Army Chief o f
Staff, Gen. Dennis J. Reimer. According to the former colonel’s wife who alleges that
Major General Hale forced her into an adulterous sexual relationship to protect her
former husband, who worked for Major General Hale, “she acted after a five month
investigation into her charges seemed to be heading nowhere.” Ms. Carpino, the
complainant, stated “her claim against Reimer is based on allowing Hale to retire and for
any attempt to cover up the investigation.” According to the article, “with Reimer’s
approval. Hale was allowed to retire eight days after making the request despite an
investigation into Carpino’s claims” (pp. 1, 10).
In a June 29, 1998 Army Times opinion piece entitled “Don’t expect action on
pay” the writer summarizes what had been an almost guaranteed military pay raise of 3.6
percent that in the end was reduced to 3.1 percent. In the discussion, the editorialist mad-e
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the point that the military senior leadership had reversed their publicly stated position of
support for the larger increase and that previously, General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of
the Joint Staff “agreed that in no uncertain terms that inadequate pay and cuts to the
retirement system are threatening the quality of the all-volunteer force.” Further the
editorialist pointed out that “Retention is falling. Highly trained people - good officers,
good noncommissioned officers in scores of specialties - are leaving in droves.” (p. 19)
Directly related to this research is the following conclusion by Armv Times:
Unfortunately the Chiefs - who surely know better - are not willing to buck the 
system. Everything’s just dandy, they continue to say. If they really think that, 
the problem goes far beyond support or opposition to a pay raise. We can’t help 
thinking that the Chiefs’ sorry performance on the pay raise issue will cost them 
more than they saved. The footsteps you hear are people - good people - heading 
for the doors, (p. 19)
A July 6, 1998 Armv Times cover story entitled “The National Training Center -
Facing New Challenges” addressed the continued improvement of quality training and a
new push to encourage bold and flexible maneuvers and more risk taking and initiative.
The assessment of training opportunities afforded to units was unanimously high.
On the downside, however, is the “unanimous view that the units are arriving here
at a much lower entry level than they were just a few years ago. There is little doubt as to
why...it’s time and money.” The article went on:
NTC officials postponed for 24 hours the second battle in Col. Bryant’s rotation 
because his troops were having trouble keeping their Abrams tanks and Bradley 
fighting vehicles up and running. Even with the additional time, the number o f 
tanks and Bradleys.. .barely met the 70 percent minimum required for any unit to 
be considered combat effective at the start of an NTC engagement... The 
problems caused by units’ lack of training are compounded by personnel 
shortages that have left many combat units hollow... The lack of resources for 
collective training, coupled with units so short of troops they cannot be employed. 
according to Army doctrine, has implications that go beyond the obvious short­
term readiness problems, (pp. 18-20) (Note: The good news from this 
researcher’s perspective is that generals and colonels publicly addressed the issues
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with candor.)
George C. Wilson, military affair’s author and former national defense
correspondent of The Washington Post commented on military leadership in an Armv
Times (July 6,1998) commentary titled “A ‘can’t do’ attitude is better.” Mr. Wilson
went on in his “letter” to General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
“there’s such a thing as being too good a soldier.” Following quotes from several
congressmen about the apparent unwillingness of the Chiefs to be less than
straightforward about current military capabilities, Mr. Wilson quotes Senator James
Inhofe, R-Okla., who chairs the Senate Armed Services Readiness Committee, “when I
hear them say that (“yes we can fight two big wars almost simultaneously with moderate
risk”) before our committee, I think they’re willfully saying things that aren’t true. I
think they know it’s not true.”
Wilson goes on in his letter to make the following key points:
I understand why you and other good soldiers gag on the word ‘can’t do’... but 
‘the can do’ is starting to get you and the Chiefs in trouble.. .you must, as the 
nation’s top soldier, break the mold and say ‘can’t do’ to the Commander in 
Chief, when its’ for the good of the other good soldiers out there, (p. 41)
Steven Lee Meyers in a July 8, 1998 The Stars and Stripes reported the latest
information on the Major General Hale Inspector General investigation which cited that
he had engaged in a pattern of “inappropriate behavior” and “sanctioned the misuse of
government resources”. The article went on to state:
In recent years, the Army and other branches of the military have been criticized 
for instances of sexual harassment and misconduct that were ignored or 
investigated slowly.” Another issue addressed was the perceived double standard 
that gives senior officers more leeway than junior officers or enlisted personnel 
citing the recent vigorous prosecution of Sergeant Major of the Army Gene 
McKinney for sexual misconduct. The article went on to quote Rep. Carolyn 
Maloney, D-NY who stated “If you’re a friend of the big guns and you’ve
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committed a crime, you can just quietly disappear, (pp. 1,4)
An article by Philip Shennon of the New York Times was printed in the July 9, 
1998 The Stars and Stripes titled “Army reverses general’s rules.” The story reports that 
as a result of the recent handling of the Maj. Gen. Hale case in which he was permitted to 
retire quickly while under investigation for sexual misconduct, approval of retirements o f 
Brigadier and Major Generals was removed from the Army Chief of Staff. The decision 
was made by the Secretary of the Army Michael Walker to move the approval authority 
to his office.
Shennon went on to report that “Gen. Dennis Reimer acknowledged that he knew 
about some of the accusations when he approved the retirement”. Pentagon spokesman 
Kenneth Bacon according to the article “reminded reporters repeatedly that ‘General 
Reimer’s actions are not under review here’” (pp.l, 4).
A July 13,1998 Armv Times feature article written by staff writer Jack Weible 
entitled “The New Military” provided the latest demographic statistics on the U. S. 
military as of 1997. It summarized that the military in general is older, more married, 
better educated and more diverse with increased representation of African Americans, 
Hispanics and women. The following comparisons for the Army were cited:
1977 1997
Married 47.8% 54%
High School Diploma 60.7% 90.0%
African Americans, Officer 6.1% 11.0%
Afiican Americans, Enlisted 26.3% 29.7%
Hispanics, Officer 0.9% 3.4%
Hispanics, Enlisted 3.7% 7.0%
Women, Officers 6.7% 14.2%
Women, Enlisted 6.8% 15T34
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Clearly, the military in general and the Army in particular can be proud of their
successful efforts to build a diverse and cohesive force (pp. 10-12).
Sean D. Naylor, staff writer reports in the July 13, 1998 Armv Times that the
1997 Leadership and Professional Assessment has not yet been released in spite of the
fact that it was conducted from December 1996 to May 1997. Naylor reports that the
survey “revealed a deep malaise among officers and NCO’s.” Naylor was able to obtain
a lengthy Pentagon briefing about the survey which included 4,065 soldiers, including 5
percent of the Officer Corps and 2 percent of the Non-Commissioned Officer Corps.
According to the briefing, prepared by the Center for Army Leadership at Ft.
Leavenworth, Kansas:
The Officer Corps is primarily comprised of high-quality individuals who are 
very committed and working very hard. However, the Army’s current culture 
forces some officers to behave in ways that are contrary to the Army’s stated 
values.
Most of the briefing is devoted to quotes from soldiers who paint a bleak picture 
of life in the Army.. .The expressed opinions describe an Army that is ‘hollow, 
overstretched, under resourced, and in which little attention is being paid to leader 
development, or the training necessary to prepare units for combat.’ Instead, a 
‘zero-defects’ environment coupled with a perceived reluctance on the part of 
senior leaders to acknowledge how bad things are is breeding cynicism at all 
levels of the force, according to many of those surveyed, (p. 3)
Lt. Gen. Frederick Volrath after explaining that the Army will not release the year
old survey “until it has fully analyzed the findings” went on to provide his opinion that
the report is outdated and that he took issue with the survey results especially those that
said the Army was “hollow” and that leaders are not “telling it like it is.”
General Volrath as the senior personnel chief of the Army went on to voice his
views. “Right now most people [in the field] are happy campers when it comes to
personnel strength. There is real happiness out in the trenches compared with conditions
units were facing in 1997” (p. 3). (Note: This article provided six examples of the kinds
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of quotes from the field contained in the briefing. The opposing points of view expressed 
by those surveyed compared to those of Lieutenant General Volrath are illustrative o f the 
message being sent by those surveyed: senior leaders are not listening and telling it like it 
is. The fact that year old survey results have yet to be released and that the briefing 
discussed above was provided to Mr. Naylor on a non attribution basis can be perceived 
as unwillingness by the Army leadership to address these important issues with candor.)
A May 1997 article written by John Marlin in Armv provides an indication that 
cynicism, careerism and a need for total honesty prevailed within the Army as seen by a 
former West Point officer who served fourteen years. At the time of the article. Marlin 
was a journalism instructor at the College of St. Elizabeth in Morristown, N.J. The 
article, title Cvnicism and Careerism . . .  Threats to Armv Ethics, cites four trends in the 
post Cold War Army that contribute to ethical cynicism. The drawdown, declining 
resources, the proliferation of computers and societal changes with respect to honesty and 
integrity. After addressing these trends in detail. Marlin concludes that unhealthy 
cynicism can be countered in party by building unit pride and esprit de corps but mostly 
done by being simply, completely and sometimes brutally honest on every occasion, (pp. 
7-10)
Insuring that at least the readers of Armv Times, which includes a significant 
number of active and retired officers, is aware of the perceived or real problems within 
the ranks, ETC Ralph Peters, an Army Time columnist wrote on opinion piece that 
contained the following salient points:
* The message I get from the field do not come with axes to grind, but from 
lieutenants, field grades and, yes, a few generals who love the Army and hate the 
deterioration and decay they see around them. They believe the senior leadership 
is failing the Army and lying about it.
* ..  .in most cases, the generals are lying first and foremost to themselves. They 
believe (italics by column writer) that the old ways are invariably the best ways 
and that change is so dangerous and unnecessary . ..
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* The spirit of intellectual inquiry and risk taking that built the Desert Storm
Army has been all but extinguished. fArmv Times. May 25, 1998, p. 21)
In a 27 January 1999 briefing from the Office of Economic and Manpower 
Analysis, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy titled. Where Have all 
the Captains Gone, the following points dealing with Army retention of West Point 
graduates are presented:
* The West Point graduate captain loss rates before promotion to major increased 
from 6.22% in FY88 to 9.25% in FY98.
* The expressed intentions of graduates to not remain in the Army as a career in 
the class of 1993 for second lieutenant, first lieutenant and captain increased from 32%, 
28% and 18% to 42%, 35% and 22% respectively for the class that graduated in 1997.
* The retention rate of West Point graduates was 60% at six years of service and 
33% at eleven years of service.
* Seventy-five percent of West Point captains are married.
* The “What to Do” portion of the briefing recommended the Army leadership 
initiate debate, raise pay, modernize housing, augment retirement and address the 
question: “Why an Army?”
A 13 October 1999 Army Research Institute briefing titled. Captain Attrition at 
Fort Benning. reported their results after interviewing 33 Army Infantry captains. Those 
interviewed had received commissions from USMA (14), ROTC (16) and CCS (3). 
Sixteen were “stayers:”
USMA (2), ROTC (11), OCS (3). Seventeen were “leavers:” USMA (12), ROTC (5). 
Other facts related to this research presented in the briefing are as follows:
*The primary reasons stated by “leavers” was dissatisfaction with “Army 
job/mission/life,” “OPTEMPO” and “excessive micromanagement.”
*OPTEMPO was cited by 71% of “leavers and 50% of stayers “as the top 
“dissatisfier.”
48
*Thirty-five percent of “leavers” cited “family issues” as main reason for leaving.
*One hundred percent of “leavers” said “family issues” were a factor in their 
overall decision to separate.
*One hundred percent of “leavers” and 93% of “stayers” stated that “high quality” 
captains were the ones leaving.
*Pay is not a factor in career intent.
*Few “leavers” reported receiving meaningful career mentoring early in their
careers.
Another briefing prepared by the U.S. Army Research Institute, Army Personnel 
Survey Office, updated on 21 January 1999 titled Highlights from the Briefing on 
Attrition Among Active Component Armv Captains, provided the following data 
compiled from longitudinal research on officer careers surveys of 1988, 89, 90 and 92 
and surveys on officer careers conducted in 1996 and 1998:
* Career intentions of company grade officers to “stay to retirement” dropped 
from 50% in 1992 to 42% in 1998.
* Those who intended to “leave after current obligation” rose from 26% in 1992 
to 29% in 1998.
* Items that were “very important/extremely import for the majority o f both 
“stayers” and “leavers” were “job satisfaction,” “time for personal/family life,” 
“integrity/professionalism,” “overall quality of life” and “spouse’s overall satisfaction.”
* Seventy-seven percent of “leavers” and 44% of “stayers” were “reluctant” to 
accept “the number of unaccompanied tours you would probably have over the course o f  
a career.” Those figures were up from 63% and 39% respectively for “leavers” and 
“stayers” in 1988.
* Ninety percent of “leavers” and 71% of “stayers” felt it would not be difficult to  
find a good civilian job in current labor conditions.
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* The bottom line conclusions briefing as to why captains are leaving reflect the 
following:
* “Benefits are seen as diminishing.”
* “Leavers’ less willing to accept impact of increased per tempo.”
* “Economy and job market are attractive and “leavers” believe they can do better 
in the civilian sector.”
In a 14 June 1999 Armv Times article, staff writer, Rick Maze, reported that with 
slight differences, the House and Senate versions of the 2000 defense authorization bill 
order a survey of separating service members which law makers hope will determine the 
priority for future action.” The Congressional action was driven by their perception that 
“defense leaders couldn’t tell you if improved health care is more important to military 
families than reducing the amount of time service members are deployed.” Senator Mary 
Landrieu, Democrat-Louisiana, chief sponsor of the Senate proposal stated, “she was a 
little taken aback” when Congress began working on improving pay and benefits, “that 
we have no sense of priority” (p. 22).
In an August 1999 Government Accounting Office briefing report to 
Congressional requestors titled. Military Personnel. Perspectives of Surveved Service 
Members in Retention Critical specialties. (GAO/NSTAD-99-197BR), the following 
information from a survey (anonymous) of 1000 military personnel of all branches 
conducted at military installations from October 1998 to June 1999 was revealed:
Forty percent of officers surveyed said they intend to leave the military after theix
current obligation, (p.2)
Three of the top five most frequently selected reasons to leave the military were
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related to work circumstances, including frequency of deployments, the lack of 
materials and equipment to successfully complete the demands of daily job 
requirements and the under manning of units, (p. 7)
Forty-three percent of Army officers were dissatisfied with the military, (p. 16)
The five most frequently selected reasons to leave military service among officers 
in order of priority were retirement pay (28%), frequency of deployment (28%), 
base pay (25%, availability of needed equipment/parts/materials (22%), and level 
of unit manning (20%). Base pay, although listed as a reason to leave, was not 
listed as a ‘dissatisfier’ by officers, (p. 25)
The top two reasons to stay, among officers were ‘military values and lifestyle’ 
(54%) and sense of ‘esprit de corps’ (44%). (p. 31).
The most frequently selected reason given by officers for joining the military was 
‘to serve my country.’ (p. 36)
For officers, the average hours worked per week was 62 and average weeks 
deployed was fifteen, (p. 36)
In a January 24, 2000 Armv Times article by Sean Naylor, “Captains parting 
company, Why the Army can’t keep junior officers,”
It was stated:
In fiscal 1999, 10.6 percent of Army captains opted to leave the service before 
being considered for major up from 9.5% and previous year and just 7.8% in 
fiscal year 1997 . . .  The Army is short about 3,000 captains and the rising 
attrition rate is responsible for half said Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
Lieutenant General David Ohle . . .  FORSCOM fiscal 1999 captain attrition rate 
was almost 21%, nearly double the Army-wide average, (p. 12) (Researcher’s 
note: The 10 Army divisions are within FORSCOM.) (Researcher’s note: All 
army divisions we assigned to FORSCOM)
A February 2000 major study on military culture conducted by CSIS and 
contained in a report titled American Military Culture in the Twentv-First Century based 
its finding upon 125 focus group discussions and a survey of 12,500 men and women in 
operational military units and selected headquarters over the two year period of 1998 to 
1999. Among the many findings, those that bear directly on this research are as follows:
51
Morale and readiness are suffering from force reductions, high operating tempo 
and resource constraints; culture may suffer in the long run . . .  Systemic 
solutions, not short term fixes must be found, (pp. xx-xxi)
. . .  many officers and NCOs, well informed through the internet and by other 
means expressed disappointment in their senior service leaders, (p. xxii)
Participants in focus groups frequently expressed the sentiment that service life 
was simply no longer tun. Some studies have noted a disturbing ambivalence in 
successfol junior officers about one day commanding ships, battalions or aviation 
squadrons. Frequently these mid-career officers see the life styles of their 
commanders as unnecessarily hectic and frustrating.
In the focus groups, many officers and NCO’s expressed disappointment in their 
senior leaders.
Higher pay and better housing are necessary but not sufficient answers to the 
problems of morale and retention. Participants in focus groups frequently 
expressed the sentiment that service life was simply no longer fun. Frequently 
these mid-career officers see the lifestyles of their commanders as unnecessarily 
hectic and frustrating, (p. xxv)
Unmet expectations for a challenging and satisfying military lifestyle were 
identified as a larger issue in nearly every focus group, (p. xxv)
Among survey results, there is much less satisfaction with the typical command 
climate and clear dissatisfaction in both absolute and relative terms - with family 
balance and living standards, (p. 42)
Quite simply, the noted tendency toward top-down micromanagement must be 
reversed before technological investments are made to reinforce such 
dysfunctional executive behaviors, (p. 58)
The zero-defects mentality often encountered in the U.S.military today is 
anathema to the kind of innovative risk taking needed to answer these questions, 
(p. 59)
Only 35% of those surveyed ‘strongly agreed/agreed’ to the statement, ‘When m y 
services senior leaders say something, you can believe it is true.’ (p. 72)
Only 36% strongly agreed/agreed to statement, ‘In my service an atmosphere o f 
trust exists between leaders and their subordinates.’ (p. 72)
This well-documented report, unfortunately, was apparently not considered
important to Army leaders in spite of what some might consider alarming news. That
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lack of concern was reflect in the comments of Lieutenant General David Ohle, the Army 
DCSPER, to the results/recommendations of CSIS study as reported by Sean Naylor, 
staff writer, in the January 17, 2000 Armv Times:
There’s nothing new in here that we haven’t heard before” and “the report told 
him nothing I did not know. I’m not uncomfortable with anything in the report. 
I’m not comfortable with where we are. That’s why we’ve got to move the Army 
forward in the leadership and human systems environment, (p. 15)
A willingness to speak out by the DOD leadership on manpower requirements
seems to have begun in 2000 as reported in USA Todav dated 26 September 2000. Dave
Moniz, in a front page article titled, Forces Seek More Troops, quotes senior Pentagon
officials as stating, “the Army is looking to add 15,000 to 40,000 soldiers . . .  They are
prepared to state that they need to bolster their forces to met a growing number of global
commitments.” (p. 1)
Subsequently, the 9 October 2000 Armv Times reported that Army Chief of Staff
General Shinseki stated the following to the Senate Armed Services Committee: “The
two war strategy is executable . . .  But the Army in the midst of a historic transformation.
to a lighter, more flexible force, will likely need thousands more soldiers and billions
more dollars to finish the job.” When asked by the Committee if a 1995 proposal to man
the Army at the 520,000 level was still accurate. General Shinseki replied, “Yes, the
essence of that amount is correct.” (p. 13)
Meanwhile, another Army Research Institute study briefing on “Attrition Among
Active Component Army Competitive Category Captains” presented in October 2000
reflected a continued deterioration of the Army’s ability to retain captains. Highlights o f
the briefing are as follows:
* ‘Stayers’ dropped from 69% in 1998 to 60% in 1996 to 50% in 2000.
* Since 1992 there have been statistically significant increases in the percentages, 
of both ‘leavers’ and ‘stayers’ who report that job satisfaction, quality of life, 
spouse satisfaction standard of living and retirement would be better in the
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civilian sector’ and are ‘reluctant to accept the amount of time away from home 
and number of PCS moves associated with being in the military.’
* The bottom line of why captains are thinking about leaving:
A. Benefits are seen as diminishing
B. “Leavers” less willing to accept impact o f PERSTEMPO.
C. Economy and job market are attractive and ‘leavers’ believe they can do better 
in the civilian sector.
Another indicator, that manning the Army was a challenge, was the comments 
made by the DCSPER to the Army commanders in a briefing in October 2000. Among a 
number of interesting elements in the briefing:
Officer attrition is continuing at a rate that will not allow full manning o f the force 
structure if  loss rates continue at the FYOO rate.
* Captains are leaving at completion of initial service obligations at higher rates.
* Lieutenant colonels and colonels are retiring earlier. Lieutenant colonels at 21 
years compared to 22 years in FY98. Colonels at 26 years compared to 28 years 
in FY98.
* Command declination at the highest rates ever: For colonels, 53 declinations 
over the 97-2000 period compared to just 12 in the previous 5 years. For 
lieutenant colonels, 108 declinations in period FY97-FY00 compared to 4 in the 
previous 5 years. Already 26 declinations in FYOl.
It is value to this research to be aware that the commanding general of U.S. Army 
Europe, General Montgomery C. Meigs, who apparently was concerned about the high 
declination of command rates issued Command Policy Letter 22, dated 6 November 
2001, with a subject: Interviewing Officers Who Decline Lieutenant Colonel and 
Colonel Command. The letter directed that:
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The first general officer (GO) in the officer’s rating chain will interview the 
officer. They should’ve conducted with objectivity and without prejudice. The 
intent is to find out why we are losing the officer (for example, personal reason, 
career decision.. .  After the interview, the GO will let me know why the officer 
declined command and provide this information to me on a non prejudicial and 
confidential basis.
From this researcher’s experience and perspective, the alarming levels of
command declinations, by which decliners forego almost any chance for their next
promotion, has alerted at least some senior leaders that losing top notch future senior
leaders is an indicator of internal Army problems with long-term adverse implications.
In what one might expect to be considered another indicator of where morale
issues were centered, a May 2001 GAO report titled Higher Allowances Should Increase
Use of Civilian Housing but Not Retention concluded:
DOD cannot expect a substantial increase in retention to result solely from 
increasing housing allowances. Together housing and housing allowances were 
cited in less than 1% of those surveyed as reasons for leaving the military, trailing 
far behind the top reasons like basic pay, amount of personal/family time and 
quality of leadership, (p.2)
An April 17, 2000, A Washington Post article written by staff writer, Thomas E. 
Ricks, titled. Younger Officers Quit Armv at Fast Clip details leaked portions of a 
General Shinseki commissioned survey of 760 officers attending the Command and 
General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The full results were never released 
by the Army but were leaked over the internet, apparently by insiders who felt the bad 
news would not be released. Some of the key points of dissatisfaction cited by these 
upper percentile officers are as follows:
* “Top down loyalty doesn’t exist. Senior leaders will throw subordinates under 
the bus in a heartbeat to protect or advance their careers.”
* “Readiness reporting - absolute lies.”
* “Many believe there needs to be a clean sweep o f senior leadership.”
* “The overriding theme is that there is no trust in the senior leadership.”
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Ricks goes on to point out that while 6.7% of Captains left the Army in 1989 at 
the end of the Cold War, 10.6%, a 58% increase, left in 1999. The article cited the 
Army’s view that the hot job market contributed to the losses, but the thrust of the 
Leavenworth survey stressed that “many leave because the Army is ‘no fun’ any more.” 
(p. A l)
OPTEMPO was addressed by Carl A. Castro and Amy B. Adler in Parameters.
the journal of the Army War College. The Autumn 1999 article titled Effects on Soldier
and Unit Readiness discussed the adverse impacts of a smaller Army with an expanded
mission within U.S. Army Europe. Key facts cited are as follows;
Within the past ten years, the U.S. Army Europe has shrunk by nearly 70%; from 
213,000 Army personnel in 1990 to approximately 62,000 in 1999 . . .  There has 
been a threefold increase in the number of military deployments with one-third o f 
the original number of personnel available to perform them.
The author’s conclude that “operations tempo has now been linked to retention,
family stability and medical readiness.” (pp. 86-95)
The end of the Cold War characterized by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and
the destruction of the Berlin Wall created an expectation that a peaceful world
environment would evolve. The downsizing of U.S. armed forces was a practical and
economically driven course of action that had popular support across the U.S. For the
U.S. army, it meant a reduction in authorized strength from a high of 711,000 in 1991 to
480,000 in 2000. The benefit of a “peaceful world” was the anticipated transfer of
defense budget dollars to other domestic programs that had seen some sacrifice in order
to “win” the Cold War.
Unfortunately, the “peaceful world” did not evolve. According to Sergeant M ajor
of the Army, Robert Hall, in a statement to Armv Times (May 1, 2000):
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As of mid April 2000, 29,000 soldiers were deployed on 272 missions in 77 
countries. That pace of operations is the most intense since WWII. As a result of 
peace keeping missions in Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and a host of smaller commitments. Armv Times (p9, 31 January 2000) 
reported the bipartisan Congressional Budget Office said as military officials have 
been warning that the increased use of U.S. military forces in peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions makes it more difficult to be prepared for w a r . . .  The 
army’s problems are more complex and could require either fundamental changes 
in how units are organized or up to 20,000 more soldiers. (P. 15)
The report was released in early January 2000.
To date no strength increases have been approved. As a result of the war against 
terrorism following the September 11, 2001, attack in New York and increasing 
deployments to the combat area in and around Afghanistan, mission commitments have 
increased while the 480,000 soldier army sees no growth.
The operational tempo or OPTEMPO has as a result been very high for the entire 
period commencing shortly after the 1991 Gulf War. According to a 1 November 1999 
article in Armv Times bv William Mathews (p. 20) “on any given day, there are 123,000 
soldiers stationed overseas and 28,000 deployed to a variety of operation around the 
world. That means nearly a third of the army’s 474,.000 troops are deployed overseas.” 
(The army failed to meet recruiting goals in 1999 which accounts for being 6,000 soldiers 
short of it’s authorized strength of 480,000.)
A June 26, 2000, Armv Times editorial addressed the cost of deployment in 
terms of “alarming losses in recruiting and retention.” The article went on to quote an 
army captain who stated, “Pay is not the No. 1 issue. The No. 1 issue is operating tempo 
and deployment.” (p. 60) The article also reminded readers that the Congress took the 
action to force the services to carefully oversee the tendency to overburden troops by 
inserting a poison pill provision in the 2000 Defense Authorization Act. The act imposed 
a penalty requiring a $100 a day allowance for any service member deployed more than 
250 of the previous 365 days commencing October 2001. The Depart of Defense did not 
seek such a provision in the Act and does not support it.
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Army Medical Care: Six The Stars and Stripes editions (October 19,20, 21, 11,12 and 
26,1997) published a series of articles written by Russel Carollo and Jeff Nesmith of the 
Davton Daily News entitled “Unnecessary Danger Military Medicine.” The series 
painted a sordid picture of Army medicine:
1. Of inept problem doctors with “special licenses” that limited practice to 
military bases, Indian reservations, mental hospitals, prisons and labs handling organs for 
transplant. They were not licensed for regular civilian health care institutions.
2. Overcrowded and understaffed medical facilities.
3. Significant numbers of malpractice accusations to include incidents involving 
170 patients who died during the period 1994 and ‘95, yet only one practitioner was 
reported in either year to the National Practitioner Data Bank, a national registry of health 
care workers linked to medical malpractice.
4. Military doctors are America’s lowest paid doctors.
5. Secrecy and lax oversight pose risks in military health care system.
Response articles reflecting Pentagon comments related to the military medicine
series were published in the 19 and 26 October 1997 The Stars and Stripes. The initial 
Pentagon medical department response emphasized:
“Military medicine isn’t perfect, but the system still rates highly when compared 
to civilian health care.”
“Inherent differences between the military and civilian health care systems do not 
mean the quality of care delivered to military personnel and their families suffer.”
“These differences, however, result in neither degraded quality of health care 
delivered nor lessened satisfaction with health care received.”
Following one sad story after another of actual medical malpractice accounts 
contained in the series of articles, it appeared that Army medical leadership had failed to 
take action against inept doctors, six of whom each had failed the standard state licensing 
exam more than 10 times. As a result of the bad press, the Pentagon’s position quickly
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changed. The October 26 The Stars and Stripes instead of sustaining the previous 
position cited on 19 October, “acknowledged” that its health care system had serious 
problems, and top military officials proposed changes to make the services nearly 600 
hospitals and clinics safer.” The artiele went on: “Rudy Deleon, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, stated, “The Pentagon has been aware of the need 
to improve the military health system . . .  of the health eare system, there are problems.” 
Unfortunately, the article went on to reveal that on the day Mr. DeLeon was 
admitting to major problems, the senior medical chiefs of the three services, in a joint 
letter to the editor of the Armv Times. 26 Oetober 1999, lauded the military health care 
system. Their letter stated in part, “we believe that our military health services system is 
one of the highest quality systems in the world” (p. 5). (Note: It is clear to those in 
uniform that the availability and quality of care is not what they have been promised. 
With the reversal of position on quality by Mr. DeLeon yet countered by the adherence 
by his uniformed medical chiefs that all is well, sends a clear message that candor from 
the uniformed side cannot be expected. The front-page series of articles resulted in high 
negative visibility for Army and Defense medicine.)
In an Armv Times (November 3, 1998) weekly commentary, John F. Mazzuehi, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Clinical Services, reinforced Secretary 
DeLeon’s position that problems in military medical delivery systems existed. Mazzuehi 
went on to state, “he is pushing the military services to speed up their review of potential 
malpraetiee cases .. I can guarantee you it will not be business as usual.”
Other highlights of the article:
* Service officials say they have taken steps to restrict or remove from clinical 
duties the 20 or so active-duty physicians they’ve identified as not holding a 
standard state medical license, a Defense Department requirement.
* The Army appears to have the greatest backlog of potential malpractice cases 
awaiting review.
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* Lieutenant General Ronald Blank, Army Surgeon General (who signed a letter 
the week before along with the other top military medical chiefs stating medical 
service was one of the highest quality systems in the world stated ‘it’s a 
considerable embarrassment to me that someone had to point these (special 
licenses) out. (p. 3)
Gulf W ar Illnesses: The Gulf War syndrome controversy has been and remains cause 
for seeds of distrust to be sown in military minds regarding the candor and advocacy of 
Army leadership. A summary of press releases commencing in 1996 provides important 
insights as to why statements from the Army and DOD may be considered misleading, 
perhaps perceived as dishonest and certainly are not the straight-forward factual 
information that a soldier, or veteran, should expect from a concerned and loyal 
leadership.
One should recall that the Gulf (Iraqi) 100-Day War commenced in January 1991. 
Some 695,000 U.S. military members served in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation 
Desert Storm. Military members from a host of NATO and even former Warsaw Pact 
nations were allied in the successful effort to push Iraq out of Kuwait and to destroy the 
Iraqi Army.
Although there is evidence that Gulf veterans began to suffer from undiagnosed
maladies soon after forces returned from the Gulf, it was not until 1993 that complaints o f
debilitating illnesses to what were once healthy soldiers became a high visibility issue.
On May 25, 1994, the U.S. Senate issued a 198-page report entitled U.S. Chemical and
Biological Warfare - Related Dual-Use reports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the
Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War.
On the same day (25 May 1994) “in a letter to all Persian Gulf War Veterans,
General John M. Shalikashvili, Army Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and William
J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, affirmed: ‘There is no information classified or
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unclassified, that indicates that chemical or biological weapons were used in the Gulf.’” 
(Arrison III, p. 14) (NOTE: While such a statement is most likely accurate, that no 
weapons were used, the potential danger of released agents from bombed chemical 
munitions storage sites or demolition of such sites by U.S. Forces was not mentioned.)
In comparison to the unequivocal statements from General Shalikashvili and 
Secretary Perry, the following chronology of excerpts from news articles reflect a far 
different version of fact (truth):
The October 21, 1996, Armv Times reported:
Five Ajrmy units were in the vicinity of Khamisiyah, Iraq, March 4 , 1991, when 
Army engineers blew up an ammunition bunker that is now thought to have 
contained significant quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons, including deadly sarin 
gas . . .
The units thought to total about 1100 soldiers in a l l . . .  The Pentagon has not yet 
determined the exact number of troops who may have been exposed to low levels 
of chemical fallout. . .
The Defense Department had long maintained that there was no evidence U.S. 
troops were exposed to toxic chemicals in the Gulf W ar . . .
‘The truth is, this is a big screw up’ said one senior defense official. . .  it was 
well known a while back - but at a lower level of the Pentagon - that there was a 
chance of chemical exposure, but it never reached high enough for anyone to act. 
(p. 12).
On October 20, 1996, The Stars and Stripes published a New York Times article 
that states:
Soldiers whose sole responsibility during the 1991 Persian Gulf War was 
chemical detection say that U.S. military commanders repeatedly were warned 
that sensitive detection equipment had identified Iraqi chemical weapons on the 
battlefield - and that the toxins were wafting over unprotected U. S. troops . . .  
The Pentagon acknowledged this month (October 1996) that more than 15,000 
U.S. troops may have been exposed to nerve gas when a battalion of U.S. combat 
engineers blew up an Iraqi ammunition depot in March 1991, a few days after the 
end of the war. (pp. 1, 6)
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An October 31, 1996, Associated Press story in the The Stars and Stripes
reported:
The Pentagon and the CIA are withholding evidence that thousands of U.S. troops 
were exposed to chemical weapons during the Persian Gulf War . . .  Patrick 
Eddington who worked for the CIA during the Gulf War said he saw ‘a Pattern o f 
deception and denial, and it is continuing to this day . . . ’ Eddington said logs for 
the 101st Airborne Division from January 1991 showed that during a period of 
two to three hours one unit repeatedly detected chemical agents, (pp. 1-2)
On November 1, 1996, The Stars and Stripes published a New York Times article
that reported:
More than 200 American intelligence reports about the 1991 Gulf War that were 
removed from public inspection earlier this year by the Pentagon are scheduled to 
be released again this week - but not by the Defense Department. . .  The 
intelligence reports were first made public last year by the Defense Department on 
the Internet to convince ailing Gulf War veterans that the government was not 
hiding information from them about the possible cause of their health problems. . . 
The owner of a small Washington publishing company said that he would defy 
the Pentagon and the CIA and make the documents public once again beginning 
today on his Internet site, http://www.insigniausa.com. (pp. 1-2)
On November 4, 1996, The Stars and Stripes reports “Defense officials say they
are now looking for more than 20,800 soldiers who may have been within a 50 kilometer
radius of Iraqi chemical weapons when they were blown up in March 1991."
On November 25, 1996, the Armv Times, in a special report, stated: 
Acknowledging that mistakes have been made in the investigation so far, defense 
officials said they are increasing the number of investigators from 12 to 110, and 
the budget is being increased from $2 million to $12 million.. ..
T don’t think we fially understood the problem,’ Bernard Rostker, Special 
Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, said. ‘Upon reflection, we could have done 
things differently and better.’ (pp. 16-18)
On December 6, 1996, The Stars and Stripes published an AP story that reported:
Several doctors claim their jobs are threatened because they are offering new 
theories that dispute government findings
Complicating matters, military logs that could be crucial to Gulf War illness 
investigators are missing according to published reports. The logs from March 4
62
to March 10,1991, were kept for U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf 
and were supposed to have recorded any incident in which chemical or biological 
agents were detected . . .
Schwarzkopf, who retired after the war, had no comment on either report, (p. 2) 
On November 28,1996, The Stars and Stripes published a Newsdav story that 
reported:
A Nobel laureate who headed a 1994 Pentagon study that dismissed links between 
chemical and biological weapons and Persian Gulf War illnesses was also the 
director of a U.S. company that had earlier exported anthrax and other lethal 
materials to Iraq before the 1991 conflict. . .  Joshua Lederberg served as 
Chairman of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health 
Effects . . .
Despite repeated requests for comment, Lederberg declined to be interviewed or 
to answer written questions . . .
According to Gary Pitts, one of the lawyers representing more than 2000 Gulf 
War veterans partieipating in a class action suite in state court in Texas, ‘it 
doesn’t pass the smell test.’ (p. 6)
On December 7, 1996, The Stars and Stripes published an AP story that reported:
A deadly nerve gas spewed out of canisters found by U.N. inspectors at an Iraqi 
weapons depot, a Pentagon official said, adding details to evidence that 
Americans who blew up the depot after the Persian Gulf War were exposed to 
chemical weapons . . .
Retired U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded forces in 
the 1991 war, said Thursday that he did not believe Iraqi chemical weapons had 
anything to do with the veterans’ illnesses . . .
In his interview with the Times. Schwarzkopf said he did not know of any 
incident in which any chemical was uncovered in the war . . .  there was no 
chemical exposure at all that I know o f . . .  absolutely no idea why parts of the 
logs are missing . . .  never saw the logs. (p. 6)
December 11, 1996, The Stars and Stripes published an AP story that reported:
A 1994 government study discounting links between chemical weapons and 
illnesses reported by some Gulf War veterans might have to be revised in light of 
new evidence ..  .
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Joshua Lederberg, the Nobel Prize-Winning Geneticist.. said the Defense 
Department had not told him about the chemical weapons explosion . . .
His remarks raise questions about a study the Pentagon has cited for more than 
two years in insisting there was no evidence U.S. troops had been sickened or 
even exposed to Iraqi nerve gas or other chemical weapons during the w a r . . .  
Lederberg also said the research panel had not been told the Czechoslovak 
soldiers who had detected chemical weapons during the war had been so 
concerned about the possibility of chemical exposure that they immediately pulled 
on gas masks and other protective equipment while American soldiers remained 
unprotected, (p. 5)
The Armv Times. January 6,1997, reported:
For nearly five years, the Department of Veterans Affairs delayed launching its 
own research studies into the effects of low-level chemical exposure or the health 
of Gulf War veterans because it relied on the Pentagon’s long-held position that 
no U.S. troops were exposed to Iraqi chemical weapons during the Gulf W ar . .
As long as the DOD sticks to its statement that nobody was injured, no chemicals 
were used . . .  the VA is going to have to take a different position, (p. 20)
Armv Times, on January 6,1997, in a special article reported:
The Pentagon has launched a search for crews who manned Fox chemical 
detection vehicles during Desert Storm to determine if they detected chemical 
agents that could have afflicted U.S. troops . . .
The Pentagon has been in an uphill fight to gain credibility on the troop exposure 
issue ever since it reversed itself. For years it said no troops were exposed to 
Iraq’s chemical agents . .
Marine Gunnery Sergeant, George G. Grass, told a House Government Reform 
and Oversight Sub-Committee that the spectrometer inside his Fox vehicle 
detected traces of a nerve agent while going firom Saudi Arabia into Kuwait with 
the 1st Marine Division during the ground war in February 1991. (p. 23)
The Armv Times on January 6,1997, reported in a story headlined: One by one.
Pentagon’s arguments crumble under weight of new data that “all Gulf War veterans
really want is Congress to pass a law much like what was done in the case of Agent
Orange in Vietnam which presumes service in the Gulf War meant exposure to hazardous
substances, and that certain illnesses therefore are automatically eligible for the full
panoply of federal health benefits.”
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The story goes on to detail how three of five pillars of Pentagon denial have fallen 
and that the fourth and fifth; ‘that massive aerial bombardment of chemical and 
biological weapons factories in Iraq did not result in low-level exposure to coalition 
forces’ and ‘that Iraq used no chemical weapons in the Gulf War’ are likely to fall in 
1997. The article goes on to state that “denial on the effects of the aerial bombardment 
persists despite testimony in Congress by American units in Saudi Arabia that during the 
air war their chemical alarms went off on average two to six times a day like clockwork 
hours after the bombing runs. This has tremendously eroded the credibility o f the 
Pentagon.” (p. 4)
In an Armv Times. July 7,1997, commentary on Gulf War Syndrome, Bernard 
Rostker, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, conceded “the Pentagon has a major 
credibility problem in winning trust with the veterans after years of telling them their 
ailments were stress induced or in their heads.” (p. 10)
Armv Times on August 4,1997, reported:
The Pentagon confirmed July 24 that five times more U.S. troops than previously 
believed - a total of about 99,000 - may have been exposed to low levels of toxic 
nerve gas . . .
In a letter from Rostker, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, to Gulf War 
vets he emphasized that current medical evidence indicates that long-term health 
problems are unlikely . . .
Once again, the Pentagon wants to have it both ways. It says people have been 
exposed but it won’t harm anybody. They’ve got just a little bit of scientific 
integrity problem on this one, stated Patrick Eddington a former CIA analyst who 
quit over the Gulf War illness issue, (p. 3)
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The Stars and Stripes. August 20,1997, reported:
Nearly half the members of the White House Committee on the Illnesses of Gulf 
War Veterans say they will urge the panel to reverse itself and conclude that Iraqi 
chemical weapons may be an important factor in the veterans’ health problems .. 
Their views suggest a dramatic turnaround in the final report of the panel which in 
an interim report to the President singled out wartime stress as a likely cause of 
the ailments, (pp. 1,5)
On Aug 31, 1997, The Stars and Stripes carried an A? story, which outlined that a 
U.S. soldier suffered bums and blisters in 1991 after searching an abandoned Iraqi bunker 
containing wooden crates inscribed with skull and crossbones poison warnings. Medical 
evaluation and treatment diagnosed the soldier to have been exposed to liquid mustard 
chemical warfare agent. The soldier who has left the Army was awarded a Purple Heart 
medal (p. 9).
In its summer 1997 edition, Hoosier Legionnaire reported “The U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Congress’ chief investigative arm, recently released a report highly 
critical of the federal government handling of health complaints by the nation’s Gulf W ar 
veterans.”
The article concluded: “GAO rapped government agencies and the Presidential
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses in particular for identifying stress
as the primary risk factor in Gulf War illnesses” (p. 9).
The Stars and Stripes, on September 7,1997, published a New York Times article
titled, “Panel: DOD out of Gulf War Probe.” The story went on to say:
A special White House panel said Friday that the Pentagon had lost so much 
credibility in its investigation of the release of Iraqi chemical weapons in the 1991 
Persian Gulf War that oversight of the investigation must be taken away from the 
Defense Department permanently . . .  In its final public hearing after a two-year 
inquiry, the panel called on the White House or the National Security Council to 
draw up plans to transfer oversight to an agency other than the Defense 
Department - possibly one with subpoena power. ( p. 5)
Armv Times, on September 29,1997, reported that in a two-day meeting on 4-5
September in Alexandria, Virginia:
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The Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illnesses indicated it is 
sticking by its conclusions of its January report to President Clinton that stress is 
the most likely cause of most gulf veterans’ illnesses. . .
But the advisory panel is drafting a new report, its last, which recommends 
Congress establish a permanent program in which scientists would continue to 
review evidence that could link illnesses to service in the war. (p. 14)
Armv Times. October 6,1997, reported:
The House of Representatives, agreeing with a presidential panel, is urging that 
more government studies be done on Gulf War illnesses - but outside the 
Department of Defense . ..
Seventy thousand soldiers are sick, said the measures sponsor. Representative 
Bernard Sanders, I-Vt. The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs, which 
have headed earlier studies have produced inadequate results, (p. 14)
The Stars and Stripes. October 27,1997, published a New York Times article
titled, “House Panel calls Gulf War inquiry inept.” The story went on to say, “in its final
report, the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight said the
congressional investigation showed that ‘a variety of toxic agents in the Gulf War’
including Iraqi chemical weapons and pesticides were probably responsible for the health
problems reported by thousands of veterans.” (p. 1)
In the introduction to the report. Representative Christopher Shays, R-
Connecticut, chairman of the committee, said the investigations by the Pentagon and the
Department of Veterans Affairs were “irreparably flawed” and had to be “plagued by
arrogant incuriosity and a pervasive myopia that sees a lack of evidence as proof’ . . .
“we find current approaches to research, diagnosis and treatment unlikely to yield
answers to veterans life-or-death questions.” (p. 2)
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The Armv Times of November 10,1997, reported:
Despite Pentagon assurances that it would not repeat the mistakes it made with 
experimental drugs in the Gulf War, it is not abiding by the regulations designed 
to ensure the safe use of such drugs - most recently in Bosnia, say federal 
officials. The deviations in Bosnia show that DOD has not corrected its 
procedures to prevent the reoccurrence of problems in the use of investigational 
products that arose during the Persian Gulf W ar . . .  We are concerned that a 
number of the lessons that should have been learned firom the Gulf War have not 
led to corrections that should have been demonstrated in Bosnia . . .  By press 
time, the Defense Department had not responded in writing to the FDA. (p. 6)
Armv Times. November 17,1997, reported:
Parts of missing logs found. Investigation finds no evidence of conspiracy to 
destroy chemical documents . . .  The investigation, armed with two federal search 
warrants, discovered 165 new entries - about 15 pages in a storage facility. They 
were found among the personal effects of an active duty Army officer who had
access to them Still missing are roughly 128 to 158 pages of logs that were
required to be kept and safeguarded, (p. 10)
Armv Times. February 2,1998, reported:
Pentagon officials have acknowledged for the first time that thousands of Gulf 
War veterans may have been unnecessarily exposed to the hazards of depleted 
uranium because of inadequate training before Desert Storm . . .  Depleted 
uranium is a heavy metal used in tank armor and armor piercing munitions and is 
sometimes associated with kidney and nervous system ailments . . .  Gulf War 
veterans’ advocates see the heightened attention given depleted uranium as a 
victory. They have been claiming for years that depleted uranium may be one of 
the reasons veterans are ill. (p. 9)
In this researcher’s questionnaire, the issue of candor, advocacy and trust of Army 
leadership is addressed. The initial denial, incomplete revelations and the growth of 
Pentagon estimates of exposed soldier numbers firom zero to 1100 to “more than 15,000” 
to 20,800 and eventually to 100,000 sends a signal to veterans and active duty soldiers 
that Army “truths” are not always true. Adding to the confusion of the levels of loyalty 
and trust of Army leadership are the unequivocal statements by Generals Shalikashvili, 
Schwarzkopf, and Powell as well as Secretary of Defense William Perry that no chemical
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or biological weapons were used in the Gulf War. These statements may be accurate 
when the operative word “used” is applied. The salient question, however, that many 
soldiers most likely continue to ponder is whether these well-known and respected 
Generals were just plain wrong or instead did not know or consider other means whereby 
exposure to chemicals may have occurred. This researcher would have expected them to 
err on the side of soldiers with illness rather than on the side of those who came down on 
the side of “stress” as the cause of Gulf War illness.
What is especially tragic with the Gulf War Syndrome episode is its similarity to 
the travails suffered by Vietnam veterans with the lethal and long-term debilitating 
illnesses from Agent Orange exposure and what was initially labeled post-traumatic 
stress disorder. Wilbur J. Scott, as a sociological storyteller, unfolds the same lack of 
advocacy on the part of the Army, DOD, and Veterans Administration in his 1993 book. 
The Politics of Readjustment. The unwillingness of government agencies, to include the 
Army, to err on the side of those who served in Vietnam continues to cause outright 
animosity and distrust by tens of thousands of veterans toward these government 
organizations.
The issue from this researcher’s perspective is the implication of failure on the 
part of the military leadership to advocate on an immediate basis for Gulf War veterans in 
their time of need. This study on trust will attempt to determine in part if the failures in 
supporting ill Veterans of the Gulf War have produced lingering doubts in the minds o f 
today’s Officer Corps as to their fate if  a similar situation occurs in the future.
In summary, the review of literature cited in this chapter provides in great detail 
indications that serious problems may exist within the Army. Those problems include
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readiness issues related to both personnel and equipment shortages, health care 
shortcomings, intolerable levels of OPTEMPO, distrust of statements emanating from 
senior leadership, a perception that advocacy by the senior leadership is questionable and 
a general sensing by many that the army is in a state of denial that serious problems 
within the army exist. The ever increasing early departures from the army by lieutenants 
and captains, earlier retirements by majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels and the 
significant increases in declination of command opportunities at battalion and brigade 
level substantiate levels of dissatisfaction by the Officer Corps that should generate 
serious concerns by army leadership and the National Command Authority. 
Unfortunately, this researcher continues to perceive a pattern of denial and unwillingness 
or inability by senior army leadership to step up and address issues forthrightly and with 
candor.
As a result of the elements cited above, this research is of value from the 
perspective that it will provide one more document that assesses the state of morale, trust 
in leadership and basis of what the causative factors are as seen through the eyes of 
officers on the ground.
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY
A. Introduction:
This study will be a histography of forty U. S. Army officers obtained through 
one on one in-depth interviews. The interviews and the resulting verbatim transcripts 
were utilized to provide a rich descriptive account of individual history, experiences, 
perceptions and opinions. Those experiences have revealed through appropriate insertion 
of questions regarding current Army culture and related issues, perceptions regarding that 
culture to include the level of trust in the Army leadership.
The purpose of this research is to provide a rich human descriptive account of 
officer experiences and observations that enhance the statistics already obtained by the 
Army in its myriad of annual sample surveys of military personnel (SSMP). My 
objective has been “to capture the complex nuances, the people, meanings, events, and 
even ideas of the past that have influenced and shaped the present” (Hamilton, 1993 and 
Leedy, 1993, cited by Berg, 1995). Since the state of Army leadership is revealed on a 
daily basis to military members, retirees and interested civilians and since its composition 
is dynamic based upon retirements, reassignments and promotions, this histography 
places primary emphasis upon the period commencing with the fall of the Warsaw Pact in 
1989 up until the day of each interview and then beyond utilizing relevant media, official 
DOD sources and other publications..
The objective of this research is to add the human dimension as seen through the 
eyes of those who have experienced those things that are measured in the form of 
opinions contained in Army surveys. It is the voices, faces and emotions that can add 
significant meaning to the statistical analysis already available. According to Berg
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(1995) eyewitnesses are considered primary sources in historical research.
1. Objective
a. To enhance the statistical results of the 1995 Command Climate Survey and the 
1997 Leadership and Professionalism Survey and follow-on Army initiated surveys with 
in-depth historiographical interviews that relate life stories and resulting perceptions 
about the military culture.
b. By blending into the interview in an unobtrusive manner appropriate questions 
that seek to reveal perceptions of trust in leadership at various levels of the Army, 
(company, battalion, brigade, division, corps, major command. Army headquarters).
c. Ultimately the objective is to portray the level o f trust in Army leadership as 
seen by those interviewed. This portrayal will add to the body of knowledge related to 
Army leadership as it carries out its important role in national defense and projecting 
power in the national interest.
2. Obiectivitv and Personal Bias: My background and entire adult life has placed me 
either inside or on the periphery of the U.S. Army. One cannot have been part of any 
institution for fifty-five years without developing strong beliefs, intense dedication and a  
critical perspective for all that it represents. As the son of a Sergeant Major who moved 
into government quarters at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in 1942,1 was raised as an 
“Army brat.” The Army has changed significantly since I was commissioned through 
the ROTC Program at North Georgia College and Rutgers University in 1958 and entered 
active duty as a second lieutenant. Quartermaster Corps, with an initial assignment as th« 
parachute pack platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division. The standards developed 
in the airborne culture, where the term “paratrooper” marks you distinctively as different
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from the non-airbome “legs” have remained as this researcher’s standards to this day. It 
is, therefore, fair to say that I bring some biases to this endeavor as I look at today’s 
Army. Along with many of my contemporaries, I wince when I hear today’s constant 
public uttering of the phrase “it’s the best Army we’ve ever had.” I perceive that the 
measurement standards have changed somewhat since 1958. Between then and today, I 
have commanded at platoon, company, battalion and depot (brigade) level mostly on 
airborne status. Concurrent with those commands, and related assignments, to include 
two Pentagon tours, I have served two tours in Vietnam and over sixteen years in 
Germany (including eight years as an Army civilian). I retired from the Army in 1984 as 
a full Colonel to enter the defense industry and subsequently returned to work with the 
Army as a DOD civilian in Germany. I retired from civilian service in December 1998 
and settled in Augusta, Georgia. In February 2002,1 subsequently gained employment 
for thirteen months with Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe as the director o f Morale, 
Welfare and Recreation for U.S. Forces serving in the Balkans. I lived with, and served 
daily on a face-to-face basis, the troops in Bosnia and Kosovo for that exciting and most 
satisfying adventure. In summary, I have been part of, or very close to, the Army since 
age seven. I bring, therefore, a solid understanding and knowledge of the Army 
organization, culture, professional ethic and most importantly of soldiers themselves. 
Along with that background comes a strong bias toward service to country as a profession 
built upon the concept that duty, honor, country should reflect one’s thoughts and deeds 
all of the time.
My perception is that a deterioration of leader ethics, honesty, candor and as a 
result trust and loyalty has occurred in today’s Army. The personal pride of having
73
played a small part in ending the Cold War by the pre 1991 Army makes this research 
project a passionate endeavor.
Oftentimes, organizational leaders do not perceive evidence of problems. It 
seems a natural phenomenon that bad news is kept from the leadership. Sometimes 
personal ego or pride on the part of the leadership deter them from recognizing that 
problems exist in their organization while they are in charge. Denial that problems exist, 
unfortunately, is not limited to military organizations. Such a situation unrecognized 
and/or not to addressed and therefore not resolved can result in serious harm to any 
organization. If such a condition exists in the Army, with its critical responsibility of 
promoting and protecting U.S. interests in a volatile world, the long-term implications 
could be disastrous for our nation.
The bias, therefore, that I bring to this study is my perception that a significant 
gulf does exist between what the Army has set for its standards of trust and integrity and 
what is actually being practiced and condoned. With that bias in mind, I did my best to 
question my interviewees objectively, listen to their responses attentively and compile 
and assess the results in a balanced and accurate manner.
B. Selection of Subjects:
1. Objective: The objective of the sampling process that was employed was to identify, 
randomly select, and interview 40 Army commissioned officers who, as a group, were 
representative of the demographics of the Army at the time. The interviewing was 
accomplished at a major Army installation where an active duty division is stationed. 
Identification of the division could breach the confidentiality of the interviewees so the 
writer does not identify it. Interviews were conducted in August 1999.
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The original plan as proposed in the prospectus, called for selecting study 
participants utilizing a cluster sampling technique (Schutt, 1996) built around battalion 
clusters within an Army division stationed in Germany. The clusters (battalions) to be 
used for selection of interview subjects were to be selected from the larger population of 
clusters (Wiersma, 1995) assigned to the Army division. Unfortunately, the assistant 
division commander of the 1®* Armored Division stationed in Germany disapproved my 
request to interview his officers. The dissertation topic of Officer Trust in Armv 
Leadership may have been too controversial from his perspective. Upon the researcher’s 
return to the United States in early 1999, he followed his only viable course o f action and 
approached an Army division located in the continental U.S. As with many plans, once 
on the ground at the Army installation, it was determined in discussions with the G-3 
projeet officer that such an approach was not practical if  the ultimate objective was to 
obtain a sample that would be representative of the Army Officer Corps from the 
perspective of race, gender, branch and grade. Based upon the researcher’s letter request 
to the division commander dated 28 June 1999, written approval (16 July 1999 was 
provided) to interview 40 officers. The division commander appointed a central tasking 
officer within the G-3 staff to assist in arranging for the interviews. That officer was the 
interface between the researcher and the division units to insure that the officers selected 
by the researcher from the division officer roster were available for interview at the 
appropriate times. By-name taskings were sent to the units by the tasking officer. In 
some cases where an officer was on leave, temporary duty, or unavailable for other 
reasons, the unit was permitted to substitute an officer possessing the same demographic 
qualifications identified in the tasking.
75
2. Selection Process:
The interviewees were selected randomly by name utilizing a table of random 
numbers. The division provided the researcher with a copy of the entire officer roster 
from its automated database. That roster reflected, among other things, those personal 
data items critical to obtaining a representative sample of the entire Army Officer Corps. 
The demographic mix of the Army Officer Corps at the time was obtained from statistical 
data released by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) as o f 
the end of fiscal year 1998 (30 September 1998). Total Army strength at that time was 
mandated by the Congress to be at 480,000 soldiers. The Department of Army, Office o f 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, (ODCSPER) report was published in the March 
8, 1999, Armv Times. Information related to the survey objective o f being 
demographically representative of the entire Army obtained from the report is as follows: 
Of an Officer Corps of 66,792, 14.4% or 9,618 were women; 11.0% or 7,372 
were black men and women; and 3.6% or 2,411 were Hispanic men and women. The 
remaining 57,009 were Caucasian, “other” or Asian/Mongolian. The latter two racial 
groups are too small to register; however, three officers interviewed who fell into that 
category (1 Native American, 1 Asian, and 1 Pacific Islander).
In order to obtain representation of the full spectrum of job specialties found 
across the Army Officer Corps, it was necessary to sample combat arms (Infantry,
Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery), combat support (Aviation, Engineers, 
Military Intelligence, Signal and Chemical Corps) and combat service support (Ordnance, 
Quartermaster and Transportation) officers in the ratio of 40%, 30%, 30% respectively. 
That ratio is a fair representation of the Army Officer Corps. Sampling across each
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branch in a proportional manner insures that input was received from the full spectrum of 
experiences and challenges that may be unique in the variety of units within an Army 
division with different missions and functions. All branches of the Army were 
represented in the interviewee population.
Second lieutenants who upon promotion to first lieutenant must have two full 
years of commissioned military service were not included in the sample. They were 
omitted on purpose. Since it oftentimes takes a year of military schooling prior to 
assignment to a unit it was the position of the researcher that such officers normally had 
not reached a point where they had a reasonable level of awareness of what was 
happening across the Army outside of their personal challenge of learning how to 
integrate successfully as a newly commission officer.
Considering the factors outlined above, the researcher utilized a random numbers 
table to rotate through he division alphabetical officer roster. Each random number “hit” 
was evaluated to verify that the officer met the predetermined selection criterion outlined 
above. Those not fitting the demographic objectives were not selected. Several passes 
through both the random numbers table and the officer roster were required in order to 
obtain the desired representative demographic mix. The names of the officers selected by 
the researcher were then provided to the G-3 tasking officer for appropriate tasking action 
with the subordinate units.
C. Generalizeability/Extemal Validity:
In spite of the relatively small sample size of forty officers, the methodology utilized 
in their selection as explained above will contribute to external validity and 
generalizeability of the results. Further, it is important to recall that the stories and
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vignettes and commentary derived from the verbatim recording of the in-depth interviews 
are designed to compliment, enhance and expand upon the statistical data derived by the 
surveys conducted by the Army since 1995 as well as other Army studies and research. It 
is anticipated that the results of both surveys and other analyses will be obtained from the 
Army and other sources to assist in correlating the stories, vignettes and commentary 
with those results. Although obtaining survey and related data is not critical to this 
research, its availability will add to the overall richness of the research. By starting with 
the Army’s survey data, the addition of both the evidence from literature and in-depth 
interviews will achieve a more substantive picture o f reality. “Enhanced validity is 
derived from the multiple lines of sight obtained by triangulation.” (Berg, 1995)
D. Subject Characteristics:
TABLE 2:
DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS BY RACE. GENDER & BRANCH
ARMY BRANCH BLACK 
M F
CAUCASIAN 
M F
HISPANIC 
M F
OTHER 
M F
TOTAL
Combat Arms 
Inf 
Arty 
Armor 
AirDef
1 1
3
5
2
1
1 3
3
6
2
14 Subtotal
Combat Support 
Aviation 
Chem 
Eng 
MI
Signal
I
I
1
1 I 
1
1 1
2 1 
1
1
2
2
4
4
1
13 Subtotal
Comb Service Support 
Ord 
QM 
Trans
1
2
3 1
4
1
1
6
5
2
13 Subtotal
Totals 5 2 24 4 1 1 1 2 40
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A summary table containing an array of demographic and other pertinent personal 
information (rank, branch, race, gender, source of commission, education, years of Army 
service, marital status and average hours worked weekly) on all officers interviewed is at 
Table 3 in chapter 3, Findings. The officer group interviewed was comprised of one 
colonel, one lieutenant colonel, four majors, twenty captains and fourteen first lieutenants 
which is an excellent pyramidal representation of the Army rank structure. Twenty-eight 
officers were Caucasian, seven were Black, two Hispanic, one Asian, one Native 
American and one a Pacific Islander. Of the forty officers, thirty-three, or 83%, were 
male and seven, or 17%, were female. In summary, the interviewed officers were a valid 
demographic representation of the entire Army Officer Corps.
E. Interview Setting and Process:
Interviews were conducted at the installation automation directorate conference 
suite, a private and quiet complex removed from the division’s operational and billeting 
areas. The two offices utilized for both administrative processing and for the interviews 
were lights, airy and very conducive to the researcher’s commitment to confidentiality.
Officers arrived in accordance with the prescribed schedule that had been 
distributed to divisional units by the division tasker. Memorandum #908-135, subject: 
“Officer Trust in Army Leadership,” interviews. That memorandum insured that 
interview subjects were aware of the topic to be discussed prior to their arrival. (The 
tasking memo is available in the researcher’s files). Accompanying the tasking 
memorandum was a copy of the consent form for each officer selected for interview 
(Appendix B). Copies of signed consent forms fi"om each interviewee are available in the 
files of the researcher.
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upon arrival at the interview location, each officer was greeted and briefed by the 
researcher’s administrative assistant as to the procedures to be followed during and after 
the interview. A participant information form was compiled and a tracking card prepared 
to facilitate the distribution of transcribed interviews to the interviewees for their review 
and approval. Following the administrative steps, officers were escorted to the interview 
room where they were introduced to the researcher who explained the research topic and 
the methodology as well as the verification of the commitment to complete 
confidentiality. A final opportunity for the officer to withdraw from the research was 
offered prior to any questions being asked. No officers refused the opportunity to 
proceed.
The interview was preceded by a few moments of “warm-up” dialog addressing 
such things as source of commission, military experience and previous assignments of the 
officer as well as a short review of the researcher’s military background as a retired Army 
officer. Experience has convinced me that officers are more comfortable with talking 
freely with a fellow officer than with a civilian. I found that in almost every case, the 
interviewees were enthusiastic about being offered the opportunity discuss the topics 
addressed by the interview questions approved by the University of Oklahoma 
Institutional Review Board in the Office of Research Administration memorandum,
March 13, 2000, subject: IRB-Review of Use of Human Subjects in Research Project 
(FY99-18). Responses from the officers interviewed were spontaneous, honest, well 
thought out and in many cases expressed with genuine emotion.
In order to maintain a relaxed atmosphere and to insure a smooth flow of dialog, 
the fixed list of questions found at Appendix C were asked in random order as
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appropriate. To insure that questions were direct and clear, it was standard practice to 
shorten and paraphrase the questions approved by the Institutional Review Board. A 
typical interview would include questions similar to the following: “Do you sense a zero 
defects environment?” “Can you make a mistake and survive?” “Can you be innovative 
and try new concepts without fear?” Or, in the case of operational tempo, “Are you too 
busy or is the daily pace of operations about right?” With the issue of health and dental 
care, “How would you rate health/dental care on the scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the 
best?” “What are the issues?” With the issues of morale, the question was asked: “How 
would you rate morale on a scale of 1 to 10?” “What do you see as factors that impact 
upon morale?” The aforementioned interview style was applied across the spectrum of 
questions in order to insure respondents an opportunity to provide the full range of their 
views.
It was interesting that the one colonel (06) interviewed was generally more 
optimistic and positive regarding every topic discussed than the officers of lower rank, to 
include the five other field grade (LTC and MAJ) who participated in the study. After 
completing all interviews, it appears, from the researcher’s perspective, that the 06 may 
have fallen into the group identified by a number of other interviewees as “echelons 
above reality.” That descriptor was applied to those senior officers normally in the rank 
of colonel and above who were generally perceived by lower ranking officers to be out o f  
touch with the daily challenges faced by the lower ranking members of the Officer Corps. 
The responses of the 06, however, appeared to be credible, honest and spontaneous and a  
valid representation of his personal views.
Each taped interview was transcribed to typed copy and sent to each officer for
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their review; any correction and approval was reflected by a signature and date. All 
transcripts were returned, some as a result of follow-up action. They are available in the 
files of the researcher.
Emphasis was placed on obtaining quality data that addressed not only 
perceptions of trust but also experiences and vignettes that could be woven into an 
understandable mosaic once the full spectrum of interviews is completed.
A tape recorder was employed to obtain a verbatim recording of oral history to 
include stories prompted by unobtrusive appropriately timed questions by the researcher. 
Simultaneously, the emotion and other insights communicated by non-verbal responses 
of body language to include eyes, head nods, posture, facial expressions and other similar 
signals were captured by the researcher in his notes. The questions at Appendix C 
established the framework of the interview. Some discretion in utilizing the full array of 
questions, based on the flow of the interview, was employed by the researcher. Total 
neutrality by the researcher was a constant objective and was maintained to the highest 
level possible.
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CHAPTER 3 
FINDINGS
In this chapter I present the findings from the interviews of 40 officers conducted 
at a division-size army installation. Additionally, you will find relevant commentary 
from 16 of 64 class sections from the U.S; Army Command and General Staff College, 
Class of 2000, regarding some of the major issues addressed in this research.
The topics pertinent to this research are presented in two groupings. One group, 
which contains zero defects, officer efficiency reports (OER), operational tempo and 
women in the Army are considered to be daily job oriented in nature. The second group 
contains downsizing, reduced retirement benefits. Gulf War Syndrome, health and dental 
care, expectations, morale and trust of leadership, which are important topics but more 
general in nature. All topics, however, have a bearing upon an officer’s assessments and 
perceptions related to his/her trust in the leadership of the Army. Additionally, 
depending upon the individual officer, each plays a role in varying degrees on the 
decision process related to remaining in the Army.
Demographic data related to each officer respondent is contained in Table 3 
below. Each respondent was assigned a number for the purpose of identification. The 
first two numbers in the code reflect the respondent’s military rank (06-colonel, 05- 
lieutenant colonel, 04-major, 03-captain, 02-first lieutenant). The third digit identified a 
particular officer within each military rank grouping. In order to insure the 
confidentiality aspect. Army branch is not shown. Instead, branches have been 
consolidated into generic groups identified as combat arms (Infantry, Artillery, Armor 
and Air Defense), combat support (Military Intelligence, Engineer, Aviation) and combat 
service support (Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation and Chemical).
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Although we have identified these officers by branch grouping, it is important to 
note that in a number of cases, combat support and combat service support officers are 
imbedded within combat brigades and sometimes combat battalions. With the lethality o f 
modem warfare and the common difficulty of identifying enemy force boundaries, all 
soldiers are in harm’s way during conflict.
Gender is shown in order to permit the reader to determine the branch grouping 
that each male and female respondent falls within. Source of commission reflects a fair 
representation of officers fi-om the three commissioning sources (Reserve Officer 
Training Corps, United States Military Academy and Officer Candidate School) which is 
important to the study in that no single source of commission is predominant.
The level of education attests to the quality of learning that is required of Army 
officers. It is important to note that of the seven field-grade officers (colonel, lieutenant 
colonel and major) all but one have earned masters degrees.
The married (Mar?) column is a solid indicator that a majority of officers are 
married. As a result of operation tempo being an issue in this research, officers were 
asked to provide an estimate of their typical work week schedule. All other columns are 
self-explanatory.
The maximum number of respondents quoted within any topic is 39 since one 
interview tape was inadvertently destroyed. With some topics, less than 39 respondents 
may be quoted due to their lack of knowledge, not being asked the appropriate question 
by the researcher due to time constraints or as a result of the response to the questions 
being non-specific or non-responsive. It is felt, however, that the patterns of responses
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tell a story that will lead to conclusions that are of value to those interested in this 
research.
For each issue, the central task was to reduce and synthesize the themes presented 
in the opinions expressed by each respondent. That was done in the following manner. 
For each issue, the researcher’s assessment of officer responses related to each of the 11 
issues addressed in this study utilized the form found at Appendix D. That format was 
designed locally applying logic similar to that utilized by N-Vivo software. N-Vivo was 
developed to provide computer-assisted analysis of computer loaded verbal applications 
such as that utilized with qualitative research.
Officer respondent statements related to each issue were manually 
assessed to determine key words and phrases that established their perceptions as 
positive, negative or neutral. Utilizing the form at Appendix D, the researcher entered 
the key words and phrases opposite the appropriate officer’s code and subsequently 
determined their position on the issue. Each form was then utilized to develop the 
percentages for each category of the respondent sample that can be found in the 11 tables 
located in Chapter 3, Findings.
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TARLK .1
CODE AND BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF OFFICERS INTERVIEWED
NO. RANK BRANCH RACE GENDER COMM
SOURCE
EDUC YRS SERV AGE MAR? WORK WK
06A COL CA c M ROTC MS 22 44 Y 70-75
05A LTC CSS c M ROTC MA 20 45 Y 70
04A MAJ CS c M ROTC MA 16 37 Y 85-100
04B MAJ CS c M ROTC MMA 13.5 38 Y 65-70
04C MAJ CSS HISP F ROTC MS 19+ 40 N 60
04D MAJ CSS c M ROTC BS 16 39 Y 60
04E MAJ CSS c M ROTC MS 15 37 Y 70
03S CPI CA c M USMA BS 9 27 Y 65
03R CPI CA c M USMA BS 4 26 Y 58
03Q CPI CA c M ROTC BA 10 32 Y 55
03P CPT CSS c M ROTC BS 11 33 Y 60
030 CPI CS ASIAN M USMA MS 6+ 27 Y 66
03N CPT CA PAC ISL M ROTC BA 5 28 N 60-70
03M CPT CA HISP M OCS BA 8 29 N 65-70
03L CPT CSS C M ROTC BA 7 29 N 60
03K CPT CA C M ROTC BS 10 34 Y 70
03J CPT CA C M OCS BBA 10(3.5 enl) 30 Y 65
031 CPT CS B F ROTC BS 7 31 N 60
03H CPT CSS C M USMA BS 8 31 Y 60-70
03G CPT CS C F ROTC BS 9 31 N 75-80
03F CPT CS C M USMA BS 5 26 Y 60+
03D CPT CSS B M ROTC BA 4.5 27 N 40-50
03C CPT CA C M USMA BS 4 26 N 65-75
03B CPT CS C M USMA MS 5 26 N 60
03A CPT CS C M OCS BS 12 35 Y 50
03E CPT CA C M USMA BS 4 26 N 60
02M 1LT CS C F ROTC BS 2.5 25 Y 60
02E 1LT CA C M ROTC BA 3 25 Y 60
02L 1LT CA C M ROTC BS 2 26 N 50
02K 1LT CSS B F ROTC BS 1.5 24 N 50+
02J 1LT CSS C F ROTC BA 2.5 24 N 60-70
021 1LT CSS B M ROTC BS 5 26 Y 56
02H 1LT CSS NAT AM M ROTC BS 4 act/4 rsv 28 N 60
02G 1LT CSS C M ROTC BS+ 10 29 Y 50
02F 1LT CA C M USMA BS 3 25 Y 60-70
02D 1LT CS B M USMA BS 3 25 Y 75
02C 1LT CSS B M USMA BS 3 26 N 60
02B 1LT CS C F USMA BS 2.5 24 Y 60-70
no
tape
1LT css B M ROTC BA 6 act/4rsv 30 Y 50-60
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This researcher’s findings and related analysis in the sequence described 
previously are as follows:
3.1 Zero Defects:
This section of the questionnaire addressed the issue of the existence of a zero 
defects environment within the Army. The definition of zero defects is that you will be 
penalized for making a mistake. Ultimately, depending upon an individual’s perceptions 
regarding the issue, boldness, innovation and a willingness to “think out of the box” may 
be stifled. If one’s perception is that you cannot make a mistake without penalty, not 
only are new ideas stifled, but job satisfaction is reduced with the ultimate choice of 
moving to another profession being an alternative. Open-ended questions were employed 
in order to obtain respondent perceptions as to the existence or non-existence of a zero 
defects mentality and/or environment. It was interesting to find that in a number of 
respondents’ cases, the new Officer Efficiency Report with its “center of mass” rating 
possibility had a bearing on the sensing that one mistake could be the discriminator that 
dropped you from a “top blocked” to “center of mass” evaluation.
TABLE 4
PERCEPTIONS REGARDING EXISTENCE OF A ZERO DEFECTS ENVIRONMENT
Categories Exists Doesn’t Exist Not Sure Total
All Respondents 69% 13% 18% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 42% 29% 29% 100% n=7
Captains 89% 0% 11% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 54% 23% 23% 100% n=13
Female R’s 86% 14% 0% 100% n=7
Male R’s 66% 12% 22% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 50% 25% 25% 100% n=12
Combat Services/ Combat 
Service Spt
78% 7% 15% 100% n=27
n=27 n=5 n=7 100%
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Analysis of Responses: Table 4 depicts, by categories of exists, doesn’t exist, not sure, 
the responses of 39 officers surveyed. The perception that a zero defects environment 
exists was evident in the responses by 69% of all respondents. Within the categories o f 
respondents, the highest “exists” responses were from captains 89%, females 86% and 
combat support/combat service support 78%, respondents. Female respondents were 
more inclined to perceive an existence of zero defects, 86%, than were males, 66%. To 
females, there were no shades of grey with none of them “not sure” while 22% of males 
fell in that category. Combat support/combat service support officers were more aware 
of a zero defects mindset at 78% than combat arms officers at 50%. Higher ranks were 
less cognizant of the existence of a zero defects mindset at 42% followed closely by 
combat arms, 54%, and lieutenants, 50%. Higher ranks felt more strongly than others 
that zero defects thinking did not exist, 29%, followed closed by combat arms, 25%, and 
lieutenants, 23%. The “not sure” perception was strongest with higher ranks, 29%, 
followed closely by combat arms, 25%, lieutenants, 23%, and males, 22%.
Common Themes: Several common themes were revealed as the respondents articulated 
their views on this issue.
Perhaps the most common view is that it is the type of mistake or failure that does 
or does not create a zero defects situation. One respondent commented: “I truly believe 
that’s a command climate issue. I don’t think it’s so much the error that folks make, it”s 
the follow-on decisions. They lose a weapon, they don’t report it. They lost sensitive 
items, they don’t record it, they try to find it. They don’t take the proper actions in the 
standard operating procedures and that’s what ultimately gets them in trouble” (04B). 
Another officer stated: “The zero defects has just shifted to another area. There is no
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tolerance for a DUI (driving under the influence). You can’t even talk to a soldier 
anymore without fear of an EO (equal opportunity) complaint. There is no tolerance for 
that. You make a mistake like that and you’re branded. Even if  you are innocent; you 
are branded. Saying there is no more zero defects is a farce” (03 A). A captain stated; “I 
think it depends on the mistake” (031). Another captain said: “It depends on the
visibility of the mistake. Just because of visibility of the mistake you made, sometimes 
your supervisors, just because they are drawing heat because of the mistake you make, 
seemed that they have to make more of an effort to penalize you. It’s dependent on how 
willing the commander is to let you learn from mistakes” (03 Q). A lieutenant 
commented: “I guess it also depends on what kind of mistake we are talking about. If I 
messed up on a Report o f Survey, as a lieutenant, I don’t think it is too much of a deal. 
But, if  a company commander lost $20,000 of equipment and there was a Report o f  
Survey done on him, it’s a big deal. I think it depends on your rank” (02B). Another 
lieutenant viewed zero defects in this way: “We have several zero defects like driving 
under the influence, being overweight or failing the PT (physical training) test. Those are 
easy to understand. When mistakes are made, however, there is a tendency to pass the 
blame downward” (02J).
A second common theme related to zero defects is the view that it is the 
commander who establishes the environment or command climate on how mistakes are 
addressed. For example, one officer commented: “It depends on who the leadership is. 
Just don’t make the same mistake twice. They use mistakes as learning and mentoring 
opportunities” (02L). Another respondent said: “The previous commander 1 had allowed 
mistakes. They needed the jobs done so they would sometimes give you free reign to do
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what you needed” (02K). Another respondent said: “Where I work now, I would say 
absolutely not (no zero defects mindset exists). The major, our S-3, who I work for is top 
notch and smart. He understands you are going to make mistakes. Maybe where I 
worked before as a platoon leader, there was more of a zero defect mentality” (02G). An 
Engineer lieutenant stated: “My current chain of command is of the mindset that
lieutenants and even captains in my battalion are fallible and we are allowed to make 
mistakes. I think that has a lot to do with my battalion commander and the command 
climate he sets. But on the whole, it is terribly obvious that zero defects thinking is there 
as far as captains are concerned” (02D). A captain viewed zero defects in this way: “It 
depends upon the leader, the unit you’re in. I see it in some units and I see it’s just a 
function of the leadership style. They might not even realize that it’s the impact they are 
having on their people. It is visible in some units” (030). Another captain observed: “ I 
think it exists in certain units. I think it’s a command thing” (03N). Still another captain 
stated: “It really depends on your commander. They say you can make mistakes and it’ s 
ok to fail. You don’t know until you actually make a mistake, go to your boss, look him 
in the eye and tell him. I’ve been fortunate to have had commanders who shielded me. 
I’ve also known some guys who had company commanders, majors or staff officers who 
would sell them out in a minute” (03M). A valid summary of the above points o f view is: 
“I think it’s commander by commander. Just depends on who you work for” (030).
Another common theme is the perception that any mistake may be the 
discriminator that places you into the center of mass block on your Officer Efficiency 
Report (OER). That report is the basis for selection for promotion, schooling and future
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assignments. At Department of Army, your OER represents you as decisions about you 
are made.
A Military Intelligence major commented: “Will that (dropping a glass ball) get 
you relieved? No, but guarantee you that you will hurt your career in terms of the effect 
on your OER” (04A). Another respondent said: “I feel that (afraid to make a mistake) 
even with the new OER. Of course, it’s new and I have only been rated once. I think it’s 
just an unknown thing. I do feel that there is a little amount of attention regarding what 
you can or cannot get away with as far as being bold and innovative in order to get a top 
block on your OER” (03 B). An Armor captain viewed the possible impact on OER’s this 
way: “Sometimes I definitely feel that if  you make a mistake, it reflects on your OER 
and you’re not going anywhere. That’s just the basic truth” (03J). Another captain said: 
“I am not going to be a first-time select to Command and General Staff College because 
of one OER as a captain that was a 2 block, center of mass, under the old system, but it’s 
center of mass. So to me that’s the zero defect. As you are looking at all the records, on.e 
little defect on your record, that’s a discriminator. To me, that’s zero defects” (03K).
It is interesting to note that several of the respondents who were rated “does not 
exist” or “not sure” made comments that reflected their personal view; however, they did 
perceive the threat of zero tolerance impacting upon others. For example, one colonel 
stated: “First of all, let me say, I am proud to serve in this division. We’ve got a 
commanding general who encourages risk, not imprudent risk. You could get nine guys 
in a room and all nine of them will tell you there was a zero defects Army today whether 
it was associated with center of mass blocks on OER’s or whatever” (06A). Another 
officer commented: “I never felt zero defects because I know I had a lot o f defects.
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What I see from younger soldiers, not younger soldiers so much but officers, is the built- 
in safety net. They surround themselves so they really don’t fail. They don’t come out o f 
the box. They don’t really risk. They stay within the parameters of accepted 
performance” (05A). A third stated: “I would look at it from a different angle than zero 
defects. I often hear senior leaders talk about ‘we just got to do the basics.’ These are 
the glass balls versus rubber balls. It used to be these would be just a couple glass balls. 
There’s probably about 100 of them out there now and every day there’s a new glass ball 
. . .  On any given day, there are a thousand things we’re trying to do, not doing any o f 
them well” (04A). Still another commented: “I’ve heard of the term. I’m not sure that it 
exists in the sense of zero defects, but I know that everybody is worried about doing 
something wrong. There is pressure about trying to do a good job and not screw up 
inadvertently on something that turns out to be held against them. It’s hard for me to 
quantify but that may just be a prevailing attitude. It’s almost like you want to do a good 
job on everything ‘cause you don’t want to make a mistake and there’s only so much time 
to work on anything. So there is a kind of, I can’t really say that this is pervasive or 
anything, but I’ve noticed” (04D). A “not sure” captain stated: “I don’t know so much 
zero defects that causes officers or junior leaders to not introduce new ideas. We train to 
a written PowerPoint presentation standard and everything is so focused on the numbers 
that it really doesn’t matter what reality is. If the stats are good, we are fine” (03C). A  
lieutenant observed: “It depends on the leader . . . There is nobody who doesn’t make 
mistakes. I don’t feel intimidated” (02L).
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3.2 Officer Efficiency Reports:
This section of the questionnaire addresses perceptions related to a new Officer 
Efficiency Report form (DA Form 67-9) which replaced one that had become very 
inflated. The new one, among other changes, has a forced rating scheme whereby the 
senior rater is limited to a specific number of top blocks (“above center of mass”) not to 
exceed 49% of the number of officers in the unit. The other aspect of the new report, 
according to information published at the time of the change, is that those rated as “center 
of mass” accompanied by positive supporting narrative should be promoted on time with 
their contemporaries. One other important change is the addition of a Junior Officer 
Developmental Support Form (DA Form 67-9-la) which mandates not only initial face- 
to-face counseling but follow-on counseling on a quarterly basis. Under the previous 
systems, counseling was also mandated but not enforced and thus depended upon the 
officers involved rather than on an enforceable system. Open-ended questions were 
employed to obtain officer perceptions (positive, negative, neutral) as to whether the new 
system was an improvement over the former system.
TABLES
PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE NEW OFFICER EVALUATION SYSTEM
Categories Positive Negative Neutral Total
All Respondents 41% 10% 49% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 29% 0% 71% 100% n=7
Captains 37% 21% 42% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 54% 0% 46% 100% n=13
Female R’s 14% 14% 72% 100% n=7
Male R’s 47% 9% 44% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 42% 16% 42% 100% n=12
Combat Services/ Combat 
Service Spt
41% 7% 52% 100% n=27
N=16 n=4 n=19 100%
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Analysis of Responses; The first obvious message summarized in Table 5 is the very 
low percentage of negative responses (10%) not only from “all respondents” but from all 
categories of respondents. In this particular subject area, the combination of positive and 
neutral responses can also be interpreted as “non negative.” In the case of “all 
respondents,” a 90% “non-negative” opinion sends a strong message to this researcher 
that the new system in the view of the respondents was considered necessary and 
acceptable. The neutral responses generally were positive but tempered by a “wait and 
see” position since the Army over time had evolved through a number o f such officer 
evaluation systems. The lowest percentage of positive responses (14%) were from the 
female officers who were much less positive than male officers (47%). Higher rank 
officers were the second lowest group with positive responses. However, with both the 
females and the higher ranks, the “non-negative” concept addressed previously is 86% 
and 90% for females and higher ranks respectively. Captains with the highest negative 
percentage of 21% also reflected a 79% “non-negative” response. There was a very 
similar pattern of responses among combat arms officers and the combat support/combat 
service support group. Generally, the acceptance (positive) level combined with the 
neutral “wait and see respondents” indicates that the new evaluation system is not a 
negative from an officer trust perspective.
Common Themes: There are three common themes that were identified by the 
respondents. One of the most consistent themes was the view that the evaluation system 
that had been replaced should have been replaced. It was inflated and as a result failed to  
identify, in many cases, the legitimately outstanding performers worthy of special 
recognition. One respondent stated: “My lieutenant colonel board meets next February
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so I think the old system had to be changed. It was inflated; there was no doubt about it.
I don’t know how the boards could differentiate between people” (04A). Another 
respondent commented: “Clearly the old OER was broke. Commanders, and they are 
culpable, did not manage the senior rater profiles . . .  They failed to hold up their end of 
the bargain so now we’ve gone to this new system” (04B). A third respondent stated: “I 
think (the new system) will bring the good officers to the top, the way the system should” 
(03 L). Another positive aspect of the new system is addressed by this respondent:
“That’s good in the sense that from my understanding, the way the new OER is, we can 
now channel people more to their stronger areas. If you’ve got a theoretical guy that 
wants to teach Army theory, he can go and teach as opposed to taking a command route 
when command may not be his strong suit. I think it’s better in that respect” (03D).
The second common theme related to OER’s is the possibility that a center of 
mass officer may be viewed as a bottom half officer and if  a company commander fails to 
receive a top block (above center of mass) they won’t get promoted to major. One 
respondent stated: “I don’t know; we’ll see how that works out. In fact, they say a two 
block (center of mass) will work. 1 don’t think s o . . .  I’ll tell you right now that if  they 
don’t get a one block out of company command, they don’t get promoted” (05A).
Another commented: “My only concern is that as we get to a 49-51 (split between above 
center of mass” and “center of mass”) a center of mass will no longer be competitive and 
guys who have center of mass, at some point, we’re not there yet, but at some point, a 
center of mass report is going to be much closer to bottom half’ (06 A). A third 
respondent with concerns said: “I don’t think the folks who sit on our promotion boards 
are well enough educated on the new system to understand that there’s a bottom half guy,
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the bottom meaning he’s not good or is he ok? Those kinds of things are going to hurt” 
(04B). Another respondent replied: “If you are a straight center of mass performer, if  all 
of your evaluations are center of mass and they say ‘the captain is an excellent performer, 
does a great job, takes the lead, can’t get above center of mass because he’s not in that 
top group but, ought to be promoted,’ that’s great; but I don’t think it is going to get you 
past major” (03F). Another officer addressed his concerns about center of mass ratings: 
“Unfortunately, it all goes back to who is a better writer if you are in the center of mass.
If you did a really super duper job but maybe your rater tried to say that in the write-up 
but just didn’t get there, than there’s the guy who doesn’t make it” (031). Still another 
stated: “I think it’s a good idea. I trust what the Army says about center of mass officers 
being promoted on time” (02G). Another lieutenant responded: “It’s good. I like it. As 
long as my rater and senior rater give me good comments in the comments block; I am 
confident I can be promoted” (021).
Perhaps a male. Field Artillery lieutenant summed up the practical view on center 
of mass offieers being promoted on time by commenting: “I want to believe it but I can’t 
see it happening. But, the Officer Corps is getting small. The board (promotion) is going 
to look at how you are blocked and how you are rated. Sometimes they don’t even read 
the comments because they have so many (people to evaluate). Center of mass should be 
standard and the top block should be above standard” (02L).
The third common theme is that the requirement for rating officers to counsel 
subordinate officers that they rate or senior rate may not be occurring as prescribed. A 
failure to properly counsel can be considered unfair to the rated officer who has no valid 
idea of things that he/she should be improving upon. One officer commented: “In regard
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to counseling, I was eventually counseled but not on time. It was at the time of the OER 
itself. In talking with my peers, it was common not to be counseled per the regulation, so 
it was not a teaching tool” (02B). Another respondent stated: “From my last OER, I did 
not get counseled. They do have a counseling block with a date on the form. I don’t 
know how they came up with the date because I wasn’t counseled” (02C). Still another 
respondent said: “. . .  I have never received initial counseling from a company 
commander. I have never received any king of counseling except for getting an OER . . .  
I have never been counseled. I don’t know if  counseling was written into the OER 
counseling blocks. I couldn’t tell you definitely. I think they may have been left blank” 
(02F). Another officer responded: “The first two, no, they didn’t counsel me on time. I 
maybe got counseled once because I kept asking to be counseled” (02H).
On the positive side regarding counseling, one respondent said: “Yes, my 
battalion commander in Korea was very big on mentoring and counseling.. . .  The 
commander I work for here, a captain, sat with me for an hour and a half in our initial 
counseling. We talked on every single one o f the Army values and what I thought it 
meant and what he thought it meant. He gave me his command philosophy. So it’s being 
done properly” (02L). A male Engineer captain company commander responded to the 
question, “Are you counseling your officers?” “Yes, all the second and first lieutenants, 
then the warrant officers” (03).
3.3 Operational Tempo tOPTEMPOl:
The next section of the questionnaire addressed issues related to the reductions in  
Army strength following the Gulf War and the resulting current pace of operations, 
length of work hours, new deployments and their impact upon morale and retention.
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OPTEMPO applies to both the unit and the individual soldier. Respondents were led into 
this area with a set of open-ended questions coneeming these issues. With the strength of 
the Army limited by law to 480,000 by 30 September 2000 down from Desert Storm 
(1991) strength of 711,000, missions have been on a steady increase. Determining the 
implications of current OPTEMPO/New Missions is an important aspect of this research. 
TABLE 6
ATTITUDES TOWARD OPERATIONAL TEMPO (OPTEMPOïïNEW MISSIONS)
Categories Positive Negative Neutral Total
All Respondents 5% 74% 21% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 0% 86% 14% 100% n=7
Captains 0% 84% 16% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 15% 54% 31% 100% n=13
Female R’s 14% 72% 14% 100% n=7
Male R’s 3% 75% 22% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 0% 92% 8% 100% n=12
Combat Support/ Combat 
Service Spt
7% 67% 26% 100% n=27
n=2 n=29 n=8 100%
Analysis of Responses; As summarized in Table 6, three quarters of all respondents fell 
into the negative category, with 11 of 12 combat arms officers at 92% being the most 
negative as a group. The higher ranks (04-06) were the second highest in negative 
responses followed closely by captains at 84% negative. The higher ranking officers in 
many cases had been through the drawdown period as had a number of the captains. 
These respondents had known officers who had been forced out and more importantly 
had served at a time when the Army was substantially larger yet faced far less 
deployments to overseas missions. The highest number of neutral responses was among 
lieutenants, many of whom had no reference point upon which to compare OPTEMPO. 
The negative responses between male and female officers were very similar at 75% and
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72% respectively. Lieutenants had the highest positive percentage at 15% and the highest 
percentage of neutral responses. That difference can most likely be attributed to less time 
in service, normally less than three years, unless a former enlisted soldier.
Common Themes: There are more than several common themes identified by the 
respondents. The issue of OPTEMPO/New Missions generated the greatest volume of 
responses. The exceptionally high percentage of negative responses identifies this issue 
as a key “hot button” impacting upon retention and morale in general.
Among the common themes was the issue “Too busy looking good rather than 
being good” interpreted to mean that the emphasis is not on training and war fighting 
preparation but rather upon things that reflect a “good” image. One respondent 
commented: “It’s getting to a point where we really can’t make an impact on soldiers 
anymore because we are too busy number crunching. Too busy looking good. Way too 
busy looking good” (03A). Another stated: “People come into the Army because they 
don’t want your typical career. They don’t want to push papers and sharpen pencils the 
rest of their life. I want to be a leader of men, be all that I can be, not getting a 
PowerPoint ranger tab” (excessive time preparing PowerPoint briefing slides just to look 
good was a common issue raised by a number of respondents) (03 A). Another 
respondent said: “What happens is that they run around and worry about their stats 
instead of worrying about the basics and it shows at NTC (National Training Center). . .  I 
hear it from platoon leaders and our battalion leaders who go out there and don’t even 
cross the line of departure with 50% of their combat power because they just hadn’t 
mastered the basics to shoot, move and communicate. They passed the line of departure 
without commo because no one knows how to use the radios” (03E). Another responded:
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“It seems like OPTEMPO is getting worse. We do an ever increasing load of work and 
decreasing levels of training . . .  They talk and talk about the training we are going to do 
but we really don’t do it at all. ‘Cheesework’ (work is considered unimportant that 
makes things look good) is huge” (03J). Another stated: “There is not enough time for 
the squad leader to train his men” (03N). Still another stated: “Most platoon leaders and 
company commanders want to go out and train. That’s why people join the Army, to go 
out and train realistically. Unfortunately, we don’t get to do it” (03E).
A male Armor lieutenant summarized this theme by commenting: “All of our 
time is spent on numbers. We call it making cheese charts, making PowerPoint 
presentations rather than training . . .  There’s no real satisfaction. We joined to be on 
tanks; tankers. Instead, we are clerks” (02E).
A second common theme is that personnel shortages in units exacerbate the 
challenge of increased OPTEMPO. The sensing is that soldiers are doing more with 
fewer resources. One officer commented:. “We’re doing more with a much smaller 
Arm y. . .  When it comes to soldier business you can’t do more with less” (05A).
Another said: “1 think the Army is over committed.. . .  1 don’t believe the force structure 
is enough to meet the commitments right now nor do 1 believe that it’s enough to meet 
the national strategy” (fight two wars simultaneously) (04E). A third respondent stated:
“. . .  but in the last four years we now do not have the resources to do our mission. We 
are trying to accomplish the same old mission with extra things added but with fewer 
people which is also causing an increase in deployments . .. People are afraid to say 
‘no’” (03D). Another commented: “I’ve got a DECON (decontamination) platoon that is  
not manned and my problem is deployability” (03P). Still another said: “1 just wish we
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had more soldiers to do it with. My unit (Engineers) is about one hundred soldiers short" 
(02D); and another . I think we need more personnel. . .  I have buddies that are 
lieutenants serving in captains’ slots because of the shortage of captains. They are really 
being overworked” (02C).
A third common theme, that apparently is a major contributing factor in the 
increased level of resignations of lieutenants and captains, is the perception that the Army 
profession is no longer fun and that OPTEMPO is so high that “working” is your only 
life; that it is difficult to balance a social life outside of the Army because of heavy work 
demands. One officer stated: “With OPTEMPO high, it’s hard to put a monetary value 
on being gone all the t ime. . .  Most of it (officers getting out) is because they have had it 
with being gone” (02C). Another respondent commented; “They’re getting out because 
they want a life. That is my one concession to stability and predictability; they don’t 
want to keep doing this pace” (06 A). Another stated: “Most of the guys I see getting out 
now do it because they can’t see a future. It is black. I know my wife and I are trying to 
get pregnant, trying to establish a family. Hell, I can’t even find time to do that. It’s like 
‘all right babe, you know we’ve got fifteen minutes for lunch, you dam well better be 
ovulating.’ These guys are getting out because there is no balance in their lives” (03A). 
Still another said: “We are absolutely too busy; unbelievably too busy. I missed one 
child being bom and almost missed the second one being bom. Luckily my wife is 
absolutely outstanding” (03H). One other commented: “Morale is bad, maybe a two on 
a scale o f one to ten because of the long work hours, of not doing real work, not 
producing anything. There is no brotherhood anymore. There isn’t time for 
camaraderie” (03J). Another said: “Most guys come in at 5-6 a.m., work all day and
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don’t go home until dark. So if you don’t want the Army to be your total life, there is no 
second life. I’m still teetering about getting out” (03K). One female captain stated: “We 
have way too much going on. It’s the primary reason for my getting out. It’s not pay and 
it’s not 40% retirement. I want to have a life. I have no life” (03G).
A fourth common theme is that the senior leadership is either out of touch with 
the adverse impacts of OPTEMPO or is unwilling to stand up, advocate for the Army and 
say “we are not capable of taking on any additional missions without an increased force.” 
One officer said: “The Army leadership can’t understand . . .  We keep hearing ‘do more 
with less, find efficiencies’” (05A). Another respondent commented: “I think the Army 
leadership is out of touch. I don’t believe sometimes that they want to believe that things 
are bad. I think they are still under the illusion that we are down here with the same 
staffs as before” (04C). A third officer said: “People are afraid to say no. That problem 
of not saying ‘no’ goes all the way to the top of the Army. I just don’t think the Army 
leadership is in touch with the OPTEMPO in the troop units” (03D). A fourth 
commented: “I think the Army leadership realizes it (we are strapped) but there is too 
much ‘sure we can do it. We can drive on, we will accomplish the mission. You give it 
to us and we will prove how good we are’” (03F). Still another stated: “I know the 
commanding general and my immediate leadership knows how hard we are working. I 
don’t think the Army senior leadership does. I don’t think they know the kind of hours 
we put it” (03L). Another respondent commented: “I don’t know if the Army leadership 
understands it. Maybe it’s something they just don’t want to talk about. I think they 
know but maybe their hands are tied. A little bit of ‘can do’ egotism might be part o f it” 
(030).
102
Some positive comments regarding senior leadership awareness of the adverse 
impact of OPTEMPO were forthcoming. One respondent commented; “The Army 
leadership is making strides in talking about how busy we are. I’m not sure they have 
raised the point as well as they should” (04B). Another said: “I think the senior 
leadership really knows how busy we are but I think it goes past the military leadership. I 
think it’s more of a political thing” (03 L). A third respondent stated: “I don’t know if 
under the present political environment that senior leaders really have an ability to reduce 
OPTEMPO” (03Q). Another commented: “I think we owe a certain amount of faith to 
your senior leadership. I don’t know if  they just don’t understand the pace and its 
impact” (04 A).
A fifth common theme is the clear message that quality officers are resigning 
from the Army because of the high OPTEMPO. One respondent stated: “We have 
increased the OPTEMPO of soldiers. They are getting out; talented guys. The love of 
the Army is getting less. Patriotism isn’t a reason. This whole OPTEMPO piece is 
rolling and lieutenants, non-commissioned officers also, are asked to do more with less” 
(05A). Another commented: “Oh, probably enough to fill a small football stadium (have 
gotten out). The best ones have gotten out” (03 A). A third stated: “It has caused a lot o f  
my friends to get out of the Army. For example, in a five-month deployment to Kuwait, 
six or seven captains dropped their paperwork. We were over there for four months in 
the desert and nobody was telling us when we were going home. We weren’t doing 
anything, no training was going on. Mainly, the officers who dropped their paperwork 
were married. The morale going over there was unbelievably high. Once we got there 
we didn’t do anything. The officers who got out were the cream of the crop. They were
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the good officers, not the slugs” (03 L). Another commented: “OPTEMPO is a big issue 
for the guys getting out. I know of more than one officer here who has more time 
deployed than they do training troops” (030). Still another stated: “Seven officers in my 
chemical company have left the Army; quality people, the best. . .  I can think off the top 
of my head of six captains that resigned. All good officers. They were driven primarily 
by the OPTEMPO of a heavy division” (03P).
A male Engineer lieutenant summed up the OPTEMPO/retention relationship 
when he commented: “For officers, OPTEMPO is definitely the cause for low morale. 
There are plenty in my unit who want to do their time and leave. A lot of my classmates 
left last year. It was a little surprising. Of my three best friends from West Point, two of 
them got out last year” (02D).
3.4 Women in the Armv:
The next section of the questionnaire addressed issues concerning the implications 
of having women serve in the U.S. Army. Women have served in the U.S. Army in 
significant numbers since the Woman's Army Corps was formed in WW II to address 
manpower shortages. Subsequently, the Woman’s Army Corps was eliminated and 
women, since that time, have been integrated throughout the Army into almost all aspects 
of the military with few exceptions. Those exceptions are driven by a combat arms 
exclusion. With some 15-16% of the Army being female, their impact upon combat 
readiness and unit capabilities in general are very important to this research. Open-ended 
questions were employed to obtain specifics as to views, both positive and negative as 
applicable. Respondents were asked in almost all cases the question: “Women in the
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Army, good or bad?” In spite of the opportunity for respondents to provide a negative or 
positive answer, almost half had mixed views about this topic.
TABLE?
ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN IN THE ARMY
Categories Positive Negative Mixed Views Total
All Respondents 28% 23% 49% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 29% 14% 57% 100% n=7
Captains 29% 19% 52% 100% n=21
Lieutenants 18% 36% 46% 100% n = ll
Female R’s 57% 0% 43% 100% n=7
Male R’s 22% 28% 50% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 17% 25% 58% 100% n=12
Combat Support/ Combat 
Service Spt
30% 22% 48% 100% n=27
n = ll n-9 n=19 100%
Analysis of the Responses: As summarized in Table 7, about half o f the respondents fall 
into the “mixed views” category, i.e., made a combination of both positive and negative 
comments. The remainder of the sample is almost evenly split in making either 
consistently positive or consistently negative assessments of women serving in the Army. 
Lieutenants tended to be slightly more negative than the other ranks (36% made negative 
assessments versus 19% for captains and 14% for higher ranks). Female officers were 
more positive than male officers (57% vs. 22%). Combat support/combat service support 
were slightly more positive than combat arms officer (30% vs. 17%). Those with ‘mixed 
views” were officers who expressed a favorable view of women serving in the Army; 
however, they also offered some level of negativity as well. For example, it was common 
among respondents who were labeled as “mixed views” to be “positive” in support of 
having women in the Army as a general concept, but were negative about the perceived 
large number of pregnancies and their perception that physical fitness and weight
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standards were not enforced as diligently upon women as men. The seven female 
officers had the highest percentage of positive responses and no negative responses. It is 
interesting that the 43% "mixed views" responses from females reflected a willingness to 
assess their perceptions objectively. Their neutral responses were generated primarily as 
a result of their perceptions that women were not being treated equally by the male 
leadership primarily by their fear of being charged with sexual harassment and/or by the 
limitations on expanding women’s opportunities for a wider array of assignments to 
combat units. One female Aviation branch captain, who was resigning because she could 
not be assigned to Task Force 160, a special operations aviation unit, felt the best way to 
increase male confidence in dealing with females was to increase the number of female 
officers in the Army. She pointed out that 50% of college graduates were female. Of 
interest is the fact that three of the seven female officers did not address the pregnancy 
issue. The combat arms (Infantry, Artillery and Armor) generally have no female 
officers assigned and, as a result, the opportunity to observe females in the work place is 
limited. Their combined “positive” and "mixed views" comments of 75% fell very 
closely in line with the combined “positive” and "mixed views" of 77% for “all 
respondents.” The “negative” perceptions that countered “positive” ones from those 
determined to have "mixed views" among the combat arms officers were observations 
made on division size physical training runs where from their view the preponderance o f  
“fall outs” were females, many of whom appeared to be overweight. In conclusion, the 
responses of all groups with the exception of the female subjects were quite similar. 
Common Themes: There are a number of common themes that were identified by the 
respondents. Among the most common themes was the observation, in some cases
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complaint, that readiness is impacted adversely by the fact that women, whether single of 
unmarried, can become pregnant and as a result, performance and readiness are degraded. 
It should be noted that current regulations permit pregnant soldiers to continue working 
sometimes under restrictions, based upon their physical response to the pregnancy. After 
giving birth, they are afforded six weeks medical leave in order to take care o f the 
newborn appropriately. During the pregnancy, the soldier is under medical care and as a 
result may lose significant duty time attending medical appointments.
Representative negative comments are as follows: “My biggest concern would be 
for readiness in a unit during a period of time that they are pregnant and recovering from 
pregnancy and not deployable.. .  I listen to the division wrestling with how many 
pregnant, or convalescent women there are that are not deployable . . . ” (06A), “Just 
seeing the pregnancies go up prior to deployment even if  the soldier was not pregnant. .  . 
It does effect readiness” (04D); “The problem we’ve got right now is at the junior 
enlisted level. . .  With single parents and gals getting pregnant to get out of 
deployments” (04E); “I think it’s kind of detrimental with female soldiers coming straight 
from AIT (advanced individual training) pregnant. . .  Females have been a detriment to 
our combat readiness” (03B); and “Actually, when we deployed to Bosnia, a lot of 
people came up pregnant in a very short period of time” (03H). “I see it as a drawback 
force when I’ve got 50-70 soldiers who can’t deploy because they are pregnant” (04E).
The strongest statement regarding pregnancy was made by a female captain 
aviator who commented: “Now there are some women, for instance, I have one in my 
unit; she’s been pregnant more than five times, had five children from five different men, 
had two miscarriages. Should you be able to put her out of the Army” Yes, I should bu t
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we can’t” (not permitted by Army regulations unless duty performance is degraded) 
(03G).
A second theme is the fear of male leaders to counsel and discipline female 
soldiers in the same manner as a male. The fear of being accused of sexual harassment 
drives this issue. One respondent stated: “We discipline differently. I watch non­
commissioned officers and senior officers as if they were in our own society where it was 
an honorable thing to treat females as if they were your own daughters. You don’t do 
that in the Army” (05 A). Another commented: “We pamper them and are afraid to work 
them . . .  We can’t train them hard or train them with the same intensity that we train a 
male soldier. . .  That’s just a sign of timid leadership” (04B). A third stated: “They 
(male leaders) are afraid of any complaint from a female. . .  There’s just a general 
hesitancy to deal with females in the same manner in which they would deal with a male . 
. .  I never close the door (with a female) but if  I have a male, I close the door. . .  My 
current supervisor is female and she won’t counsel me with the door closed but there 
would be no problem if  it were a female” (03D). “Not a chance (would I counsel a 
female with the door closed). Being accused of acting inappropriately behind closed 
doors (drives the concern). Even if  innocent, it seems that you are almost believed to be 
guilty until you are proved innocent” (03F). Another respondent with deep emotion 
stated in regard to this theme: “. . .  if an allegation (of sexual harassment) existed and the 
finger pointed at a male cadet, that male cadet’s career was as good as over. Guilty until 
proven innocent, absolutely . . .  The NCO’s feel the same way” (02D). “ . ..  We still 
have a lot of male supervisors who are hesitant to really correct females the same way 
they would male soldiers” (03K). No officer, either male or female interviewed, would
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coxmsel/reprimand a soldier of the opposite sex without the door being opened or a 
witness present.
The most concise summation of this theme came from a male, Air Defense 
Artillery captain, who stated, “From a discipline perspective, yes, they (male leaders) are 
more careful. There is a fear o f the unknown. They are afraid of any complaint from a 
female . . .  From what I’ve seen, there’s a general hesitancy to deal with the female in the 
same manner in which they would deal with a male. There apparently is a myriad of 
things that are behind that to which I am not privy” (03 C).
A third theme was the perceived and/or observed differences in physical training 
(PT) and enforcement of weight standards between male and female soldiers. One 
respondent observed: “It’s definitely easier for women . . .  It does bother me that you go 
down to PT every morning and see all these females just walking down the street. They 
don’t do PT; they just go on a walk” (02S). Another commented: “Young soldiers, 
males, see that. They (female soldiers) don’t have the same PT test standards, don’t have 
the same weight standards, don’t have any kinds of standards that are laid on male 
soldiers . . .  I think we have a social experiment going on to see what’s happening”
(05A). A third responded: “. . .  There’s a definite perception that the Army PT test is 
biased towards the females. I’m a 38-year old male and I’ve got to run faster than almost 
a 19-year old female” (04B). A fourth officer commented: “There is definitely a 
difference in the physical training standards . . .  I talked to quite a number of the Armor 
and Infantry guys within my brigade and the ones who have never really been exposed to  
women actually have a problem with it. When they graduate from the Platoon Leader 
Development Course, there is always an honor graduate that gets the award for being a
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triathlon or triathlete person. It’s always a female . .  .It’s because of the different 
standards. I can see a problem with that” (03B).
A male Infantry captain sums up the perception of many of those interviewed that 
women as a group are a substandard group of performers from a physical fitness 
perspective. He commented: “Things that contribute to that attitude (that women are 
substandard in fitness) and contribute to discrimination against women in the military is 
the mixed division runs where you can see the bulk of the fallouts are female soldiers. It 
is an extremely visible opportunity where you have 500 infantrymen who don’t come into 
contact with female soldiers, going for a battalion run. Swarms of female soldiers fall out 
from the run. Normally, they don’t seem to have the best physique. Some of them are 
overtly overweight and it leads to stereotypes which are projected upon all women in the 
military, right or wrong” (03 S).
A fourth common theme addresses the perception that the increased female 
soldier population and its expansion into some combat support jobs such as Air Defense 
Artillery and Combat Engineers is driven by the political correctness of the senior 
leadership. There was a sensing by a number of officers, expressed in different ways, 
that the leadership was either ignorant of the issues related to females in the Army or felt 
that the leadership was bowing to the politics of the times. For example, one respondent 
observed: “Yes, I think they are (aware of female deployment issues). It is evident to 
everybody. It is one of the most sensitive political correct issues to address. I think it is a  
subject that most people would rather not approach” (03S). Another responded: “I 
would honestly have to say no as to whether the Army leadership is in touch with this 
issue. If they are, they’re just doing the right thing because that’s the way it is now.
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They are politically correct” (02G). A third, a female, observed: “Army leadership is not 
an honest advocate for women’s issues . . .  Every single one of my female friends has 
gotten out. Actually, all of my friends, both male and female, who got here in ‘95 and 
‘96, have gotten out. (Women) add a distracter. I don’t think the senior level Pentagon 
people understand because they don’t have to work down here on the ground with the 
troops” (02H). A fourth respondent commented: “I think the senior leadership 
understands the problem but, to my knowledge, haven’t done anything about it” (03J).
A male. Military Intelligence major, summed up a common view regarding the 
Army leadership’s level of being in touch with women’s issues on the ground when he 
stated: “No, they’re not (in touch). I think for the most part, on a personal level, they 
may believe it’s not the best thing but rather, politically correct. They supported the 
politicians that are going to make this change. It will get there” (04A).
There were a number of positive comments from not only those respondents 
identified as positive but also from some respondents with generally “mixed views” or 
even negative ones. For example, one stated: “They’ve (female soldiers) made me a lot 
of money as a commander. I’ve served with some great female soldiers” (04B). Another 
observed: “I think women are just as capable (as males) but I also understand the 
limitations . . .  Women have a very important role in the military” (04C). A third 
commented: “Based upon just the quality of soldiers I see coming into my area right 
now, I’d say just about any female soldier coming out of AIT is just about the same as 
any male soldier” (04E). Another replied: “No problem whatsoever . . .  In Germany, 
half the company was female. During Desert Storm was where I gained the greatest 
respect because I noticed females acted more calmly than the men when the pressure was
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on” (03A). An Aviation branch captain stated: “The females that I worked with have 
been just about as consistent as the males. We have some really good ones and some 
really bad ones” (030). A captain who was generally negative admitted: “I think women 
can be in the military, no problems” (03M).
3.5 Downsizing of the Armv:
This section of the questionnaire addresses the impact of the reduction in the strength of 
the Army from 781,000 in 1991 following the first Gulf War to the current mandated 
strength o f480,000 as well as reductions in funding. Open ended questions were 
employed to lead respondents into this potential issue. At issue is determining the 
perceived impact of the reductions both personally and/or professionally.
TABLE 8
ATTITUDES TOWARD DOWNSIZING/REDUCED RESOURCES
Categories Positive Negative Neutral Total
All Respondents 3% 48% 49% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 0% 57% 43% 100% n=7
Captains 0% 53% 47% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 8% 38% 54% 100% n=13
Female R’s 0% 43% 57% 100% n=7
Male R’s 3% 50% 47% 100% n=27
Combat Arms 8% 50% 42% 100% n=12
Combat
Support/Combat 
Service Spt
0% 48% 52% 100% n=27
n=l n=19 n=19 100%
Analysis of Responses; Responses were evenly split between negative (48%) and 
neutral (49%) comments. That split generally remained the same across all ranks, 
genders and branches. The somewhat higher number of negative responses from the 
higher ranks can most likely be attributed to the fact that they were in service during the 
period of the drawdown which commenced in 1993 and ran through 1996. They knew
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officers and NCO’s who had been forced out. The single positive comment on this issue 
was made by a male, Armor branch lieutenant, who viewed the officer shortages resulting 
fiom the drawdown as an opportunity for faster promotions.
Common Themes: There were three common themes that were identified by the 
respondents related to this issue. Since the drawdown or in politically correct terms 
‘rightsizing’ of the Army, along with the rest of the armed forces, occurred during the 
period 1993-96, actual experience within the period rested primarily with the higher rank 
officers who were on duty at the time. Among the captains and lieutenants, actual 
contact with those who personally suffered from the effort were former enlisted members 
who are now commissioned officers as well as cadets at West Point or in ROTC who had 
seen members of the instructor staff who they knew forced out of the Army.
Additionally, comments of non-commissioned officers who had served in the Army prior 
to drawdown and work with the officers surveyed had a bearing on the perceptions of 
captains and lieutenants.
The most common theme addressed by the respondents was that the reduced 
authorized force structure of 480,000 soldiers is inadequate to accomplish the increased 
missions being assigned. One respondent stated: “It is impossible to count the scars 
from downsizing that are in my mind. I think it was done too fast. I don’t think it was 
planned too wel l . . .  it used to be that ‘doing more with less’ was an occasional joke type 
saying but now it is a way of life . . .  Somebody has got to know when to say ‘stop’”
(03A). Another respondent said: “I can see the results here in the little time I’ve been 
here. We do not have the resources to do our mission” (03D). Another officer 
responded: “Downsizing is not just another historical event. Today, divisional units are
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asked to do too much -  more frequent deployments” (03E). A Fourth respondent 
commented: “Now, as a direct result of downsizing, our lives are upside down because 
of it. The Army is way too small” (03 J). Another respondent stated: “I think the general 
downsizing along with today’s missions has implications for me. I work a pretty long 
week and a lot of weekends. I wouldn’t have had to do that a few years ago. It has 
implications for anyone coming in today” (02J).
A male, Ordnance Corps, lieutenant colonel, summed up this theme with a very 
representative view of the negative perceptions: “The lingering effect is that we are 
doing more with a much smaller Army. Who picks what up as a result o f downsizing? 
We have increased the OPTEMPO of the soldiers. They are getting out; talented guys. I 
have a lieutenant who came in and said he was absolutely amazed that he worked so hard 
an Infantry officer. Then he came to Quartermaster and saw his desk and mission which 
was tenfold that of his Infantry challenges. He was one of those guys with 1600 on his 
college boards. As a result, he was accepted at Stanford for a Master’s Degree program. 
The love of the Army is getting less. Patriotism is not the reason. When it comes to 
soldier business, you can’t do more with less. You can’t take more ground with less 
soldiers. You cannot do more with less” (05A).
A second common theme was the perceived loss of experienced officers and non­
commissioned officers due to downsizing and a resulting deterioration of leadership 
quality. One respondent stated: “I know about the end result. It is very hard to work in 
maintenance. You have only what they now consider a senior NCO who is a new E-6 
without much experience. The Army has not developed new people in these positions. I 
don’t think the Army thought very far into the future as to who is going to be the
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technical expert in the maintenance area; who is going to be the ‘old sarge’ that you go to 
and ask how to fix something” (02K). Another subject responded: “Where it does affect 
me, however, is with non-commissioned officer leadership and the officer grooming that 
has not been taking place. The leaders we are now producing are horrible. I’m afraid to 
go to war right now. That’s why I’m getting out of service” (03 G). A third respondent 
stated: “Yes, there are some ramifications on lots of levels the Army now operates.
Some people don’t have the experience level to accomplish a mission. They get 
promoted too fast just to fill vacancies . . .  My perception is that we are doing more 
mission with less people, less experience and less room for error” (03M). Another 
respondent said: “after we came back fi-om Desert Storm, a lot of guys I thought were 
pretty good officers got forced out of service to include captains. Now you see officers at 
the lieutenant and captain level who aren’t even in the same category with those guys. 
Because we are at a strained point of retention for officers, we are keeping those who 
really should not be staying . . .  It’s just sad to see these guys with bronze stars who got 
kicked out of the Army and then you see guys who couldn’t carry their boots that are 
being kept in” (03Q). One respondent stated: “I know that our entire battalion (Field 
Artillery) staff right now has only one branch qualified captain. Normally we should 
have five or six. . .  .We are struggling to survive” (03R).
A male, Armor captain, summed up the loss of leadership experience when he 
commented, “Yes, there are some ramifications on lots of levels in the way the Army 
now operates. Some people don’t have the experience level to accomplish a mission. 
They got promoted too fast, just to fill vacancies. When you have less people doing 
critical missions, you no longer have the time or opportunity to train these people. Now
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you have to take people who are less than ready and need training. By all rights, if  they 
were in a bigger Army or in an older version of the Army, there could be somebody who 
could mentor or teach them. My perception is that we are doing more missions with less 
people and less experience and less room for error. If we don’t have enough people who 
are ready and trained and can train other folks, they are going to make mistakes . . . ” 
(03M).
The third common theme existed within the senior captains as well as the majors 
and lieutenant colonel who had lingering concerns of their ability to reach retirement 
eligibility at the twenty year mark. Combined with that perception was their sensing that 
the idea of downward loyalty had been violated. Most of the captains and all lieutenants 
had no such concerns. One respondent commented: “I’ve got almost fourteen years in 
the service but no guarantee I’ll make twenty. People do remember downsizing and its 
pain . . .  The impact lingers on. The fact that such an action could happen again is in the 
thought process as people are getting out at a tremendous paee. Good guys are getting 
out right and left” (04B). Another responded: “I think there is a bit of lingering loyalty 
issues. I’m getting to a point where, hey, if I don’t get promoted to lieutenant colonel, I 
may be in trouble” (04D). A third subject stated: “I saw a lot of tactical officers and 
professors (at West Point) who were great offieers, asked to leave. Although it didn’t 
scar me, I saw early on that leaders were somewhat expendable” (02D).
Several lieutenants saw a different, more positive, result of the downsizing.
Their view was that the eurrent officer shortages were a blessing in spite of the loss of 
experience and the resultant OPTEMPO. One respondent stated: “Instead, we see the 
brass ring in ftont of us; make it to the advanced course, get promoted and do as well as
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you can” (02D). Another commented: “What happened with my class year, we actually 
got pushed up and promoted earlier. We made first lieutenant in one and a half years and 
now we get promoted to captain in three years. I believe it was four years” (02A).
Another respondent saw downsizing in this light: “I think it was a good thing because we 
had a lot of unnecessary people. I don’t think, however, the Army made some right 
choices during the effort” (02M).
3.6 Reduced Retirement Benefits fREDUXl:
This section of the questionnaire addressed the issue of retirees receiving 40% of their 
high three years of base pay versus 50% last three years base pay if  they reach 20 years o f 
service and decide to retire. This change was initiated by the Retirement Reform Act of 
1986. The change did not impact on those who entered active duty prior to 1 August 
1986. The change had been endorsed by the Department of Defense. At the time of the 
interviews, action was under way to reverse the change as a result of its adverse impact 
upon retention. The reversal action was being supported by DOD. Many of the 
respondents were aware of the Army leadership’s support of the reversal action and were 
reasonably confident it would occur. Open-ended questions were employed to obtain the 
views of respondents on the issue. Questions such as, “Is the retirement plan you fall 
under a good one? Is it what you expected when you entered service?” Many 
respondents used the questions as a means to express their views on different but related 
issues that impact upon morale and retention.
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TABLE 9
ATTITUDES TOWARD REDUCED RETIREMENT fREDUX)
Categories Positive Negative Neutral Total
All Respondents 0% 31% 69% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 0% 43% 57% 100% n=7
Captains 0% 32% 68% 100% n=21
Lieutenants 0% 23% 77% 100% n = ll
Female R’s 0% 14% 86% 100% n=7
Male R’s 0% 34% 66% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 0% 42% 58% 100% n=12
Combat Services/ Combat 
Service Spt
0% 26% 74% 100% n=27
n=0 n=12 n=27 100%
Analysis of Responses: As summarized in Table 9, over two-thirds of respondents were 
neutral while none had positive comments. The neutral responses accounted for the 
highest percentage of responses across all segments of the sample group. No respondents 
addressed the REDUX issue as positive. The higher ranks and combat arms articulated 
the highest percentage of negative comments at 43% and 42%, respectively, which put 
these groups at a higher negativity than all respondents at 31%. The combat arms group 
was significantly more negative at 42% than the combat support/combat service support 
at 26%. Female respondents were significantly less negative (14%) than male 
respondents (34%). The higher the rank, the higher the percentage of negative responses. 
It may be assumed that the higher ranking respondents who were previously under the 
former, more generous system, had the greater negative attitudes about the reduction in 
retirement benefits.
Common Themes: There were two common themes identified by the respondents in 
addressing the REDUX issue. The first, and most commonly addressed response, was 
that the leadership was missing the real issues related to retention and morale in spite of
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their support for the reversal of REDUX. General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), had been quoted in the September 21,1998 The Armv Times as 
stating: “improving retirement benefits for those covered by the 1986 law was their (JCS) 
top priority for improving military readiness . . .  the 40% plan is increasingly perceived 
by our members as simply not good enough to justify making a career of the military.”
(p. 3) A number of respondents were in disagreement with General Shelton on the 
importance of REDUX in the larger scheme of things. One stated: “I think for some, the 
retirement, as well as pay, issues are certainly a plus but, in my opinion, pay and 
retirement was not an issue. I would have worked for the same pay and retirement wasn’t  
an issue. These two items were never an issue for me. But for our soldiers, and what 
they are living in, these conditions are deplorable. It’s shamefiil for those soldiers.
What’s missing today is that it isn’t fim coming to work” (04A). Another commented: “ I 
came in one year after REDUX started. It is not an important issue for me. Look how 
many captains are getting out. Then you hear the 4.5% pay raise is the panacea along 
with a change in REDUX; that will keep us in. Wrong! For those of us who are staying 
in, it is not the money or a measly 50% retirement check. We’re staying because it used 
to be fun. We’re staying for soldiers. We’re staying because we feel we can actually 
have an impact. Unfortunately, that is going away” (03A). A third commented: “I don’t  
think the leadership has the total picture. Money and retirement is one portion of it but, 
from my experience, 1 think the leadership is trying to operate the Army in the same 
manner in which they grew up. Today, our soldiers do not respond in those same ways 
because you are dealing with a smarter soldier . . .  I don’t think the pay raise and a 
reversal of REDUX will keep the officers that you want to stay in service. For me, my
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intent is to leave Army service in order to earn more money, have more stability and gain 
more autonomy in my life” (03D). Still another said: “REDUX is not a big deal. It is 
not pay. It is not 40% retirement. It is too much OPTEMPO and having no other life 
than work that is drawing me out. OPTEMPO is the primary reason for my getting out” 
(03 G). Another officer stated: “Fixing REDUX and fixing pay is out of touch with the 
real problem. The leadership needs to know that OPTEMPO is the big thing. What I’m 
hearing from people getting out, who are definitely just fired up about getting out, is 
because they have just had it always being gone . . .  With OPTEMPO high, it’s hard to 
put a monetary value on being gone all the time” (02C).
A female Engineer lieutenant summed up this theme when she stated: “If the 
Army leadership thinks they can wave money and better retirement in our faees to make 
us stay, they are wrong. It’s not the money or REDUX. Right now, I am happy with 
what I make. The issue is the ridiculousness we have to deal with . . .  You come here and 
put up with all this dumb ass crap and work a minimum of 12 hours a day and never less.
I haven’t gotten home before 10:00 p.m. this week . . .  There’s more cheese going 
through and such a pencil whip of stupidity” (02M).
The second theme is that the difference between REDUX and the former more 
liberal 50% at 20 years is fairly important to some of the respondents. One officer 
commented: “Right now, 1 wouldn’t stay for 20 years if 40% were the retirement. You 
can’t afford, the way things are, to live on 40%. I think the Army leadership is going to 
get back the 50%. The new plan of 50%, along with the pay increases we’ll get, I eould 
live on. But, if OPTEMPO doesn’t change, it could cancel the pay and retirement out” 
(02L). Another respondent commented: “I think REDUX, which doesn’t affect me
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personally, has had implications on mid-career folks and on recruiting. So I really think 
the impact has been on our four to seven year grade NCO’s who already we don’t pay 
enough to and on our captains who are getting out at their six and seven year mark . .  
.They are saying, T’m working my ass off here, working a good 12-14 hour day and I’m 
going to get 30-40% when I retire; this sucks. I’m out of here.’” (04B). Still another 
respondent said: “REDUX does kinda’ weigh heavily. The pay right now is fine. I’m 
single with a captain’s pay. I do very well. However, retirement does weigh heavily. 
Fixing REDUX is moving toward the right direction to keep more people in but it 
wouldn’t keep me in” (03F). And another officer said: “I think correcting REDUX and 
increasing pay might help keep some of your fence riders, ones that are teetering on the 
edge of staying in or getting out” (03F).
A male Quartermaster captain put the importance level of fixing REDUX in 
perspective with other human resources issues when he stated: “Correcting REDUX and 
increasing pay will make a slight difference. I don’t think it’s going to make a big 
difference. The friends I have who are getting out are making $75-85,000 a year, getting 
great jobs. A little pay increase is not going to stop a person from getting out. People are 
going to stay in the Army because they love the Army; it’s their life. That’s the way I 
feel about it. If a person is tired of the Army and tired of being away from their family, 
pay and retirement benefits are not going to do a thing to stop them from getting out. 
Actually, 40% versus 50% is a big deal to me; it really is. But still, if  I was tired of the 
Army, totally fed up with everything, that would not be a reason that would stop me from 
getting out” (03L).
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3.7 Gulf War Syndrome:
The next section of the questionnaire addressed the perceptions in regard to how 
well the Army leadership responded to the Gulf War Syndrome issue. Following the 
Gulf War in 1991, some military members, to include soldiers, began to suffer a variety 
of maladies that can be considered to be unusual for the generally young and physically 
fit military. As time went on, some Gulf War veterans’ spouses were identified as 
delivering children with birth defects. The controversy as to what caused the illnesses 
and birth defects continues today but at a more subdued level than the mid 90’s when the 
official explanations from the DOD, to include the number of military who may have 
been exposed in the chemical release pattern, changed from week to week. Some of 
those with knowledge of the Agent Orange controversy following the Vietnam War 
perceived a reoccurrence of the DOD denial and obfuscation associated with that era. 
Open-ended questions were employed to obtain respondents’ views as to how well the 
Gulf War Syndrome issue was addressed by the Army leadership. A portion o f the 
respondents were not asked about this issue because of time constraints. Many others 
had no real knowledge of the GWS issue because it occurred before their time in service.
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TABLE 10
PERCEPTIONS OF GULF WAR SYNDROME
Categories Positive Negative Limited
Knowledge/No
Comment
Total
All Respondents 0% 28% 72% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 0% 43% 57% 100% n=7
Captains 0% 42% 58% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 0% 8% 92% 100% n=13
Female R’s 0% 14% 86% 100% n=7
Male R’s 0% 31% 69% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 0% 42% 58% 100% n=12
Combat Services/ Combat 
Service Spt
0% 22% 78% 100% n=27
n=0 n = ll n=28 100%
Analysis of Responses: As summarized in table 10, 28% of all respondents had a 
negative view of how the Army addressed the Gulf War Syndrome issues while 72% had 
limited knowledge or made no comments. Only one respondent classified as no 
comment/limited knowledge actually had a balanced or neutral comment. All others had 
no comment on the issue. No respondent who commented on the GWS issue was 
positive regarding the Army’s responses/actions. The higher the rank, the greater 
percentage of negative responses; 43% for higher ranks and 42% for captains while 
lieutenants were 8% positive and 92% no comment/no knowledge. One may be willing 
to draw a relationship to a longer time in service having a direct impact upon knowledge 
and perhaps actual experience with the Gulf War and with soldiers who served in the 
exposure area. Although female respondents were only 14% negative versus 31% for 
males, it is worth noting that only three of the female respondents were in the higher 
ranks/captain’s group and of the three, one captain had knowledge and commented in a 
negative manner. Combat arms officers were 42% negative as compared to 22% of
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combat support/combat service support officers. Since the estimated downwind pattern o f 
chemical fallout encompassed personnel from all branches of service and all types of 
units, the disparity between combat arms and the rest of those surveyed is most likely a 
random occurrence.
Common Themes: Two common themes were identified by the respondents. The 
common theme among those respondents who commented on the issue was that the 
Army leadership failed to address the Gulf War Syndrome issue in a totally forthright 
manner and failed to advocate for soldiers to the degree the respondents felt would have 
been proper.
Representative negative comments are as follows: “I think the evidence is clear 
that the leadership was not forthcoming initially. I think they were forced to be 
forthcoming, and that’s DOD wide, not just the Army. I think there is plenty of evidence 
to show the initial support of soldiers was not what it could have been” (04A). Another 
respondent stated: “I don’t think so (Army dealt honestly with GWS), only because you 
would have to be naïve. Number one, we know the Iraqis had the stuff, in fact, we found 
it. So to say we are going to spend 40 days bombing those bastards and we’re not going 
to open those cans. We were targeting their ASP’s (ammunition supply points). You’ve 
got to be foolish not to think there’s a potential that we are going to cause some of that 
stuff to spill out of those 155mm shells” (04B). A third officer said: “I don’t think we 
did the right things in the beginning. I think it took a lot of gnashing of teeth and a lot o f  
public pressure, a lot of involvement of folks to really get somebody to stand up and 
recognize that we think we do have a problem here” (04E), Another respondent 
commented: “I don’t think the Gulf War Syndrome issue was handled very well. That’s
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why we are having a lot of problems with the anthrax vaccine. Everyone is saying it’s 
safe. It may be safe yet this is the same establishment, although not the same people, that 
said after the Gulf War that no one was exposed to anything” (03C). Still another said:
“I would expect more from the Army leadership. If they are the ones sitting there 
deciding who goes where and when, then they should be able to make decisions about the 
health of soldiers coming back from the Gulf. It’s just not right” (031). An Ordnance 
captain responded: “Of course the Army should have embraced things from the 
beginning but they didn’t do it. I am disappointed with many things the government 
does. That doesn’t shock me now but probably a few years ago it would have” (03 J). 
Another respondent stated: “DOD, to include the Army, did not deal honestly on this 
issue. Are they going to? They still won’t” (03K).
A male Field Artillery lieutenant’s comments represented the sensing of a number 
of the negative respondents when he stated: “I don’t find it surprising that the Army 
leadership didn’t stand up right away because it’s kind of an Agent Orange issue. They 
denied it for so long that there was any sickness. Then the book was laid out to them and 
they said, ‘Ok, you’ve finally caught us. There is something wrong and we’re going to 
make it right.’ We need to study history so events don’t repeat themselves. We need to 
go to work right away to solve a problem. The leadership didn’t do that at first. It’s kind 
of disheartening” (02L).
It is of value to provide the comments of the male. West Point Armor lieutenant, 
who was rated as a no comment/neutral respondent: “The Army, in my opinion, did not 
handle the GWS controversy dishonestly. It probably could have been handled better in 
terms of being open soon after the people had the symptoms. Somebody knew, in my
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opinion. Somebody knew up there and the fact they were not able to disclose information 
earlier, I think, it looks poorly on our leaders. However, I don’t know what kind of 
security issues may have been involved. Middle of the road, they probably could have 
handled it better; but they weren’t dishonest. It does create questions, however. It is very 
similar to the agent Orange issues” (02F).
The second common theme as determined by the researcher is that for a large 
majority, in this sample 72%, the Gulf War Syndrome issue is not a high visibility issue 
among the variety of issues addressed in this research. It is important that readers are 
aware of the fact that soldiers who suffer from GWS to an extent that duty performance is 
impaired, are quickly given a medical retirement with some percentage of disability. As 
a result, victims of GWS are not normally visible to active duty military.
3.8 Health/Dental Care:
The next section of the questionnaire addressed issues concerning the quality of 
health care and dental care, a sensitive topic for some military members, especially those 
with families. Respondents were led into this area with a set of open-ended questions 
concerning their levels of satisfaction with both health care and dental care received 
while in service, whether or not their family, if applicable, had received such care and 
how they would rate the quality of care they had received.
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TABLE 11
ATTITUDES TOWARD HEALTH/DENTAL CARE
Categories Positive Negative Neutral Total
All Respondents 13% 54% 33% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 0% 71% 29% 100% n=7
Captains 16% 53% 31% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 8% 46% 46% 100% n=13
Female R’s 0% 57% 43% 100% n=7
Male R’s 16% 53% 31% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 7% 36% 57% 100% n=14
Combat Services/ Combat 
Service Spt
16% 64% 20% 100% n=25
n=5 n=21 n=13 100%
Analysis of Responses: As summarized in Table 11, a little over half of the 39 
respondents made negative comments (54%) while only 13% were positive. O f interest 
is that the higher the military rank and thus the longer the Army service, the higher the 
rate of negative responses. Lieutenants had the lowest number of negative responses, 
46%, compared to 53% negative for captains and 71% for higher officers (major through, 
colonel). The lack of positive comments across those interviewed should be cause for 
concern by the Army. There was little difference between female and male in negative 
comments at 57% and 53% respectively. The 14 combat arms officers had the lowest 
percentage of negative comments (36%) compared to the rest of those surveyed (64%).
As a result, combat arms officers, who had a very low number of positive responses 
(7%), had the highest rate of “neutral” responses at 57%. That rate differed significantly 
from all respondents who were at 33%. A detailed analysis of the neutral responses from 
the 14 combat arms revealed nothing unusual. Three of the 14 had no experience with 
medical/dental care which influenced the higher percentage. The others were relatively
127
balanced with positive and negative comments similar to all respondents who were rated 
as neutral.
Common Themes; Several common themes were reflected in the interview responses.
It should be noted that responses ranged in length from a couple of sentences to several 
paragraphs as the study subjects, in some cases, described their personal 
experiences/observations at length. As common themes are addressed, supporting 
examples are most often verbatim excerpts from a longer statement. The most common 
theme addressed the long waits and lost time associated with seeking medical treatment 
at the on-post military health facility.
One respondent said, “Overloaded. It takes 4-5 hours to be seen. Lots of 
complaints. I worry about health care after I retire.” (04A). Another commented: “I 
waited 10 hours in the emergency room.” (03C). A third stated: “The speed you get 
processed through the emergency room can be a little long.” (03B). A fourth respondent 
reflected the thoughts of several other officers when he stated: “A soldier goes on sick 
call at 0630 and you don’t see him again until 1700 when it’s time to go home. The 
system takes too long.” (021).
A male Ordnance Corps lieutenant summed up the long wait/lost time issue of 
medical care when he commented: “Health care is bad, very bad. I don’t know if an 
officer or NCO should get special privileges (in being seen quickly), but an officer or 
NCO will go over there and waste so much time getting looked at. It is just a huge waste 
o f time going on sick call. You are sitting over there forever just to get seen for 
something minor. It’s not the quality of the doctors. Once I’m seen, I’m pretty much 
given good care. It’s just the wait to get there” (02G).
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A second common theme complains about the ease with which soldiers are able to 
obtain a medical profile whereby they are placed on limited duty. That medical directive 
limits participation in some/many aspects of typical military duty such as physical 
training, lifting, standing for long periods, etc. Soldiers with profiles continue to fill their 
space on the unit authorization during the period that they are unable to accomplish the 
full spectrum of duties. That may result in additional workload being passed to healthy 
soldiers. One respondent stated: “Terrible; you can easily find yourself on profile for a 
year, a whole year, without anybody telling you how to fix it.” (031). Another 
commented: “There are tons of soldiers, males and females included, who will run down 
and get a profile for whatever. Our current medical system is not screening properly.
I’m not sure they can.” (03S). A third reflected: “Health care is bad . . .  Now they are 
giving soldiers profiles for anything.” (021).
A female Military Intelligence captain portrayed health care and the profile issue 
in this manner: “Terrible! Take for instance, a soldier goes to sick call. Soldier sits in 
the clinic almost all morning long, really, all morning to see a physician’s assistant (PA), 
not a doctor. PA screens him and says, ‘oh,’ especially if it’s an orthopedic problem 
because they aren’t trained on how to fix ortho problems. They tell you that they don’t 
know. You go back and they give you a profile for 30 days, go back, see another PA who 
is different from the one that he saw before, determines something else, so you get 
another profile for another 30 days or for however long they decide. You come back, you 
send the soldier back again, see somebody else or maybe by then, hopefully, they’ll say 
‘ok, now you have to see a doctor’ or they send you to the orthopedic clinic. So it gets to  
the point where something is really wrong with them; Nobody has diagnosed it from the
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beginning so they can go ahead and get well. So you are gone about 60, 90 days.
Finally, after I write a memo over to the clinic say, ‘hey, what’s going on? I’ve got this 
soldier that’s been on profile for over 90 days.’ I am not a doctor, but I know something 
is wrong. Then they send him over to the ortho clinic and ortho says, ‘ok. I’ll give you 
another profile, let’s try this.’ They give him another profile for however long it is. You 
can very easily find yourself on profile for a year, a whole year without anybody ever 
telling you how to fix it” (031).
A third common theme is the shortcomings of the Tricare system which provides 
medical care to military family members. It also covers costs of soldiers who, in 
emergencies or when they serve away from a military installation, must utilize a civilian 
medical facility. The shortcomings of Tricare Standard, as compared to Tricare Prime, 
the inordinate time it takes to obtain an appointment and the perceived poor service in a 
general sense available under family medical care were addressed. It should be noted 
that at the installation where the division officers were interviewed, family members 
were seen in the same military clinics that served soldiers. Representative comments 
addressing medical support to families are as follows: “It’s bad for dependents. My 
personal experiences have not been good.” (05 A); “I hear all kinds of horror stories, 
especially simple access to Tricare.” (03D); “If a soldier and his family have to be seen 
that day, that’s not happening.” (03M); “It’s good for me, bad for my wife . . .  Tricare is 
so confusing . . . ” (02E); and, finally, “. . .  it would scare me to death to be married right 
now and have to send my wife to a military hospital.” (03L).
A male Armor captain expressed his dissatisfaction under Tricare as follows: “A. 
couple of years ago at Fort Hood, my wife was pregnant. We went to the hospital there at
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Hood (Fort Hood, Texas) and we said, ‘hey, we’ve already had one miscarriage; we’ve 
lost one, what extra can we do for her?’ They said, ‘no, that ain’t going to happen.’ I 
sent her home. I’ve got two kids; she’s pregnant with another one. For both kids, I sent 
her back home. It shouldn’t be that way. Hell no!! But for me, it works out and is a 
little bit easier” (03 K).
A fourth common theme related to medical/dental services was the actual or 
perceived low quality o f the medical system and professional staff in general. 
Representative comments related to this theme range from “My soldiers on sick call are 
treated terribly. I feel they are abused, ignored and don’t get the treatment that they need 
..  . There is a lot of neglect.” (02D); “. .  .There seems to be a low quality in doctors.” 
(02M); “I’m afraid to get anything done. If I stayed in the Army as a career person, I 
would have health care elsewhere for my family.” (02H); “I feel for the doctors; these 
military doctors who are inexperienced but expected to know and be the experts up front. 
You are getting a lot of our soldiers treated by guys who just don’t have the background 
they ought to.” (030); and “. . .  you don’t see a doctor; you see a PA (physician’s 
assistant). Occasionally you see a civilian doctor; 1 don’t mean this in a racist sense, it 
seems like it’s foreign nationals. I don’t mean this in a racist sense, but where did they 
come from? It’s like they could be a taxi driver from New York and they just sent them 
down to do this.” (04C); and finally, “it doesn’t seem like it is quality.” (03C).
A male Ordnance Corps lieutenant colonel addressed his view on the quality o f 
care from his personal experience with his wife’s delivery of a child in a military 
hospital. He commented: “It’s bad for dependents. My wife says we are going to move 
as far away from this kind of military hospital as we can and we’ll figure out how to pay
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for i t . .  . I’ve gone for my daughter being bom at Irwin Army Hospital at Fort Riley, with 
the doctor trying to force delivery of the placenta for my wife, and as I look back, he was 
pulling on it, caused her to hemorrhage. Then, the nurses threw sheets at my wife and 
told her to change the sheets because she had bled on the sheets overnight. She called me 
screaming, telling me to get her out of there. I carried her out of the hospital. My 
personal experiences have not been good” (05A).
A fifth common theme is the sensing that the leadership is not aware of the high 
level of dissatisfaction that exists in the medical/dental area. One subject frames its 
importance to quality of life by stating: “If you look at the military, and the benefits that 
are important to soldiers and that can have a very frequent effect on their lives, health 
care is one of the biggest.” (03Q). Yet, the perception, as a theme, is that leadership is 
not engaged in assessing or resolving the issues raised by the majority of those 
interviewed. One respondent stated: “The leadership does not want to know how dicked 
up their medical program is. It is awful.” (04B). Another commented: “Health care 
sucks. I have no idea if  Army leadership knows. Probably not, because they have Walter 
Reed (the premier Army hospital located in the Washington, D.C., area). It sucks, 
absolutely sucks.” (04C). A third respondent stated: “The system is totally 
unprofessional. . .  I don’t think our leadership is in toueh with the situation.” (02D).
The aspects of health/dental care generated some of the longest and most 
emotional commentary from respondents. This research would be lacking if  the 
following representative comments of the 54% of negative were not recorded: “It’s 
awful. It’s gotten worse. It’s gone downhill.” (04B); “Health care sucks.” (04C); 
“Horrendous! You can’t be seen by a doctor.” (03G); and “Health care is bad.” (03J).
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On the positive side, represented by 18% of the respondents, only one respondent 
was completely and enthusiastically satisfied who commented: “I f  s definitely a plus.
I’ve gotten to see it up close. I was a happy customer.” (02L). Of the other six “positive” 
responses, all were either subdued such as “It’s ok, we don’t go that often.” (04D); and “I 
haven’t had any problems at all.” (03H); or expressed some reservations such as “I’ve 
had no problems. Basically, the Army medical system is socialized medicine.” (03 A); 
and “1 am moderately satisfied.” (03S).
3.9 Expectations Met:
This section of the questionnaire addressed the issue of how well the Army 
experience has met the expectations of the respondents. It is generally accepted in the 
personnel management/leadership literature that meeting individual expectations is an 
important aspect of the morale and retention equation. An open-ended question was 
employed in order to seek respondent opinions on how well their expectations were being 
met. That question was, “Has the Army lived up to your expectations? Are you staying 
in the Army?” It is important to note that oftentimes officer expectations were developed 
in the academic/military environments of West Point or within the ROTC experience at 
civilian colleges and universities.
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TABLE 12
ATTITUDES TOWARD EXPECTATIONS BEING MET
Categories Positive Negative Neutral Total
All Respondents 49% 43% 8% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 8% 10% 0% 100% n=7
Captains 28% 15% 5% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 13% 18% 13% 100% n=13
Female R’s 29% 71% 0% 100% n=7
Male R’s 53% 38% 9% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 66% 17% 17% 100% n=12
Combat Services/ Combat 
Service Spt
41% 56% 3% 100% n=27
n=19 n=17 n=3 100%
Analysis of Responses: Table 12 depicts, by the categories of positive, negative or 
neutral, the responses of 39 officers surveyed.
This issue was reasonably balanced between positive (49%) and negative (43%) 
replies for all respondents. Female officers reflected the highest level of negative 
responses with five of the seven or 71% indicating that the Army failed to meet their 
expectations. That is a significant difference from the 53% positive and 38% negative 
responses from the male respondents. It is worth noting that one female captain, an 
Army senior aviator, was dissatisfied and intended to resign because of being 
overworked, however, stated “But, if the Army would permit me, a woman, to be 
assigned as a pilot to Task Force 160 at Fort Campbell, I’d stay in a heart beat” (03F). 
(Unfortunately, for this officer, TF160 is restricted to male aviators because of the types 
of special operations combat missions they support.) Combat arms officers had the 
highest positive response rate of 66% exceeding both the combat support/combat service 
support (41%) segment and all respondents (49%) by a significant margin. Combat arms 
officers, 7 of whom were captains, were also far less negative (17%) than all respondents
134
(43%) as well as combat support/combat service support (56%). Also important to note 
is the low number of neutral responses. It appears that the “expectations” issue is one 
that generates a black or white response with few shades of gray.
Common Themes: Themes that were common among the respondents in regard to the 
Army meeting their expectations were wide ranging with only a few that were truly 
common. Contained in both the positive and negative responses, among those staying in 
and those with intentions to leave the Army, was the enjoyment and satisfaction of 
working with and leading soldiers. The desire to command at the company level was part 
of that overall aspect of being with the troops in lieu of staff or administrative 
assignments. Some positive comments that are reflective of this theme are: “I’m having 
fun as a company commander. I’m staying in” (03P). “Yes, sir. I’m a happy Army 
officer” (03H), “I stay in because, God, I’m going to sound like a walking cliché, I like 
soldiers. I like these guys” (03A), “As a platoon leader, that was the best time” (03C), “It 
was good the first couple of years because I was a platoon leader, I was with troops”
(03 J), and “I have to get a company command” (03M). Negative comments regarding 
command came from 04A who responded to the meeting expectations question by 
saying: “Not today. I won’t take battalion command today. I would take it if  there were 
a war, in a heartbeat. I could do a good job.”
Respondent 05 A, who had expressed his unhappiness with the current state of the 
Army, wrote the following note upon completing his review of the interview transcript: 
“Since interview, I have been selected to attend the Army War College (AWC) in 
Pennsylvania but decided to retire anyway.” Researcher’s note: That decision by this 
lieutenant colonel was a significant one in that almost every graduate of the AWC is
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selected for promotion to 06. War College level schooling is a prerequisite for selection 
to command at the brigade level (eolonel level) and the eventual opportunity to be 
considered for promotion to general officer.
An opposite and very positive point of view come fi*om a male Military 
Intelligence captain who described the Army’s success in meeting his expectations in this 
manner: “Actually yes, because I try to keep my expectations low. That’s something my 
old man taught me. He advised that just like when he was in World War II, ‘keep your 
expectations low, always look for the worst and that way if  something good happens, you 
will feel better.’ I came into the Army with no preeonceived notions . . .  I like soldiers. I 
like these guys. Where else can I have an organization where I have black soldiers, white 
soldiers, Chicano soldiers, Asian soldiers, soldiers firom almost every state of the union, 
every different religion, all working as a team? You do not see that anywhere else but 
right here. And this uniform is what helps it. There is something about that that flips m y 
switch, fries my bacon . . .  whatever you want. That’s the reason I get up every morning 
to see that team concept work. I hope we stick with that. I’m staying in” (03 A).
(Editor’s comment: That kind of soldier makes your heart beat a bit faster with genuine 
pride of being an American.)
A second common theme was the perception of having or not having fun as an 
Army officer. Across all of the interviews in one place or another the issue of enjoying 
what you are doing came across as an important element of self-satisfaction not only in 
relation to the individual but also to family relationships. Intuitively, we can accept the 
fact that having fun or enjoying one’s job is not unique to just the profession of arms. It 
bears an important role in job satisfaction levels within the civilian sector as well. What
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is unique, however, when considering the profession of arms, is that a group of physically 
fit, highly motivated, highly competitive, well educated and patriotic individuals see 
“fun” as leading soldiers in tough field training, jumping or repelling out of aircraft, 
flying airplanes, firing artillery, driving and shooting the main gun on a tank, or shooting 
individual and crew served weapons, and training in the art of war. Conversely, making 
PowerPoint briefings, attending a never-ending series of classes on consideration of 
others, sexual harassment and similar social issues as well as doing “cheese work” is 
considered to be “civilian” work. Excitement, adventure and living a challenging life is 
oftentimes what drew officers, both male and female, to become part of the Army. So the 
fun issue, which oftentimes entails realistic training, is an important measure of how well 
the Army is doing in satisfying expectations. Comments related to fun in regard to 
expectations are as follows: “I was going to stay in the Army as long as I was having fun 
and felt that I was contributing something. I’m still doing both in my opinion” (04E), 
“I’m having fun, but it’s more fun sometimes than at other times” (03H), “I’m having fun 
as a company commander. I’m staying in” (03P), “I get bored with what I am doing 
now, but when I get in a tank and shoot, it makes it all worthwhile. Sometimes I think, 
wow, this is really cool” (03E); and, “I’ve pretty much done all the things I wanted to do . 
I can’t see where if I went back and even tried to change anything I would change it. I’m  
making the Army my career” (03Q).
On the negative side, some respondents indicated that soldiering, at least in their 
current assignment, was not fun. For example, one respondent stated “Not where I am 
right now; I’m not having fun” (03F). Another stated “We’re just not having fun
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anymore and that’s where the Army didn’t meet my expectations” (03J). A third said:
“It certainly hasn’t (met my expectations).. .  Coming to work is sorry” (03R).
A male Armor officer had a far different and unselfish perspective regarding 
expectations and fun when he stated: “I’m going to stay in the Army. If 1 can make the 
cut, I’m going to stick it out. My philosophy on this is it’s probably happened before or 
probably will happen again, it’s just the American way we do business . . .  war. A guy 
like Colin Powell, General Thurmond, all of those guys stuck it out. When it was time to 
bat, they put it together because they cared. 1 get fed up a lot and think about getting out 
just about every day but 1 also think there is a responsibility because 1 care about the 
Army. This is my home. 1 love the Army. I’m going to go through these growing pains 
again because there may be somebody around to get us back on track” (03 M).
A third theme expressed the perception that Army leadership, with no specific 
leader cited, was not aware that some level of officer dissatisfaction prevailed. One 
respondent stated: “1 think it is so far off the leadership’s radar screen. 1 will probably 
not stay because the Army is clueless as to what is going on in the Army” (02M). 
Another response was: “No one wants my ideas. They don’t even interview you when 
you leave.. .  By the time someone listens to you, it’s too late” (02K). A third stated: “1 
am fimstrated with the direction the Army is moving. 1 feel the focus is not on war 
fighting but rather on fulfilling statistics to impress higher ups and maintaining the status 
quo” (03E); and finally, “In spite of my love for the Army, it is saddening to view the 
way the Army is going; however, 1 do intend to stay as a career officer” (04C).
Some other perceptions that may not fall in any theme other than “not sure” but 
worth citing are as follows: “Perhaps, it depends. 1 love the Army and how they treat
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me. The question is do I get what I want in the Army. To tell you the truth, I was pretty 
disappointed when I came to this post. I always looked forward to going to an airborne 
unit. When I came here I was disappointed. I’d say you’ve got to be very flexible. A lot 
of things we do, at least to me, we don’t understand because we have too much on our 
plate” (02A). Another lieutenant summed up how well the Army met his expectations in 
this manner: “Yes, for the most part. I’ve learned quite a bit that I didn’t know when I 
first came into the Army. It was a real eye opener but I think it was good for me, even 
after seeing negative leadership. You can always leam from negative leadership; leam 
what not to do and how not to treat your people. You’ve got to listen to them. I’m 
undecided at this point about staying in” (02B). And a male Engineer lieutenant 
expressed his views in this manner: “Sir, I don’t know how to explain it but I just have 
no desire to get out. I feel confident. I just have this panging that I have not done enough 
yet. There is so much more I want to do and I haven’t gotten to that point. I guess I 
leave myself open. The first time I will actually consider whether or not to get out will 
be after my command. Before then, I have no desire (to get out of the Army)” (02D).
3.10 Morale:
This section of the questionnaire addressed the perceptions of respondents as to 
the state of morale within the Army Officer Corps. Open-ended questions to include: 
“How would you rate morale of the Officer Corps on a scale of 1 to 10” and/or “how 
would you rate morale in the Officer Corps,” were employed to solicit candid responses. 
The state of morale of an officer, his friends and even his chain of command may have an 
impact upon retention levels within the Officer Corps.
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TABLE 13
PERCEPTIONS AS TO THE STATE OF OFFICER MORALE
Categories Positive Negative Neutral Total
All Respondents 16% 74% 10% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 14% 57% 29% 100% n=7
Captains 21% 79% 0% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 8% 69% 23% 100% n=13
Female R’s 0% 86% 14% 100% n=7
Male R’s 19% 72% 9% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 25% 58% 17% 100% n=12
Combat Support/ Combat 
Service Spt
11% 81% 8% 100% n=27
N=6 n=28 n=5 100%
Analysis of Responses; As summarized in Table 13, only 16% or 6 of 39 respondents 
were positive in their perceptions regarding morale of officers serving on active duty.
This researcher considers the 74% negative responses combined with 10% neutral 
responses of all respondents as an alarming signal to the leadership of any organization, 
either military or civilian. Higher rank respondents and combat arms officers had the 
lowest levels of negative responses at 57% and 58% respectively. Combat arms officers 
had the highest positive response rate at 25%. Female respondents had a zero percentage 
of positive response, the only group without at least one positive response. The higher 
ranks had the highest neutral response rate with 2 respondents of 7 or 29%. Although 
captains had the highest positive response rate at 21%, they also had the second highest 
negative rate at 79% just below the females at 86%. Combat support/combat service 
support responses were more negative than combat arms with an 81% negative compared 
to 58%.
Common Themes: : Although there may be some subtleties within the comments o f the 
respondents, several themes became obvious as the primary causative factors for the low
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morale of the Officer Corps. First and foremost is the adverse impact of OPTEMPO. 
Specifically too many deployments, too much work for the resources available, excessive 
work hours and for the married officers, the corresponding unacceptable time away from 
family.
One respondent commented: “Not being able to spend time with your family and 
then comparing it to your buddies out there in the civilian work force who have normal 
lives, putting down stakes, buying a house, putting money into it and seeing flowers 
bloom in two years, is not good” (03 A). Another stated: “In the Aviation branch, I 
would say about a “3,” driven by OPTEMPO which trickles down into everything else, 
not having enough soldiers, non-commissioned officers not knowing their jobs. It all 
adds up to the OPTEMPO issue” (03G). A third respondent said: “I would say about a 
“3.” The cause? The number of, I guess you can say, deployments because it appears the 
U.S. Army is like the World Red Cross. Anything goes on, we’re on it” (031). Another 
commented: “I have to say again, most of the officers that I talk to, company grade, a 
“4.” The reason? OPTEMPO, too much on the plate . . .  Most guys come in 5-6 A.M., 
work all day, don’t go home until it’s dark, work until 8 at night. So if you don’t want 
the Army to be your total life, there is no time for a second life” (03K). An Engineer 
captain observed: “It’s an overcommitted, under strength issue. We’ve got plenty of 
officers but they are doing NCO stuff because we don’t have the NCO’s. Well, the real 
contributors to low morale are OPTEMPO and stability, then the attractiveness of 
opportunities on the outside, money and benefits” (030). Another respondent 
commented: “I rarely see peers of mine that are basically excited about being in the 
Army. Maybe they are not having fun. Deployment is the biggest problem. I know
141
those guys in the Forward Support Battalion are trying to race out of the battalion 
because they are always gone. OPTEMPO is the reason” (02C). Still another officer 
stated: “The leadership needs to know that OPTEMPO is the big thing. What I’m 
hearing from people getting out, just definitely fired up about getting out, most of it is 
because they have had it always being gone” (02C).
A male Military Intelligence major summed up the OPTEMPO impact upon 
morale when he commented: “Certainly there are daily fluctuations, but overall no 
higher than a “4” overall. I was telling your wife that when I get up at 4:00 A.M. in the 
morning, get back at 8:00 P.M., kids already in bed. I’m not complaining, it’s the job I 
have chosen but the stuff we are doing is not contributing. We’re doing everything, 
going task to task, not doing any of them well, just checking blocks . . .  That’s OK if 
we’re getting ready to go to war; there’s a purpose, kiss your family goodbye and spend 
whatever time, six months, three months, getting ready for it. People just run into the 
ground here” (04A).
A second common theme is the frustration of not being able to train properly for 
war fighting, the expectation that many had when they chose the Army as a career. There 
was a sensing that much of the work being done had no positive bearing on being a 
competent soldier.
One respondent observed: “Probably about a “4” (morale). For me personally, 
it’s the frustration. Too many competing interests for scarce resources of money and 
time. Most of all, it’s basically just time to go out and train. Most platoon leaders and 
company commanders want to go out and train. That’s why people join the Army. Go 
out and train realistically” (03E). Another commented: “As a platoon leader, not getting
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a chance to be a platoon leader, rhake mistakes, frustration of not being able to lead. 
Frustration of being gone a lot, doing deployments and not getting a chance to train like 
you had wanted to do when you went combat arms or whatever like the combat service 
support guys do in their jobs. I guess it’s just not having the chance to do what you came 
in the Army to do. Frustrating! (03F). Still another said; “Maybe a “2.” The reason? 
Work hours of not doing real work, not producing anything, there’s no brotherhood 
anymore. There isn’t time for camaraderie anymore” (03J). An Armor captain 
commented: “We don’t know how to fire a tank. We don’t have the time to train 
properly. The things that I’ve seen, the guys who I consider good officers, who care 
about the tank firing, trigger pulling, good individual training, their morale is low because 
they’re one shot from being with troops” (03M). Another respondent stated: “We are 
being micro-managed.. .  Training for war is no longer my number one priority when I 
come to work. My number one priority is making sure my soldiers don’t bounce checks, 
don’t speed, don’t play loud music, they wear their seatbelts and that they are safety 
focused. If we do everything safely, I will be a success. Our readiness and our go to war 
capability is no longer in the front of my line (of things to do)” (03P). An Armor 
lieutenant stated: “Number one is the workload or the quality of the work you get to do. 
Seems like with me personally and a lot of other guys I work with, all of our time is spent 
on numbers. We call it ‘making cheese charts, making PowerPoint presentations versus 
actually training’ . .  . There’s no real satisfaction. We came in to be on tanks, tankers. 
Instead, we are clerks” (02E). Another lieutenant had an interesting perspective when he  
stated: “I see some people with good morale. I don’t think they need a lot in their lives.
143
Maybe that’s what it takes. Maybe the Army actually needs to go out and find people 
who need only one focus to fiinction as a human being” (02H).
Another common theme was the perception that hard work and dedication were 
not being appreciated by those in leadership positions. One respondent observed; “I 
think it’s the fact that there is a feeling that the people we are working for don’t 
appreciate the work we are doing. ‘Please’ and ‘thank you’ are powerful words” (03C). 
Another commented: “A ‘3’ (level of morale), there’s no sense of appreciation for what 
people do on this installation” (03D). A third said: “Sometimes you have a commander 
above you who has no respect for you. You just tolerate it and you can’t say anything. 
You just have to take it. You can’t give an opinion. It’s either his way or no way. You 
work hard to accomplish a mission and you get chewed out. You work long hours and 
you don’t get paid enough and you still get chewed out” (021). Still another lamented: 
“Oh, lieutenants are bitter. We are a bitter bunch. The Army gives us the jobs, we work 
on them and our voices are not heard. You are out there doing twice the amount of work, 
twelve additional duties, trying to do the best you can. But when you have a complaint or 
say, ‘I think we should really do it this way,’ nobody wants to listen . . .  It’s just that we 
are not given the ability to voice our opinion. Everybody likes to be heard. Maybe if  w e 
could have a dialog instead of a monologue, it would work out a lot better. Nothing 
worse than say, ‘we don’t want your ideas’” (02K). One female lieutenant summed up 
her frustration by stating: “The stuff you put up with? (The issues?). I’ve only known 
our new commander for two months. I already named him ‘Napoleon.’ His attitude is h e  
is the captain and you’re a lieutenant. You’re a piss-on. It is the attitude and the way you 
get treated. It’s ridiculous!” (02M).
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One other officer said: “I’m not getting out for the money. I’m getting out 
because I’m just so frustrated. All I do is put out fires after fires.. .  I know I’m sounding 
real bitter. I get so finstrated. I wish things would change. I know if more and more 
people stay in, things will change. I just can’t” (03 E).
A male Ordnance Corps major provides a vignette of the morale situation with 
this comment: “I quote something our previous DISCOM commander (colonel) told us 
and I think he hit it right on the head. He was interviewing a lieutenant who was a West 
Pointer who had put his resignation pack in. The commander was West Point also. The 
lieutenant said, T don’t want to look like you. I don’t want to be you in twenty years.’ 
The young company commanders come in; I talk to them pretty openly. They don’t see 
how we can put in the hours that you are putting in and they don’t want to make the 
investment” (04E).
Positive comments regarding morale were commonly built around the personal 
satisfaction of accomplishing a mission that had a good impact on someone or something. 
One officer stated: “The high morale pockets are when you go into and do something 
where you have success in this area; there is high morale in that” (05A). A respondent 
who put morale ‘about a 7 or 8,’ commented: “I don’t run into many people who aren’t 
happy doing what they do because with all the opportunities there are out there (civilian 
jobs) most of the people who were unhappy are already gone. Looking at our West Point 
web page, there’s a list of about 100, already that we know who got out and then I’ve 
heard of plenty of others” (03H). A full colonel, DIVARTY commander described 
morale as ‘strong, good, solid.’ Proud to serve and guys getting out to go to school.
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getting out because they never intended to stay. They’re getting out because they want a 
life. That is my one concession to stability and predictability” (06A).
3.11 Trust and Advocacy:
This section of the questionnaire addressed the issue of the level o f trust that respondents 
felt for the top Army leadership. Open-ended questions were employed to obtain the 
perceptions of respondents regarding the strength of the leadership in advocating for the 
Army, their willingness to tell the truth about Army problems and challenges and, as a 
general issue, the level of trust in the leadership’s public statements. The ability of the 
leadership to instill soldiers and officers with a sense of trust in them is a significant 
factor in the morale and retention equation. The literature review in Chapter I addresses 
the importance of trust to organizations in great detail and cites the presence or absence 
of trust as an essential element in organizational dynamics. The responses within this 
section contain important signals for Army leadership as they assess the issues they must 
address to reverse the current trend of officers leaving the Army. Typical questions 
asked were: “Do you consider the senior leaders strong advocates for you and the Army"? 
Do they tell it like it is? Do you trust what they say?”
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TABLE 14
ATTITUDES TOWARD TRUST AND ADVOCACY
Categories Positive Negative Neutral Total
All Respondents 13% 56% 31% 100% n=39
Higher Ranks 0% 86% 14% 100% n=7
Captains 26% 42% 32% 100% n=19
Lieutenants 0% 62% 38% 100% n=13
Female R’s 0% 86% 14% 100% n=7
Male R’s 16% 50% 34% 100% n=32
Combat Arms 8% 50% 42% 100% n=12
Combat Services/ Combat 
Service Spt
15% 59% 26% 100% n=27
N=5 n=22 N=12 100%
Analysis of Responses; Table 14 depicts by the categories of positive, negative or 
neutral an assessment of the responses of 39 officers surveyed. An analysis of the 
negative perceptions of all respondents should be alarming to the leadership o f the Army 
or for that matter any organization in any industry. Of special note is the high percentage 
(86%) of negative responses from the 7 higher rank officers (04 to 06) as well as the 6 o f  
7 female officers (86%). If one were to interpret a neutral response as a non-vote of 
confidence, the perceived negativity in this area of trust/advocacy coupled with only 5 o f  
39 (13%) positive responses (all from captains) should be interpreted as an area of 
concern for the leadership. The similar level of negative responses from both combat 
arms officers (50%) and combat service/combat service support officers (59%) reflects a 
consistent level of negativity regardless of branch.
Common Themes: Several common themes became evident as the full responses of all 
subjects were analyzed. The primary theme was “leadership is out of touch.” Some 
examples of comments that represent this point of view are: “I don’t know if the senior 
leadership really knows enough to tell the truth.” (04D); “I think the leadership is out of
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touch.” (04C); “Where are they getting their information?” (05A); “At that echelon 
(senior leadership) it’s hard for them to be in touch with what goes on down here with the 
soldiers every day. The way they get the information up that chain, it’s filtered with no 
bad news” (02C); and “No, I don’t think they are in touch. I don’t think they see what 
goes on day to day and understand why at the age of 24 an officer is ready to leave.” 
(02Kj
A male Engineer captain who was rated neutral provides an example of other 
neutral responses related to the advocacy issue: “Great confidence, no. But they have to 
advocate for a lot more than just my interest. So, I have to, at least, give them that much. 
I could sit here and say I don’t think they think about my career or my family. But, I 
know if I were in their jobs, I would be making some of the same decisions. Some of 
them, I think, are in touch. I think they know but maybe they don’t understand.
Knowing something is half of it. Understanding and feeling it is an entirely different 
thing” (030).
A second common theme is that creating trust and advocacy does not appear to be  
a priority of the leadership. One respondent stated “I don’t think they care too much 
about that although I think the general here (division commander) does.” (04B). A 
second responded: “I don’t think it’s their number one priority, probably falls to a two o r 
three behind some of the political things that have to be done. . . ” (03F). Another stated : 
“There’s just got to be some times that they stand up and say, ‘hey, chairman (Senate or 
House Armed Services Committee), we can’t do any more. We can’t send another task 
force. We are killing these guys.’” (04E).
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A male Armor captain provided a view that seems to be representative of several 
responses regarding advocacy. He stated; “I worked for General Shinseki (Army Chief 
of Staff at the time of the interviews) and I know he’s a very personal guy and down to 
earth. He’ll listen to soldiers and fix what he can. So I would hate to say he’s not (a 
good advocate). He is kinda’ out of tune, far away and working on other things, 
probably. I know if General Shinseki came here and saw this, all the WWII buildings 
around this place, the hole that it is, sorry barracks, no parking places, no curbs on the 
streets, he would fix them” (03 K).
A third theme is that maintaining a positive public image of the Army and being 
politically correct appears to have priority over speaking with candor, without spin. One 
respondent spoke directly to this issue when he stated: “ . . .  a lot of stuff they put out has 
been PR filtered.. .  It has to be halfway palatable to the regular citizens.” (03D). Another 
commented: “You have to filter it first because there is always a loophole.” (031). A 
third stated, “But what they say can be so convoluted because it is heard by the general 
public.” (03N); and another, “I guess we are all human, but at some point they make a 
mistake or two or said something that they shouldn’t have and got burned for it; they are 
facing some of the zero defects at their level that I’m looking at right here. So they get a 
little tentative up there.” (03F).
A male Ordnance Corps lieutenant colonel’s comments articulate the view of 
several respondents in regard to speaking with candor: “No (don’t trust what they say). I 
try to listen to them. Where are they getting their information? It depends on what it is, 
o f course. If if  s an operational briefing like Desert Storm, I would say they are telling 
them (Congress and general public) what they need to know and I believe them. I believe
149
their integrity for the most part but when it comes to information to the press, I want to 
bring this up. We talk about taking care of soldiers in the Army as our first priority; yet, 
we are now just getting around to considering pay raises, valuable pay raises, and 
valuable retirement programs. We don’t address a lot of other things like housing. Why 
don’t we?” (05A).
A fourth theme is that the historical “can do” attitude of the Army has a tendency 
to overcome the leadership’s willingness to say “no,” when a candid and objective 
assessment says the Army and its soldiers have reached their limits. One officer stated: 
“One of the problems I observe is the conflict between candor versus “can do.” Where 
people who just got out of command or just retired have all the courage in the world to 
spill their guts and tell the editor what’s wrong with the Army and the things needed to 
fix it. But when they were in command positions, that candor was overwhelmed by ‘can 
do’ and ‘yes sir give it to me, we can do it.’” (03J). Another stated: “It seems that their 
efforts are misguided.” (03R). A third respondent said, “I guess one of the traits (that 
may be lacking) might be moral courage to stand up on tough issues.” (02B). A fourth 
explained his view by stating: “I think they are really out of touch or they are just 
concerned with survival. I feel we are in one of those times right now where the 
leadership.. .  Is just ensuring that 20 years from now we are still around and viable. But 
in the meantime, we’ve got to cheat ourselves a little. It’s either that or they are just 
totally blind and don’t see what is going on.” (02D).
A male Quartermaster major represents the perceptions of several others when he 
commented: “They (Joint Chiefs of Staff) were pretty big on the pay issue and they are 
pretty big on the retirement issue. Those are big issues. But I think there are some other
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issues that they really ought to address. They’ve got to look at this turbulence issue and 
the OPTEMPO issue. There’s just got to be some times that they stand up and say, like 1 
hope they are doing, ‘hey, chairman, we can’t do any more. We can’t send another task 
force; we’re killing these guys’” (04D).
A fifth theme addresses the less than admirable examples being set by some 
senior Army leaders along with the incumbent commander in chief that portray a “do as I 
say, not as I do’ form of leadership. One officer observed: “. . .  Today we’ve got general 
officers and command sergeants major who may be involved in activities that violate 
trust and confidence . . .  They undermine junior officer and soldier trust and confidence.” 
(06A). Another respondent stated: “. . .  trying to tell soldiers that committing adultery is 
wrong, lying is wrong and the soldier turns around and says ‘hey sir, the President lied 
about it and nothing happened to him. Why should I do any different?’ It just drives me 
crazy.” (03E).
Of the 5 positive respondents, views ranged across the spectrum of enthusiasm. 
For example, “I think they are doing fine” (03B), “I would say they are trying to move in 
the right direction and are doing an ok job” (03C); and “yes sir, I do, and have no 
problems with it” (03 L). It was clear that even with the positive respondents, there were 
no enthusiastic, flag waving votes of confidence.
3.12 Comments from students at the Armv Command and General Staff College :
Although not part of the responses from the officers addressed through the 
interview process, the comments from 16 of 64 class sections from the Command and 
General Staff College Class of 2000 student body of 760 Army majors and lieutenant 
colonels, are very pertinent. This researcher initially read of the survey in a front page
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The Washington Post article written by staff writer, Thomas E. Ricks, on April 17, 2000, 
titled “Younger officers quit Army at fast clip.” The comments by the class were 
provided to the Army Chief of Staff as a result of his quest to obtain insights as to why so 
many young officers were leaving the Army after five to ten years in the military. The 
results were apparently so negative and emotional that the Army has yet to provide this 
researcher with the survey in spite of two requests under the provisions of the Freedom o f 
Information Act. In any case, 16 of the 64 reports were “leaked” by “someone in the 
Pentagon” to Mr. Ricks who addressed them in his news article. At my request he 
provided them to me to assist in my research. I have extracted the summary type 
statements generated by the students in 2-3 page papers and placed them in the same 
topical order, where appropriate, as the interview topics. They are oftentimes very 
similar and, in some respects, more caustic than those made during my interviews. My 
personal recollections of my student time at CGSC is reinforced in that students are 
encouraged to be more free thinking than when in a unit. When one reads the Class of 
2000 statements, it is easy to determine how successful the faculty was in attaining that 
objective. The students did not restrain their commentary.
At the request of the Army Chief of Staff following his receipt of the CGSC input, 
28 students volunteered to provide their collective views in support of a Blue Ribbon 
Panel which was created to address leadership and training. That final report, dated 23 
May 2000, is a very straightforward and comprehensive document that anyone interested 
in leadership will find very worthwhile.
The comments provided in response to General Eric Shinseki's request for the 
reasons young officers are leaving the Army by the CGSC Class of 2000 are as follows in
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topical sequence. It should be noted, however, that not all topics addressed in the 
questioning of the officers’ subjects during the interview process were addressed by the 
CGSC commentaries. They are, however, important to this research because they reflect 
directly upon officer perceptions within the Army:
Zero Defects:
“Everything overly centralized (not just training, but the example is here; Division 
Command directing training based on two battalions going to NTC; everything else stops; 
give young leaders responsibility for training and hold them accountable.”
“Preoccupation with risk assessment to the extent that training quality suffers.”
“Reasons for Captain attrition: Lack of empowerment for Captains/Company 
Commanders. Too many decisions taken out of their hands. Closely connected to 
perceived inability to take risks and fail (zero defect mentality).”
“Zero defect culture does not reward risk takers = little challenge or opportunity to 
display unique competencies = low job satisfaction/failure of expectations.”
“’PowerPoint Army:’ Form over substance; over reliance on computers; use of computer 
and info systems micro management and enforcement o f ‘zero defects.’”
“No risks in training; getting worse; short assignments in key positions (XO/S3) 
magnifies errors, causes officers to be oriented on short term results; field grade officers 
are biggest violators; leads to looking for culprit and the entire chain of command hangs. ” 
“Even though the drawdown is complete, I still feel we have a zero defects Army . . . .  
Even though we have completed the drawdown I still feel that many officers are so 
worried about their careers that they still back stab.”
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“ . . .  Most junior officers are not allowed to make mistakes and survive and leam, 
so they don’t use their initiative. Instead they wait to be told what to do - so do you think 
in combat they are going to show any initiative . .  No . .  so soldiers are going to die.” 
“Zero defects is real; evolved during drawdown when Army was looking for any reason 
to non-select officers. Now it’s here to stay. No tolerance for mistakes . .  No freedom to 
take chances/fail/leam fi-om mistakes.”
“Feeling overwhelmed and under-resourced. Too many training detractors and 
too much micromanagement. Not empowering front line managers-senior officers 
concerned with zero defect environment (brigade commands: you’re only one incident 
away from the end of a career).
“Micro management. A killer on the front line. Too many events directed from 
above.”
“Zero defects: A real problem, killed a lot of good officers.” “We live and fear 
‘zero tolerance.’ Please do not say we are not. One bad (even mediocre, even apparently 
okay but ‘velvet hammer’) OER and we’re through. Bosses refuse to take risks for fear 
of failing. . .  We are a talk Army.” “One guy/OER can ‘kill’ you.”
“Micro management reduces predictability when a plan is changed to 
accommodate a senior officer’s demands for control rather than results. What is the 
mission? Let me do it.”
“We talk about initiative and agility, but we reward officers who follow a rigidly 
prescribed path to success. Being innovative will get you fired unless your results are so 
outstanding that your boss can’t slam you. Forget about taking risk; we don’t reward risk  
takers.”
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“Saying that we are not a zero defects Army does not make it so; there is no 
freedom to face and everyone is just a step away from a 2 block (or worse) and the 
potential end of your career.” “Too much micromanagement taking place: Captains are 
told exactly how to do their jobs - can’t use initiative.” “Zero defects army. Officers 
don’t feel as if  they can make mistakes.” “It is believed that the Army has finally 
evolved into a ‘zero defects’ culture.”
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO):
“. . .  problem is tasking in garrison (make work) leadership unwilling to say 
enough is enough.”
“My wife tells me every day to get out of the Army. She is disgusted with the 
quality of life and the high stress pace.”
“Frequent 6 month deployments - no real credit as there is with one year 
unaccompanied tour.”
“Hours worked are too long (because so many hours are for wrong reason . i.e., 
making the perfect PowerPoint briefing). If it’s rewarding work, the long hours won’t 
matter.”
“Turbulence and uncertainty are key reasons for leaving. Officers perceive the 
blame starts at CSA (Chief of Staff) level (he’s in charge).”
“Spouses increasingly starting to think there is no assignment that allows for some 
‘downtime/get to know the family again time.’”
“Personal time/family life is a big factor and today many 03’s are married. For a 
lot the choice to resign hinges on the wife’s decision.”
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“They (captains) do not want to be like us. Burning mid night oil, see our jobs 
(04) as even less fun.”
“The OPTEMPO is killing the force and driving people out of the Army.”
“Should be no need for an 18-hour work day while in garrison.” “The current 
OPTEMPO degrades the quality of professional life.” “OPTEMPO increase and force 
structure decrease is hurting families and job satisfaction, leading to exodus from 
military.”
“DEPTEMPO (deployment tempo) is OK (as evidenced by reenlistment in 
frequently deployed units) if the mission is a good one, you are given responsibility and 
authority and have the support of superiors; problem is tasking in garrison (make work; 
leadership unwilling to say enough is enough).”
“No end in sight for missions other than war deployments. The current 
administration would deploy a division anywhere for political gain and the current 
military leadership (all services) will never take a stand - they aren’t the ones doing more 
with less.”
“Too much borrowed military manpower. Not doing what they signed up for.” 
“Predictability relieves much stress. Our lives are not predictable.”
“Every suspense is now, little long range planning is done (or when done, 
appreciated), and low-density MGS soldiers are always gone. Why would one stay?”
“We are trying too hard and need to reassess long-term effects on can-doism. For 
example, a senior leader who spoke here recently, recited with pride how a platoon 
deployed to an airfield for a short notice deployment in record time, then, went on to say 
they sat there for weeks until someone figured out they needed a flight to transport them.
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This is not something to be proud of. That unit could have been preparing their families 
for the separation instead of proving we can deploy in “x” hours.”
“Increased OPTEMPO has second and third tier affects on developing, training 
and mentoring soldiers. We’re too busy in the field to teach subordinates who have spent 
too little time in sehools (trained by unqualified instructors) because the TRADOC goal 
is not to certify eompetence but to ‘pound through’ the numbers and let the ‘students’ 
leam their job in the field. Can you say Catch 22?”
“The OPTEMPO is killing the force and driving people out of the Army.” 
“Commanders put too much on the training schedule and demand that it all be done 
perfeetly; the result is medioere training, long hours, frustration and disillusionment.” 
“Too much to do and not enough people to do it. This did not translate to too 
high on OPTEMPO. They felt that fi-equent/multiple deployments isn’t as much an issue 
as under manning without a commensurate tailoring of (often seemingly non-essential) 
job related tasks. Difficult to spend quality time with families even when not deployed.” 
“Another problem is that the fbree strueture does not support the Army doing half 
a dozen peaeekeeping missions. Our senior leaders must demand more structure or less 
missions and stop saying ‘can do.’”
“Deployments are not satisfying and occur too often - because senior leaders are 
devoted to mieromanagement and their own career advancement, they spend most of 
their time avoiding mistakes. Then these real world deployments don’t count as ‘real’ 
training, the day after the soldiers return from 6 months in Bosnia, they have to go into an  
NTC train-up cycle and deployments so their CG can get a report card.... Senior leaders 
need to stop blaming the NCA (National Command Authority) for our deployment woes
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and adjust what they can control to ameliorate current conditions - but they don’t because 
they care about their report card.”
“Don’t think the Chief of Staff knows the kind of hours they are required to put 
in. OPTEMPO increase and force structure decrease is hurting families and job 
satisfaction, leading to exodus from military.”
“Current OPTEMPO degrades the quality of professional life. Units operate at 
80% intensity level all the time instead of cycling down during non-deployment times in 
order to ‘rest, recuperate and rebuild unit cohesion.’ At all levels, commanders go hard 
throughout their command tours because that may be their only chance to command at 
that level. Reputations are made in command billets. Units surge during the command 
tour only to surge again during the tour o f the next commander, without break.”
“Commanders are part of the OPTEMPO problem. ‘Won’t cut back on my 
watch’ is the general theme among commanders. Senior commanders take on all 
missions with no/little regard for subordinates. Not doing deployments as a commander 
is a sign of weakness and decreases potential to reach the next level as an individual. 
Downsizing of the Armv:
“The downsizing of the force from 18 to 10 divisions has caused ‘too much, too 
few’ situation in which we all must do more than truly possible . .  Why would one stay?” 
“Drawdown - young Captains saw perceived unfairness in the drawdown as some 
seniors were ‘forced’ out of the Army; the Captains did not want to have the same 
experience.”
Reduced Retirement Benefits (REDUX):
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“I don’t think I’ll have any benefits when I retire. Benefits are steadily eroding 
and perception is that senior leaders count on us to just continue to ‘do more with less’ 
and like i t . . .  There is a growing feeling that senior leaders (military and civilian) are 
exploiting that attitude, counting on us to drive on while our promised benefits continue 
to disappear.”
“Continuous and unrelenting erosion of benefits (Tricare, retirement, housing). 
Leadership at the top constantly talking about what’s in the works but never seems to 
become reality.”
Health/Dental Care:
“Medical and dental - now paying for things that are not better.” “Health care. 
Loved reading a General’s comments in the last Tricare update that he had never had a 
problem with the system. His aide probably makes his appointments and files his claim 
forms. Ask the soldiers.”
“The perception of the erosion of benefits insures that currently serving officers 
will not help the recruiting effort, especially their own kids. Creeping cynicism from a 
decade of broken promises.”
“Spend billions to build the medium brigade a need obvious to everyone since at 
least 1995, while the quality of life issues (housing, medical care and too frequent moves) 
go unsolved.”
“Fun of job satisfaction would ameliorate much of the dissatisfaction with 
housing medical care and OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO turbulence.”
“Tricare is more than a minor irritant. A General officer may not have any 
problem with the system but he should try it down at the other end of the food chain.”
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“Lobby Congress to bring back the medical care that retirees were promised.” 
“Care for family is number one reason Captains are getting ou t . . .  Benefits, pay, 
medical and housing.”
“A number of Majors said Captains are getting out because younger wives, who 
are not as indoctrinated in sacrifice, are sick of having to mail in Tricare forms a dozen 
times before they are corrected.”
“Tricare: For a profession that requires its members to move frequently, it is 
absurd to have a health care system that administratively requires its members to ‘unplug’ 
from a departure station and ‘replug’ upon arrival of a new station.”
“Health care is inadequate especially for soldiers with families 
(Tricare/Champus), now paying for low quality services after promise of full benefits.” 
“Health care is completely inadequate. Some have supplemental health care due 
to inadequacies in Tricare/Champus system. Stop talking and fix it.”
Trust in Leadership:
“Biggest Issue: Communications at every level. Counseling is not happening. 
Knee jerk reaction to adverse publicity; don’t act like everyone needs to be punished or 
“trained” for acts of a few. Don’t issue press releases that are not accurate; we know they 
are not and it threatens leadership credibility. Bottom line: lack of communications 
breeds lack of trust.”
“Young officers are getting out because they feel out of touch with leadership; the 
Army they are experiencing is NOT the same as when GO’s were LT/CPTS.”
“The Army has always treated people badly - now they don’t have to take it.”
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“Much more disturbing than the bullet above is the perception that nobody cares 
enough to do something about it and it’s only going to get worse. HOOAH!”
“Officers question how much the senior leaders really care - riding the status quo 
is not standing up and sounding off. To hear a General officer make the statement that 
something is ‘above my pay grade’ generates massive cynicism.”
“We need senior leaders to stand up before Congress, the administration, the 
public and explain reality. Our civilian leadership is out of touch with the military, 
there’s a declining percentage of military experience among them. That’s got to be 
addressed by the senior leadership, not Majors at the local Optimist Club.”
“Army as a values-based organization. We all have values cards. Loyalty works 
both ways. Where’s the (senior leadership) loyalty? To the System? To political 
correctness? Or to the soldier?”
“Reference officer retention. Instead of looking for outside influences the Army 
needs to look inward - - when junior officers have strong positive leadership, they are 
more inclined to stay in the Army. When presented with bad leadership, they want out. 
Talking with peers, most notably in the past six months, there seems to be an alarming 
number of bad leaders out there. Leaders who sugar coat things to higher; leaders who 
lie, leaders who are immoral; leaders who won’t think twice about killing a career over an 
honest mistake or a difference of opinions; leaders who lead by fear and intimidation; 
leaders who care more about themselves than their soldiers/officers. Who wants to work 
under conditions where they are exposed to bad leadership?”
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“Deteriorating trust in senior leadership: (a) lack of consistent vision, (b) poor 
command climates, (c) expediency hurts effectiveness, (d) zero defects mentality is 
stronger than ever.”
“No end in sight for additional MOOTW (mission operations other than war) 
deployments. The current administration would deploy a division anywhere for political 
gain and the current military leadership (all services) will never take a stand - they aren’t 
the ones doing more with less.”
“Perception seems to be that the McMasters’ book Dereliction of Dutv could have 
been written about the current JCS and the current OPTEMPO. No one thinks a service 
chief would have the guts to take a stand, much less resign in a matter of principle, last 
person perceived as having that kind of stand-up fortitude was Krulak (former Marine 
Corps Commandant).”
“Some students wondered if the Chief of JCS has gone from being a war fighter 
to a yes-man.”
“Top down loyalty: need to walk the talk.”
“Senior officers are more concerned with ‘pretty’ versus substance.”
“Major’s Issue: The Army leadership is out of touch, not trusted.”
“Soldiers First, ‘We Care for Soldiers’ are empty slogans.”
“The senior leadership does not inform the force. This is the information age and 
it is not happening.”
“Political correctness reigns; there are too many programs that appear to be 
response to media scrutiny (values cards, co2, homosexual sensitivity training).”
162
“Senior officers must stand up and be counted; the force is being pulled in every 
direction and no one appears to be falling on his sword over it.”
“There is a credibility gap between senior leaders and the rest of the Army.
Senior leadership is losing the confidence and trust of its subordinates; there are growing 
doubts about the trustworthiness of senior military and DOD civilian leadership. Service 
member suspicions of anthrax vaccinations, BAH changes, Gulf War Syndrome, 
adequacy of retirement and health care and the handling of senior officer ethical cases 
(MG Hale) are immediate examples of the effects of the growing credibility gap that has 
caused many in the Army to question senior leadership.”
“PowerPoint Army. We are leading by email. Too much time spent getting 
things pretty - not conducting real training - pretty versus content.”
“Top down loyalty. Just plain don’t see it that way - perception is top is watching 
their own butt.”
“Leaders are not adequately addressing/dealing with issues that directly affect the 
morale/quality of life of the soldiers. Senior leaders talk a good talk but don’t walk the 
walk. They are not representing the interest of the soldier to the civilian leadership.”
“We never hear the ground truth from our senior leaders. They are too politically 
correct when addressing us.”
“Top down loyalty - DOES NOT EXIST. Senior leaders will throw subordinates 
under the bus in a heartbeat to protect or advance their eareer. There is no trust of senior 
leaders in terms of loyalty because the record is clear. At the highest level, as example, 4  
stars will watch our health care exude without taking a stand.”
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What is your perception of the Army’s senior leadership? The current crop of 
Majors find somewhat incredible that the senior leadership mentions ethics to them.
From their perspective, these are the same folks that won’t support healthcare, the same 
folks that allowed housing allowances to erode, the same guys that get personally 
involved and tinker with the assignment process (how can a GO make an informed 
decision on who should have BQ (branch qualified) job? He doesn’t know all the 
candidates, so it becomes out-and-out favoritism), the same guys who base decisions on 
political correctness rather than right and wrong. Many believe there needs to be a clean 
sweep of senior leadership before the rest of the Army follows. Many pointed out that 
they were not talking about moral ethics (i.e. “sleeping around”) but PROFESSIONAL 
ethics - selfless service, honesty to subordinates, courage of their convictions, etc. Other 
comments were:
“They are not doing much right.”
“They do not speak truthfully to Congress or the force. They should keep in mind 
that we see them on C-SPAN and we read the Early Bird.”
“General officers DO NOT stay in assignments long enough to have a vested 
interest in the organization or unit or even to get to know the organization or unit. 
Therefore, their focus is on short-impact fixes that make them look good and get them 
their next star.”
“The General officers in the U.S. Army would gain much from having instruction 
and developing an understanding on “selfless service” versus “selfish service.” Most are 
preoccupied with their careers. Unfortunately, this is the type of officer the system 
moves along.”
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“Our General officers should be the smart guys who have the moxy to tell 
Congress where we really stand.”
“The senior leaders of today had an officer’s club that encouraged camaraderie 
when they were Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, but now they see no utility so they took 
them away from us. And then they wonder why we don’t feel that we are part of 
something special?”
“Soldiers ARE NOT getting out because of the economy or job market - they are 
getting out because senior leaders are micro managers.”
“We create expectations for our soldiers that we don’t fulfill. We stifle initiative 
o f smart soldiers at every turn because there may be some risk associated with the idea. 
Most importantly, our senior leaders are incapable of listening because the system has 
told them how good they are so many times that they really believe they are some sort o f  
special, infallible animal. They need to wake up to their shortcomings and allow the rest 
o f the Army to contribute.”
(Researcher’s note: One group summary had the following lead-in comment from 
the contributing class section: “The staff group was very animated on these issues. All 
had an opinion. Despite efforts to direct the conversation to perceived positivism, 
virtually every officer was negative. Of the 13 officers in the group, only ONE was even, 
considering remaining in service after 20 years. All were initially reluctant to participate 
in this discussion as many believed they would be held accountable via an audit trail for 
what they said. That, in and of itself, speaks volumes about the environment of today’s 
Army.)
Another summary had the following preface:
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“The Army officers interviewed uniformly perceive a shortfall in Army readiness. 
They also perceive that senior Army leaders are understating the problem. This damages 
the credibility of senior Army leaders.” (researcher’s note: This group’s input had the 
following wrap-up statement: “when asked how many will do 20 years and out, all but 
two officers raised their hands. Changing the question to: “If you were picked up for 
battalion command and assured you would make 06, all but three officers raised their 
hand.”) “As middle managers, we feel betrayed by senior leaders.” These straight­
forward comments from the 2000 Class of CGSC who represent the top 50% of their year 
group from a quality/promotion perspective, clearly reflect the same levels of 
dissatisfaction on the “hot button” issues addressed by the interviewee subjects o f this 
research.
It is important to note that obtaining a sample from only one Army division 
stationed within the continental United States may result in skewed results. Clearly, an 
Army division with either superb or a miserable leadership climate at the top may impact 
in a generalized manner upon attitudes and experiences across the entire organization. It 
is worth noting that no adverse comments were made about the division commander.
With the exception of junior grade first lieutenants, most subjects brought views that had 
matured over a period of time that encompassed assignments at other installations/units 
and professional schooling. The officers interviewed had a range o f tenure in the division 
of from one week to three years. Turnover within a division is constant as officers depart 
for new assignments, to attend school or for release from active duty. Operational tempo 
of the unit, temporary deployment time frames, combat operations and off installation 
training experiences all play a role in defining officer attitudes and morale just as quality
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of life issues impact upon their sense of well being. Not to be ignored, is the importance 
of spousal happiness, as well as sense of job security and job satisfaction. Just as in any 
professional endeavor, an unhappy spouse can result in adverse job performance, attitude, 
job satisfaction and ultimately loyalty and retainability of the professional soldier. All o f 
these aspects of military life play a role in an officer's general outlook, morale, loyalty, 
attitude, and level of trust in army leadership. Additionally, all play a role in the decision 
to stay in the Army or to seek another profession.
Every officer interviewed as part of this research was articulate, well educated, 
physically fit, patriotic and willing to address the issues in a straightforward manner. 
Across the board, they would have been quality targets for any corporate head hunter.
No one can say with any factual basis that the Army is not able to attract some of our best 
young citizens not only from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, but also from the 
nation’s private and public universities and colleges where the Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (ROTC) is part of the institution. It was my personal pleasure to meet and 
question every officer regardless of their intention to remain or resign as soldiers. They 
were all first-class citizens who voluntarily chose to serve their nation. Unfortunately, 
many had not seen their expectations met, some to a degree where they had already made 
a decision to resign. Their departure is a loss to the Army’s ability to carry out its 
mission, but from this researcher’s perspective will be beneficial to the corporate world 
where their military experience and values will be a genuine asset not only to their 
employer but to the nation as a whole.
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CHAPTER 4 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Background
This research addressed the level of trust of the senior Army leadership that exists 
within the Officer Corps of the Army. The basic questions that were asked; “Do Army 
officers trust implicitly what the leadership says both verbally and in writing;” “Do 
officers believe that the leadership tells lies by either commission or omission;” “Does 
the existence of a zero defects mentality or the demand for political correctness force 
leaders to deviate firom the truth when stating their views on issues related to the Army or 
the national defense?” Answers to these questions and other directly related issues were 
sought by going to the Army Officer Corps and asking for its perceptions.
Methodologv
Qualitative research, research that describes phenomena in words instead of 
numbers or measures was employed to obtain answers to the general questions cited 
above. Because qualitative research is context-specific this researcher embedded himself 
within the physical and social environment of the Army in order to facilitate an 
understanding of the relationships, effects and causes of the dynamics associated with the 
research topic. Forty officers were selected randomly from within an active Army 
division utilizing a random numbers table against the division alphabetical roster. The 
selection process was designed in a manner that produced a representative demographic 
cross section of the Army considering rank, branch, gender and race. The division 
commander and his staff supported and assisted in the research process. Questions 
employed in the interview sessions were approved by the University of Oklahoma 
Institutional review board on August 5,1998, prior to their use. Individual interviews
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were conducted at an appropriate site where confidential sessions were tape recorded. 
Transcripts of the interviews were sent to each subject for final approval prior to use. 
Commitment to confidentiality of responses was part of the initial interview process. No 
officer refused to go through with the interview. The objective of the process was to 
obtain a rich human descriptive account of officer experiences and observations that had 
bearing on the research topic.
Major Findings
A summary of the major findings in an order that represents from the perspective 
of the respondents, the least pertinent or important, to the most pertinent issues is as 
follows:
Officer Efficiency Reports (OER). This issue addressed the perceptions regarding 
the new OER where the senior rater may only place 49% of officers in the top block 
while the remainder is categorized as “center of mass.” Among the respondents, 41% 
were positive, 10% negative and 49% neutral. Rather than being detrimental to morale 
and leadership challenges, the new OER was generally welcomed as an improvement 
over the previous report that had become too inflated to serve its purpose. Some 
apprehension did exist as to the implications of being identified a “center o f mass” versus 
a “top block” officer. The OER is not considered a leadership trust issue.
Women in the Armv. This issue dealt with officer views on the value female 
officers contributed to the Army as a military force; specifically, was the presence of 
women in the Army ultimately good or bad. Among respondents, 28% were positive,
23% negative and 49% neutral or expressed mixed views. This balanced mix of 
responses made this potential issue relatively benign from a general perspective. Levels
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of dissatisfaction existed across all demographic segments regarding pregnancy and its 
impact upon readiness and mission accomplishment. A perception that women were less 
severely disciplined and not held to the same weight and fitness standards as males was a 
common complaint. However, general acceptance of females as an essential part of the 
Army prevailed. Women in the Army is not a significant leadership trust issue although 
leadership political correctness on this topic was a concern for some respondents.
Gulf War Syndrome TOWS). This issue addressed the slow response of DOD in 
recognizing GWS as a serious health issue rather than a psychological problem which 
was the initial diagnosis. Among respondents, 28% were negative but 72% expressed 
limited knowledge of the issue and thus were considered neutral. These responses 
identified GWS as a time based historical issue where the higher the rank, and therefore 
longer service, the higher the rate of negativity. Although creating some distrust among 
those who had known soldiers suffering from GWS, a significant level of negativity 
related to the less than aggressive response of the DOD and Army in accepting GWS as a  
health issue, did not surface as an important trust issue.
Reduced Retirement (REDUX). This issue addressed the 1996 change to the 
historical retirement program of 50% base pay at 20 years to 40%. Respondents were 
31% negative and 69% neutral on this issue. At the time of the interview there were 
strong indications that REDUX would be reversed as a result of its negative impact upon. 
soldier retention. REDUX was eliminated and the 50% salary, highest grade held at 
retirement, was reinstituted as part of the FY2000 Defense Appropriations Act. Since the 
DOD and Army leadership supported return to the former system, no trust implications 
related to this issue continue to exist.
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Army Met Officer Expectations. This issue dealt with officer perceptions as to 
how well the Army had met their expectations. Responses were 49% positive, 43% 
negative and 8% neutral. Although generally balanced among all respondents, the 71% 
and 56% negative perceptions by females and combat support/combat service support 
officers respectively should be grounds for concern by the leadership. From a common 
sense perspective, any organization should find it alarming when only 49% of its 
members perceive that their expectations are being met. There are leadership trust 
implications reflected among the respondent replies. Serving with troops and the 
opportunity to command were the two most important aspects of having expectations 
met.
Downsizing of the Armv. This issue addressed the impact upon respondents of 
the maimer in which officers were forced to retire or leave active duty in order to achieve 
the mandated reduction of Army strength firom 781,000 in 1991 to 480,000. Responses 
were 3% positive, 48% negative and 49% neutral. Similar to GWS, the higher the rank 
and longer years of service and therefore the closer to the 1993-96 force out period of 
many officers, the higher the levels of negativity toward the process. The most common 
themes of negativity were based upon the perceptions of being overcommitted without 
adequate manpower, the absence of experienced non-commissioned officers and the 
accelerated promotion of officers before they reached adequate levels of experience. 
Some officers did view personnel shortages, however, as an opportunity to be promoted 
faster. Trust in leadership was adversely impacted by the relatively common view that 
Army leaders were unaware of the implications of a reduced strength Army.
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Health and Dental Care. This issue addressed respondent perceptions regarding 
the quality of the Army health and dental services. Responses were 54% negative, 13% 
positive and 33% neutral. The higher the rank and time in service, the higher the level o f 
dissatisfaction with higher ranks at 71% negative. The greatest common levels of 
dissatisfaction centered around wait time at clinics, the ease with which soldiers were 
granted a profile, an unresponsive Tricare program that supports dependants and the poor 
quality of care in general. Respondents perceived that Army leadership was out o f touch 
with this important aspect of human services. It is, therefore, a trust issue.
Zero Defects. This issue addressed the degree that a command climate existed 
that would not tolerate mistakes by its officers. Respondents were 69% negative, 13% 
positive and 18% not sure or neutral. This level of negativity reflects adversely on the 
command climate established by Army leadership. Among captains, a critical shortage 
area due to a high resignation rate, 89% perceived the existence of a zero defects 
command climate. The continued existence of such a mindset and its adverse impact 
upon officer willingness to be innovative, bold in execution and to learn by making 
mistakes is a major leadership issue. Although identified as a problem since at least 1995 
when General Reimer, then Chief of Staff, addressed the issue in his “White Paper,” it 
appears that little success has occurred in eliminating it. This is a significant trust issue.
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPOl. This issue addressed the intensity and length 
of day-to-day operations, deployment duration and frequency and the ability to have free 
time for family and social activities. Responses were 74% negative, 5% positive and 
21 % neutral. OPTEMPO is clearly the greatest concern of respondents and is the largest 
source of negativity toward Army leadership. The leadership is viewed as being out of
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touch and not playing a positive advocacy role with the national command authority. 
OPTEMPO was cited as the primary contributor toward officers deciding to resign.
There was a general view that the Army was so overcommitted and work hours so long, 
with no end in sight, that there was no time for family or a social life, only time to work. 
The OPTEMPO issue was viewed as the significant morale and retention element among 
Army officers. The leadership was viewed as out of touch and not supportive in 
resolving this major morale and retention issue.
Trust and Advocacv of the Leadership. This issue dealt with the perceptions of 
respondents as to how well they viewed the leadership as trustworthy in what they said 
verbally or in writing and how well they advocated on behalf of the Army. Responses 
were 56% negative, 13% positive and 31% neutral. Eighty-six percent of higher ranks 
and females were by far the highest groups with negative perceptions. The leadership 
was perceived as out of touch, not advocating to slow mission creep, acting out of 
political correctness versus candor, too much “can do” and an unwillingness to say “can’t 
be done” and possessing a “do as I say, not as I do” mindset. These perceptions should 
be of major concern to Army leadership since they address directly the trust level held by 
Army officers as they view their leaders.
The State of Morale. This issue addressed respondent perceptions regarding the 
state of morale within the Army Officer Corps. Responses were 74% negative, 16% 
positive and 10% neutral. This is a strong signal to the leadership that serious challenges 
exist that must be addressed and resolved on a priority basis. The higher negative rate, 
similar to the zero defects and OPTEMPO issues, was found among captains, the group 
resigning at rates that have been and continue to be alarming to the leadership. The
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greatest contributors to the existence of low morale was an unacceptably high level of 
OPTEMPO, the inability to train realistically and the perception that the leadership was 
unappreciative of the sacrifices being made by the officers at the expense of family time 
as well as being unable to live a balanced “normal” life. The implications of low morale 
and its direct relationship to trust in leadership are of high importance. Any organization, 
military or civilian, can be viewed as facing difficulty when a 74% negative response rate 
comes from its junior leaders.
Relevance
In view of the above conclusions, and the actual statements of the respondents 
interviewed in this research, there are solid indications that officer trust in Army 
leadership is not at the levels that the leadership would or should expect. When one 
considers that the Army is an institution created and maintained ultimately to fight wars, 
the objective should be a 100% level of trust in the leadership that may take you in 
harm’s way at the nations call.
One may ask what relevance research commencing in 1996 and interviews 
conducted in 1999 has with regard to the Army of 2003. From this researcher’s view, 
especially with the OPTEMPO of today, the presumption that the contents of this 
dissertation may be old news, cannot be further from the tmth. At this moment, the U.S. 
Army, assisted by other services and some foreign troops, is deeply committed to the 
occupation of Iraq, the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and Bosnia, as well as the Sinai, 
the support of the newly formed Afghani government and its ongoing battle with the 
Taliban, major deployments in Korea, as well as a host of other commitments across the 
world. OPTEMPO is currently at a pace not seen since World War 11. The critical
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difference in that comparison is that WWII saw an unlimited growth in the strength of 
U.S. Forces in order to defeat the axis powers, while today, in spite of our excessive new 
commitments. Army strength continues to be limited to the ceiling o f480,000 troops 
mandated in 1998.
It is important to consider that if the levels of OPTEMPO were most likely to 
have been the most significant factor in 1998 causing officers to leave the Army, the 
OPTEMPO situation of today far exceeds that of 1998. Of greater concern is the open- 
ended commitment to the Iraqi oceupation/nation building effort and the unfortunate 
reluctance of the DOD to seek an increase in force authorizations in spite of the Congress 
strongly recommending such an increase.
The significance of this research in 2003/4 is just as important as it was in 1998. 
Some of the minor issues addressed in the research may have improved or perhaps were 
resolved completely; however, it appears that OPTEMPO and shortfalls in leadership 
advocacy and their level of trust by the Officer Corps are completely relevant today. A 
review of the deployment facts cited in a Mathew Cox article in the June 23, 2003, Armv 
Times, titled “Stretched Thin,” states the following: “As of June 9, about 369,000 
soldiers are deployed throughout the world conducting training, peacekeeping and 
combat operations. About 229,000 of those soldiers are firom the active force” (pp. 14- 
15). A September 28,2003, Miami Herald article written by Joseph L. Galloway, noted 
war correspondent and author, titled, “How To Ruin a Great Army in a Short Time,” 
points out that “Under Rumsfeld by next spring 30 of the Army’s 33 combat brigades 
will either be in Iraq or on their way home from Iraq . . .  with an operation’s tempo this 
high, there’s little time for units to do much more than repair their equipment and send
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their soldiers on leave with long-neglected families before it’s time to deploy again.”
(P.l)
In spite of the OPTEMPO of 2003 with no end in sight, the perception from the 
Congress is that the current administration, DOD and Army leadership are unwilling to 
be forthcoming on the need to increase the strength of the U.S. forces. In spite of a 
Senate vote on 17 October 03, to increase the size of the active duty Army by 10,000, the 
Bush administration objected. Subsequently, a bipartisan effort to recruit 40,000 
additional soldiers and raise the force authorization from 480,000 to 520,000 was refused 
by the Pentagon.” (New York Dailv News. November 6, 2003, (p.6)
A 22 September 2003 Armv Times article by Rick Maze titled, “DOD Resists 
Force Increase:” “Deputy Dense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, and Air Force General 
Richard Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said they do not support a personnel 
increase because combatant commanders haven’t asked for it. (p.22) Unfortunately, one 
may perceive a similarity in the Army leadership compromising its responsibility for 
advocacy of its soldiers by the fact that the new Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. 
Schoomaker, told Congress in late July that he “intuitively” believes the Army needs 
more people but then asked the Senate Armed Services committee to give him time to 
conduct a study since he thought the cost may be prohibitive. (Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly. October 4, 2003, p. 2456) To date, no request for a strength increase has been 
forthcoming.
The comments of the majors and lieutenant colonel CGSC students cited in 
Chapter 3, Findings substantiate with anger and hostility the position of the research 
respondents regarding zero defects, OPTEMPO, health care and a lack of trust in Army
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leadership. The total package of the CGSC comments was so negative that the Army has 
yet to make it public in spite of FOI A requests from this researcher.
“Echelons Above Reality” and “Careerism”
These two terms are addressed by officer respondents and numerous literature 
citations. The term, “echelons above reality,” appears to be commonly used among 
junior officers to describe those in command and leadership positions normally at the 
brigade level (colonel) and above. The term identifies those who do not understand or 
cannot identify with the daily challenges and work load of those serving below them. 
Those who are so identified are considered to be part of the issue related to those leaders 
who are identified as being at an “echelon above reality.” “Careerism” is an unflattering 
term which describes a tendency or personal philosophy where taking care of one’s 
personal career and advancement becomes the top priority of an officer. Where self 
promotion and personal ambition are placed above the Army’s historical culture where 
leaders are expected to place the welfare of the soldiers and accomplishment o f the 
mission as first priority. Those identified as following a path of “careerism” are viewed 
as willing to sacrifice those below them if necessary to protect themselves from criticism 
and who place their greatest concern on what their superior thinks of them rather than 
what their subordinates think about them.
A spin-off of those identified as suffering from “careerism” is the phrase “looking 
good - not being good.” This refers to the activity of expending inordinate efforts to 
make things appear to be in good shape when they are not. It is a form of telling a lie. 
Some would call it a “cover-up.” One of the common methods of “looking good” is the 
orchestrating of visits by higher leaders to insure that only the brightest soldiers who will
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not say anything detrimental are visible to the visitors. The visiting leaders are normally 
followed by a high ranking entourage that discourages personnel in the unit being visited 
to identify problems that may exist. The concept of providing only good news rather than 
a complete assessment if  problems exist is part of the “looking good -  not being good” 
condition. Reflecting training records that indicate a higher level of individual and crew 
expertise is also part of this condition. The bottom line is that extra efforts are expended 
to orchestrate a façade where only good things are evident and problems are hidden. A 
great example is the visit of President Clinton to the Army brigade in Baumholder, 
Germany. In order to make the installation appear to be in better condition that it was, 
only the sides of buildings that would be visible to President Clinton were painted while 
the sides not visible were left with peeling paint and cracks. From the perspective of 
many, an opportunity was missed to seek additional funding support from the President 
for building maintenance. Instead, the decision was made to make things appear in top 
notch condition when in actuality they were not. Thus, things were “looking good, not 
being good.”
Trust Remains Essential 
As cited extensively in Chapter I, Introduction and Literature Review, trust, 
candor and a two-way communication process are essential to the success of any 
organization. Warren Bennis, in a number of publications, cited extensively in Chapter 1, 
identifies trust as “the glue that maintains organizational integrity,” “the lubrication that 
makes it possible for organizations to work,” “integrity is the basis of trust” and “trust, o f  
course, cannot be acquired, but can only be given.” A host of Army publications as well 
as numerous other scholars in the leadership, communication and cultural diversity
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disciplines cited in Chapter I all point toward integrity and trust as essential elements of 
any successful organization. Conversely, they address the lack of such trust within an 
organization as resulting in a leaderless, foundering entity.
This research and the resultant findings from both the interview of a 
representative sample of officers as well as the CGSC Class of 2000 commentaries 
indicate that an unsatisfactory perception of trust in Army leadership exists with the 
Army Officer Corps at least through Spring 2000. There are no indications, as a result o f 
reviewing literature since that time, nor has any major improvement in officer retention 
rates occurred that may signal that a reversal of the trust issue has occurred. Instead, one 
could contend that negative indicators actually depict a worsening of morale and 
therefore trust in leadership by the increase to 16% of captains resigning in FY2000 
compared to 11% in 1998 and 9% in 1988 (Army Research Institute briefing, October 
2000) as well as the alarming level of declinations of command at the battalion (LTC) 
and brigade (COL) levels which totaled 36, 51 and 55 for FY 98, 99 and 00 respectively 
compared to only one declination annually in FY92, 93 and 94 respectively. ODCSPER 
(Office of Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel) briefing, 19 Oct 2000). The two briefings 
addressed above reflect evidence that little progress has been made in reversing a low 
level of morale, job satisfaction and ultimately trust in leadership.
It is reasonable to assume, based upon both this research as well as the continued 
retention and command declination difficulties cited above, that the theory that trust 
remains as an absolutely essential ingredient to any successful organization, that premise 
is just as relevant today as at any time in the past.
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The research contained in this dissertation supports the theory that a command 
climate created by a leadership that is perceived to be out of touch can become the 
catalyst for degradation in the trust of leadership by organizational members. Functional 
shortfalls in areas such as health care, historical events such as the drawdown of the 
Army, Gulf War health issues and reductions in benefits as well as daily challenges o f 
dealing with women issues, a zero defects mentality and excessive operational tempo can, 
when encountered as a group, result in expectations not being met, low morale and 
retention challenges. Such a situation existed in the Army of 1999 and 2000 as identified 
by this research. There is no popular evidence that improvements of any consequence in 
morale, trust of leadership or retention has occurred to date.
Recommendations for Future Research 
It is recommended that a follow-on research effort similar to this research be 
undertaken. An excellent case could be made regarding the benefits of returning to the 
same division installation with the same basic array of questions, though several, such as 
REDUX, GWS and downsizing, could be eliminated as historically irrelevant. Areas to 
be added should be trust in the inoculation plan/process, assessment of deployment pace 
and its future, need for a larger Army strength and, perhaps most important, intent to stay 
or leave the Army and the reasons for both decisions. When one considers the 
OPTEMPO of the late 1990’s as the primary dissatisfier of the times, it may be assumed 
that with Iraq and Afghanistan added to the mission array, OPTEMPO remains and will 
remain the dissatisfier driving the exodus rate. There may be value, if time and resources 
allow, to conduct this research at a division post preparing to depart for Iraq and one ju st 
returned. The views from these two perspectives may be significantly different because
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looking back at a one-year deployment through the eyes of experience versus the 
anticipation of going on a mission you are well trained for may differ in some interesting 
ways.
Additionally, with the significant employment of both Reserve and National 
Guard divisions, brigades and lesser size units, one may find this same research to be 
very valuable in the Reserve and National Guard forces.
Recommendations to the Armv leadership
The following recommendations, garnered both from the data presented in this 
dissertation and from my personal experience in the Army are presented as steps to 
address the problems raised here.
1. Retention of junior officers, especially captains and lieutenants, has been and 
remains a critical challenge for the Army. The Army has a considerable investment in 
these young leaders. Many of the causes for their early departure are documented in this 
research. Command climate and trust in leadership are both basic causative factors 
related to the many issues that result in early departures of quality officers. The leaders 
on the ground at both battalion and brigade level are the “hands on” mentors who through 
continuous dialog and communication are able to keep officers and their spouses content 
enough to retain them.
I recommend that all Officer Efficiency Reports for both battalion and brigade 
commanders have a mandated entry that reflects the number of lieutenants and captains 
who resign as well as the number of such officers assigned and on the OER rating 
scheme. Commanders are very competitive. They respond to challenges that compare 
them with one another. Competition against peers is an important element in determining
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who will make it to general officer rank. It is time to be bold and innovative in order to 
resolve the retention challenge. As a result of Department of Army interest, many of the 
elements of the morale/command climate/trust equation will be resolved because 
commanders on the ground will be forced to resolve them in order to keep their retention 
numbers high.
2. The Army, as policy, should return to unannounced maintenance. Inspector 
General, and other functional area inspections rather than the current policy of providing 
advanced notice. Unannounced inspections provide a far greater opportunity to view a 
unit or organization as it actually exists on a day-to-day basis. Not only does this type o f 
inspection provide a clearer picture of reality, it also eliminates the many preparatory 
hours and efforts dedicated to arriving at a one-day peak that is not a true reflection of 
day-to-day status. From a soldier’s perspective, meeting higher standards on a daily basis 
rather than surging, not only generates higher readiness, it depicts a level of honesty that 
is preferred. The soldiers are the first to know when a unit distorts its true level of 
readiness.
3. As part of all inspections, inspectors should insure that a specific minimum 
number of one-on-one confidential interviews are conducted with officers, non­
commissioned officers and enlisted soldiers. That is a key method in obtaining an 
accurate picture of morale and unit cohesiveness. Leaders from the unit being visited 
must not be part of an entourage that may discourage an open communication channel 
between inspectors and unit personnel.
4. When senior leaders, both military and civilian, visit an installation, planned 
activities aimed at providing soldiers an opportunity to speak candidly should occur. The
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typical orchestrated visits in today’s Army culture are oftentimes carmed and productions 
where only the brightest and best soldiers are permitted near the visiting dignitaries. If 
the leadership is interested in determining true reality, they must establish a mechanism 
whereby one-on-one interviews with randomly selected soldiers are conducted.
5. Command tours at all levels starting at platoon and company must be longer. 
Platoon and company tours should be a minimum of 18 months. Battalion and brigade 
tours should be a minimum of 30 months. Assistant division commander and division 
commander assignments should be at a minimum two and three years respectively.
Those levels of longevity will not only develop a more qualified leader but, more 
importantly, they will provide a level of stability for soldiers who are currently watching 
a constant change of both leaders and command climate as every new commander 
charges in with only a short time frame to make his mark. Soldiers suffer under the 
current short command system. The move to longer periods of command should fit well 
with the new command track where the Army identifies those best suited to command 
and then provides ample opportunity to truly develop skill, maturity and experience.
6. The Army should implement as policy a series of evaluations and inspections 
during the last month of a command tour aimed at assessing the actual status of the unit. 
Such an evaluation should include focus group discussions and one-on-one interviews by 
evaluators. This inspection philosophy should validate the long-term status o f personnel 
and maintenance readiness as well as levels of crew training, morale and deployment 
capabilities.
7. With Army Reserve and National Guard units now a total partner to the active 
Army, the same recommendations cited above are applicable to these important
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components. The days of the “week-end warrior” have passed. A totally combat ready 
and deployable reserve component is essential to carrying out the national interest. 
Professional inspection and evaluation teams staffed with quality officers and non­
commissioned officers is a costly but essential application of resources. It is a cost that 
must be accepted.
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HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION:___________  MAJOR STUDY:
GENDER:_________  RACE:  AGE: _
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IF NOT, WHY NOT? ~
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WRITTEN CONSENT FORM 
OFFICER TRUST IN ARMY LEADERSHIP
Dear Study Participant:
My name is Bob Schloesser. I am a Ph.D. student at the University o f  Oklahoma. The subject o f  
my doctoral research is “Officer Trust in Army leadership.” Obviously, that is a controversial, but from my 
perspective, a relevant subject for today’s Army. It is worth noting that I am a retired 06 and currently 
work for the Department o f Army as a civilian.
As part o f this study, you are being asked to participate in an in-depth, one-on-one interview with 
me. I will be asking for your military background and experiences as well as your views on this study topic 
with emphasis on command climate, readiness, honesty and ethics, zero defects, medical care, 
deployments, retirement and other issues where Army leadership plays a role as your advocate.
My goal is to analyze the materials from a number o f interviews in order to understand what the 
perceptions o f the Army Officer Corps are regarding levels o f trust in Army leadership. The results o f  my 
study will be summarized in my dissertation along with vignettes/stories/experiences gained from the 
interviews that illustrate the issues. I may use portions o f  the interviews in journal articles and/or 
presentations to interested groups. I may wish to use the material as the basis for a book.
Each interview will be audio taped by the researcher and later transcribed by my wife into a 
verbatim manuscript. For your protection, the following procedures will be followed: 1. Before any o f the 
material is used, I will provide you a copy in order that you may review it for accuracy. 2. Confidentiality 
will be assured in that your name, unit or names o f persons in your unit will never be identified in either 
written or oral presentations developed as a result o f this research. Transcripts will be typed using only 
initials for names, and in final form the interview material will use pseudonyms.
You may withdraw at any time from the interview process. In signing this form, you are also 
assuring me that you will make no financial claims for the use o f the material in your interviews. You are 
also agreeing that you will not make any claims for medical treatment should any physical injury result 
from participating in these interviews.
I ,________________________________ , have read the statement above and agree to participate as
an interviewee under the conditions stated above.
Signature o f Participant
Signature o f  Interviewer
(Date)
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Interview Question Framework  
(Officer trust In the leadership of the United States Army)
1) General History/Background:
Tell me about your entry into the Army. When was it? How were you 
commissioned? Where did you go to college? What made you decide on entering the 
Army? What is your branch? What assignments have you had? What do you do in your 
unit? Do you intend to make the Amy a career? Do you have a wife? Children? Are 
they here with you in Germany?
2) Downsizing:
Are you familiar with the term downsizing or rightsizing? Did you know any 
officers who left the Army early because of it? Or were forced out? Do you have any 
fear of being effected if further reductions occur?
3) Zero defects environment:
Are you familiar with the term zero defects? Does it exist anywhere in your chain 
of command? Does it have any impact on you or your unit? If it does, give some 
examples. Are mistakes considered part of the learning process? Are you permitted to 
make decisions?
4) Women in the military:
Are there women in your unit? What is your opinion of them as soldiers? Do the 
men and women work together in harmony? Do the women get treated in the same 
manner as the men?
5) New missions/deployment:
When did you deploy last? For how long and to where? Had you or your unit 
deployed previously? When and for how long? Does your unit have enough to do? Do 
you have enough soldiers and enough time to keep trained in combat skills? To keep 
your equipment fully operational? Do deployments have any impact upon unit readiness? 
Does the unit see deployments as a quality training and skills developer? Is there any 
increase in family problems due to deployments?
6) Reduced health/dental care:
Are you satisfied with the health and dental care in the Army? Does your wife 
and children receive quality care? Is health care as good as in the States?
7) Reduced retirement:
What retirement plan are you eligible for? Is it a good plan? Is it worth staying in 
the Army for? Is it what you expected when you entered the Army?
8) Gulf War syndrome:
Did you serve in the Gulf? Are you familiar with the controversy regarding sick 
Gulf veterans and the difficulty of pinpointing the cause of illness? If so, what are your 
perceptions of the Army’s role in helping ill soldiers? Do you have any friends who
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became ill after serving in the Gulf? Tell me about them.
9) Personnel and parts shortages;
Is your unit up to strength? Has it been? Are all of your vehicles operational?
Are the parts, the time and the expertise available to keep everything operational? Do 
unit readiness reports look good? Are they accurate?
10) Inconsistent discipline revelations:
Are you familiar with the Aberdeen sexual harassment and assault court martial, 
the Command Sergeant Major McKinney trial and the Major General Hale controversy? 
What do you think about the way these three issues were handled?
11) Do more with less:
Do you have enough equipment, material and people to get your unit’s mission 
completed and stay combat ready? Are you and your unit ready to deploy and go into 
sustained combat operations? Is the OPTEMPO (pace of operations) faster or slower 
than a year ago? Two years ago? Is morale high?
12) Officer perceptions:
What do you think about today’s Army leadership? Do you feel they are concerned 
about the troops? Do they do what they say? Do they have a good feel for what is going 
on in your unit and others like it? Do you feel that Army leadership tells it like it is to the 
Army and to the Congress? What do you think about the new OER? Is it good for you? 
For the Army? Have you been counseled yet? What do you think about the emphasis on 
the seven core values? What is the emphasis on them in your unit? Does everyone in 
your chain of command demonstrate them? Do you feel comfortable in reporting 
mistakes or problems up the chain of command? Is your unit as good as it looks? Are 
you going to stay in the Army for a career? Why? What does your wife think about that? 
Would you recommend the Army as a career to a family member or friend?
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RESPONSE ASSESSMENT FORM 
OFFICER TRUST IN ARMY LEADERSHIP 
Responses to Issue;
Officer
Code
Pos Neg Neu Key Words and Phrases
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